A new development has emerged in the曲折 ceasefire negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. On May 14, Russia announced the list of delegations for the Turkey-Ukraine-Russia talks, but Putin was not on the list. Subsequently, the United States announced that Trump would also not attend the meeting in Istanbul. Earlier, Putin proposed to restart direct negotiations unconditionally in Istanbul, Turkey on May 15, and mentioned that some new ceasefire proposals might be reached during the negotiations. In response, Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine expected a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire to begin on May 12, and he would "wait" for Putin in Turkey. Facing this "cross-border call," Trump, while on his way to the Middle East, said that if Putin attended, he would also go to Turkey to participate in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations. What are the real positions of Russia, Ukraine, the United States, Europe, and other parties regarding the ceasefire negotiations? What are their respective conditions? Additionally, after Russia recently concluded its Victory Day parade, what valuable experiences have been gained in the construction of its military industry after more than three years of conflict? Observer Network interviewed Vasily Kashin, director of the Center for European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, and military expert, who shared his views on these issues for readers' reference. [Compiled/Observer Network Guo Han] Observer Network: Regarding the ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, there are some changes in President Trump's stance. Earlier, he expressed slight disappointment, suspecting that Putin may not want to stop the war and is just pretending, and if no agreement is reached, it will be "Russia's fault," and he plans to impose secondary tariffs on Russian oil exports. How do you view the current deadlock in the negotiations? Vasily Kashin: I don't think the negotiations have completely broken down. Both sides still have a strong willingness to reach an agreement. Trump needs this ceasefire agreement to achieve two major goals: first, to reduce defense spending (with a long-term plan to reduce by 40% over eight years), and second, to concentrate a large amount of military resources in Asia to contain China. Compared to his predecessors, Trump believes that the conflict in Ukraine has brought little benefit to the United States. Since Ukraine's failed counteroffensive in 2023, even the Biden administration has realized that they are gradually heading toward failure. Trump assesses the situation more pessimistically, so he needs to promote a ceasefire. However, this is a very complex agreement that involves not only Russia and the U.S., but also Europe and Ukraine. The latter actually does not truly wish to reach a ceasefire agreement. For personal reasons, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy hopes to continue the war, because once a ceasefire is achieved, Ukraine will hold elections, and he will inevitably lose. Europe also needs this proxy war against Russia to continue in order to serve several important political goals, including internal reforms within the EU, suppressing extreme opposition in European politics, etc. For example, what happened in the Romanian election earlier. An "extreme right-wing" candidate won the first round of the election. Then, the EU side accused that candidate of receiving support from Russia without evidence and canceled his eligibility to run. This fully exposes their operating mechanism. The process of ceasefire negotiations will undoubtedly be difficult, and we can expect that Ukraine will do everything possible to try to destroy the agreement. However, both Russia and the U.S. will continue dialogue. Over time, the positions of Europe and Ukraine will also begin to change because they clearly understand that they cannot confront Russia alone after losing U.S. support. Therefore, I believe that there is a possibility of reaching a ceasefire agreement this year (even within the next few months). Of course, there will be setbacks along the way, such as statements about imposing additional tariffs, etc. Observer Network: In this war, artificial intelligence and low-cost drone technology have been widely used in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. What impact have they had on contemporary military balance? Vasily Kashin: The use of FPV (First Person View) suicide drones has completely transformed the tactical nature of warfare. Since the second half of 2023, FPV drones began to be massively deployed in the Ukraine conflict (previously only in small-scale use), which means that densely gathering troops on the battlefield has become extremely dangerous. Both sides are massively using drones, even deploying thousands in a few days, using them like artillery shells, leading to a sharp increase in the damage rate of combat vehicles. An image showing a Russian soldier operating a Supercam drone during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Visual China. The Russian side has achieved independent production of drones, while the Ukrainian side mainly assembles Western-provided components. The next phase of the evolution of drone technology will exclude human operators and achieve autonomous identification and attack through the