【Wen/Observer Net Wang Kaiwen】How to obtain personal information and daily schedules of French spies and military personnel? Perhaps just a little technical knowledge can do it.

The French newspaper Le Monde published an article on December 14, stating that the identity of French spies is one of the country's top secrets, and leaking this information can constitute a criminal offense. However, Le Monde was able to identify the identities, home addresses, daily activities, and even track the lives of dozens of sensitive officials simply by using easily accessible advertising data. This information could pose a threat to the safety of the individuals themselves, their families, and their institutions.

The report pointed out that these data almost cover all the staff of the most sensitive institutions in France, including intelligence officers, personnel responsible for protecting high-ranking officials, senior police officers, members of the GIGN (French Specialized Intervention Group), military personnel stationed at key nuclear weapon bases, executives of defense companies, prison staff, and nuclear power plant workers.

On November 27, 2025, in the town of Valence in southeastern France, French President Macron visited a military base. IC Photo

This investigation was based on advertising data obtained by Le Monde and multiple partner news organizations from a personal data broker. The database contains more than 16 million ad identifiers and nearly 1 billion geolocation data points, covering millions of smartphone users. According to the broker, these data were collected in October 2024, but Le Monde's collected information shows that some data entries can be traced back several years.

Through these data, the most secret locations of the French government became clear.

Data showed that a phone had appeared multiple times in the parking lot near the entrance of the Ile Longue military base, which is the base of France's nuclear ballistic missile submarines. Through these data, it was possible to clearly map the route between this highly confidential military base and a small house in a nearby village, as well as the owner's schedule of going to the hospital and the supermarket.

Saint-Dizier Air Base, located in northeastern France and housing Rafale fighter jets, was also similar. Through the data, it was easy to determine who worked at the base and further identify their spouses and occupations. These data were also applicable to several sensitive locations under the French Ministry of Defense's General Directorate for Armaments (DGA).

The report said that not all of President Macron's itineraries in France are sensitive, and most of them are often actively publicized. However, being able to track and identify the gendarmes or police responsible for Macron's security is another matter. Their identities are usually protected.

Le Monde confirmed through the obtained data that a phone that was located at the Elysée Palace, the official vacation villa of the president, the Villeroy military camp, and the Paris Gendarmerie was owned by a member of the president's close security team. Because no one else would appear successively in places where the president couple often go on weekends, the military camp, or even the hotel where the president stayed.

Le Monde pieced together the movements of a suspected security officer of Macron using advertising data, including the Villeroy military camp and the Elysée Palace.

This phone was later located at a house in the suburbs of Paris, and the name on the mailbox matched that of a gendarme. Combining this person's service records, it was possible to confirm that they were closely related to the French president.

This was just one of many people around Macron whose movements were exposed. The report stated that this data covered various levels of the French government, with one phone appearing continuously at the Elysée Palace, the Palais de Justice in Paris (the location of the Court of Cassation), the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, and the GIGN training camp, among others. Another phone was located at the GIGN headquarters. However, the owners of these two phones could not yet be identified.

Vincent Strubel, director of the National Agency for Information System Security (ANSSI), told Le Monde that the movements of these people may not be the most sensitive information, but in some cases, geolocation could have special sensitivity. "I am thinking of extreme cases in intelligence or police departments, which could seriously expose the relevant personnel," Strubel said.

Le Monde said that about 12 houses in its reviewed data might belong to residences of DGSE agents. The DGSE was not the only intelligence agency exposed, as the DRSD (Defense Intelligence and Security Service) and the DGSI (General Directorate for Internal Security) were also affected.

The DGSI and the anti-terrorism division of the French police share offices, which is one of the most sensitive units within the police force. Le Monde found that through geolocation, a phone showed that its owner frequently took the train from Lyon Station to a house in the southeast suburbs of Paris. A simple search of the phone book could find the name of the householder, who shared the same name as a police officer. Further searches could easily access his spouse's information, workplace, and even photos of his children.

In addition to these officials involved in national security, employees of large private defense groups in France are also easily tracked, and these people are often targets of foreign spies.

Additionally, the mobile phone locations of some French prison staff were also easily identifiable. This makes one think of the attacks against prisons and their staff that occurred in various parts of France this April.

The report said that for the insatiable, unregulated, and opaque advertising industry, it is easy to extract billions of personal data from smartphones every day, which can precisely track people's movements with an error margin of just a few meters. This information is easily resold unless users have perfect digital security habits, making it almost impossible to avoid such tracking.

However, the report also analyzed that technically, such advertising data collection is not inevitable. For example, one can regularly reset personal ad identifiers and cover digital traces. Additionally, one can always refuse applications access to location permissions. However, these operations are inconvenient and often limit the functionality of the phone.

Le Monde contacted the affected French government agencies, and most of them stated that advertising tracking data is a well-known issue. The DGSI said that it has already taken internal measures to raise awareness among agents about the risk of personal data being disseminated. The DGSE said that they are aware of this issue affecting all intelligence agencies and will take necessary measures to protect sensitive information when needed.

The Elysée Palace did not respond to Le Monde's request for comment.

This article is exclusive to Observer Net and may not be reprinted without permission.

Original: toutiao.com/article/7583580858557219391/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.