application of artificial intelligence. This will bring new operational capability improvements because such intelligent drones are better suited to resist electronic warfare interference and are more efficient. Some of the cruise missiles currently used by Russia are equipped with AI image recognition technology and have had a significant impact. I believe that the widespread use of lethal weapons platforms controlled by AI is an inevitable trend, and the "Pandora's box" has already been opened. Such trends will inevitably spread, and some ground autonomous combat platforms and heavy drones are also being tested. Another major impact of AI is seen in intelligence processing. Nowadays, armies can quickly collect and process data through space-based reconnaissance systems, which changes the nature of warfare. Because even large-scale troop concentrations far behind the front lines will be rapidly targeted by artillery or missile strikes once located by satellite intelligence (either electronic or optical imaging reconnaissance). This changes everything. Currently, the only feasible countermeasure is to shoot down the enemy's satellites, but this will trigger serious escalation of the war. The development of space reconnaissance capabilities is fundamentally changing the nature of warfare. Observer Network: Regarding great power博弈 around Central Asia, the U.S. has promoted the "C5+1" diplomatic mechanism, Russia has established a security framework based on the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and China has advanced energy, infrastructure, and other projects through the "Belt and Road" initiative. How do you evaluate the choices made by Central Asian countries facing great power博弈? If the U.S. attempts to replicate the Ukraine proxy war model in Central Asia, how should China and Russia respond? Vasily Kashin: At present, the likelihood of such a scenario occurring is relatively low. Central Asian countries have shown high rationality and maturity on the international stage. They are indeed good at utilizing contradictions and competition among major powers to seek benefits for themselves, but they avoid joining any military alliances and are well aware of the risks of disrupting relations with China and Russia. The only country in Central Asia with some internal stability and ethnic unity issues is Kazakhstan, which mainly depends on the nature of Kazakhstan's domestic politics, but the situation has eased significantly compared to the past. Central Asian countries differ from Ukraine in that they generally actively resist external forces. Regarding Russia's "Greater Eurasian Partnership Initiative," its core proposition in the security domain is that matters concerning Eurasia should be resolved by Eurasian countries themselves, without interference from the U.S. and the EU. Only the countries and nations living in this region have the right to decide their own future. Russia proposes establishing a network of security arrangements among these countries and different country groups, where the relationships between countries should be equal, constructive, and inclusive. We should gradually unite under these arrangements, integrate, and create a new order structure. Observer Network: Earlier in March, during their phone conversation, Putin and President Trump agreed to strengthen dialogue on nuclear arms control and strategic stability. Trump also mentioned inviting China to join relevant negotiations. What is Russia's position on this issue? Vasily Kashin: I believe there may be some misunderstandings and incorrect statements on the American side. Russia has never agreed to invite China to join relevant negotiations. Russia's position is: if the U.S. wishes China to participate in negotiations, this should be a bilateral issue between China and the U.S. If China does not wish to participate, Russia will not do anything for the U.S. At the same time, Russia demands that U.S. military allies, such as the UK and France, also participate in arms control negotiations because they have joint nuclear programs with the U.S. This is a reasonable demand. But considering that all parties are upgrading their nuclear arsenals, substantive negotiations are difficult to advance. Image: A screenshot of an intercontinental ballistic missile launch during Russia's strategic nuclear forces exercise on October 29, 2024. Our understanding is that Trump now wants to discuss nuclear arms control because he wants to buy time for the U.S. to develop a larger strategic plan. First, Trump wants to build a massive missile defense system, which he calls the "Golden Dome"; simultaneously, he aims to negotiate reductions in nuclear arsenals, which will completely destroy strategic stability between Russia, China, and the U.S. Secondly, due to neglect over many years, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is in a very poor state of maintenance, lacking the ability for rapid response and large-scale production of nuclear warheads and launchers. Therefore, the U.S. needs time to expand its nuclear arsenal, with the ultimate goal of establishing nuclear superiority to simultaneously counter and overwhelm China and Russia. This thinking is clearly outlined in the U.S. Strategic Posture Report released in 2023. Observer Network: Could you share with Chinese readers the experiences and lessons learned by Russia's military-industrial complex during this conflict? To what extent do you think Russia's cooperation with countries like North Korea and Iran in the military field will deepen? Vasily Kashin: First, our experience is that we need to restructure Russia's military-industrial complex to provide the armed forces with the weapons needed for enduring high-intensity conflicts (which means suffering significant losses). This requires building a highly efficient economic and manpower mobilization system focused on mass production. The wider the military system expands, the greater the need for large-scale production capabilities of usable weapons, and these need to be maintained in the long term. Secondly, we need to rethink the construction ideas of certain fields in wartime economies. Now, there is a very inexpensive weapon called a remote attack drone, and attacking it with expensive surface-to-air missiles is not cost-effective. For example, Western air defense missiles range in price from tens of thousands to millions of dollars, whereas those drones might cost only two or three thousand dollars each. So, simply overwhelming the enemy's air defense system with cheap drones could bankrupt them. Additionally, we need to be flexible. During prolonged periods of peace or low-intensity conflicts, many technical standards and management regulations that have been in use for a long time make rapid innovation (such as changing the design of some ground vehicles and ships that have been certified) very difficult. This involves many bureaucratic processes and numerous testing phases, intended to ensure the safety and reliability of weapons. However, in wartime, these processes are less important than during peacetime. Wartime requires another set of management systems. Russia's military cooperation with North Korea and Iran will continue, bringing benefits to both sides. I believe that the Russian leadership is satisfied with the current state of cooperation. North Korea has the opportunity to gain some very important practical experience that will help enhance the combat capabilities of the Korean People's Army. Observer Network: You mentioned before that "China's military-industrial self-innovation has surpassed Russian design, but some elites in Russia still harbor doubts about Sino-Russian technological cooperation." What do you think are the obstacles in the current cooperation between the two countries? How does Russia position itself in its military cooperation with China? Vasily Kashin: First, we need to understand that the main problems facing defense technology cooperation between Russia and China today are largely at the level of mindset. In my opinion, both Russia and China hold extreme "technological nationalism" mindsets, to some extent even more backward than during the Cold War. For instance, whether during the Cold War or today, the U.S. relies on a vast network of partners. When competing with the U.S., it's not just against Americans but also against Japan (with significant military potential), Europe, Israel, South Korea, and others—countries with substantial military technological capabilities. They form a bloc. On the other hand, we know that China wants to achieve technological independence. When importing certain technologies, especially military technologies, this is often seen as a sign of backwardness and shame in China, and efforts are made to overcome this as soon as possible, achieving local production and original design. Russia is essentially doing the same thing, if not worse. Therefore, when the U.S. and dozens of developed countries engage in military cooperation, China and Russia are basically fighting separately. Although some cooperation occurs between them, it is not systematic, and trust levels are low. If they want to seriously compete with the U.S. and its allies, Russia and China need long-term deepened cooperation and must realize that they are mutually dependent on each other. I mentioned the Soviet Union as an example because even during the Cold War, the Soviet Union outsourced part of its military production to allies in the Warsaw Pact. For instance, the Soviet Union could not produce trainer aircraft themselves; they were produced by Czechoslovakia. Some ship models the Soviet Union could not manufacture either, relying instead on Poland and East Germany. There were many such cases. Despite the relatively smaller size of other Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet Union was willing to outsource production to them. Today, Russia and China are not yet ready to outsource production to each other in the military industry. More often, they are competing with each other to ensure their ability to independently produce and manufacture, and trust in joint research and development is low. To improve the current state of cooperation in the military industry, I believe both countries may need to make some major decisions because even China probably cannot face the U.S. and dozens of countries behind it alone. This article is an exclusive piece by Observer Network. The content purely reflects the author's personal views and does not necessarily represent the platform's views. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited, and legal action will be taken for violations. Follow Observer Network on WeChat (guanchacn) for daily interesting articles. 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