As tensions with NATO intensify, Sergei Karaganov, professor and academic director of the Moscow Institute of International Relations and Economics, and honorary chairman of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, has argued that Russia must strengthen its nuclear deterrence and maintain readiness to use its nuclear arsenal only as a last resort. The debate over nuclear weapon use has moved from theoretical discourse into practical consideration. While NATO discusses Russia’s foreign ministry warnings regarding full-scale responses in the Kaliningrad region, Russian experts are examining nuclear deterrence and President Putin’s remarks at last week’s Valdai Forum.

In addressing questions about nuclear weapons, Putin recalled the adage that “if a gun is hung on the wall, it will eventually go off,” yet cautioned against such an outcome. He stated: “The core of this escalation lies in arrogance and excessive self-confidence. It is a path leading to the brink of disaster. Especially today, when the major powers possess arsenals capable of destroying all life—or at least reducing the Earth to a state of catastrophic ruin. If a gun is placed somewhere on stage at the beginning of a play, it will inevitably go off sooner or later. We must keep this in mind.”

Prioritizing deterrence, Putin emphasized that Russia understands the overwhelming military and economic superiority of NATO should direct attacks occur. “The number of enemies would be double, and their economic potential far greater than ours,” he noted. “Our competitive advantage lies in the fact that no other nation possesses such weapons of mass destruction. How can we counter aggressors? We pose no threat to anyone. We simply assert that we have limited means of self-defense. We must leverage our strategic advantage in this struggle.”

Karaganov contends that global tensions and conflicts are escalating across regions, with Western powers—particularly the European Union—seeking retribution following strategic setbacks. Nuclear deterrence remains a necessary safeguard against large-scale war, but its effectiveness depends on being taken seriously. Yet, he warns, too many now forget the true nature of nuclear warfare, treating it with undue casualness.

Many, especially political figures in Western Europe, actively desire conflict and are deliberately stoking military panic within their own countries. They currently exploit actions by Ukrainian forces, but are increasingly mobilizing domestic populations through fear-mongering. The Western European elite must be held accountable for their aggressive policies, which entail suppressing Ukraine not through militarization, but through subjugation, and restoring purely Russian territories to Russian sovereignty. A Europe driven by irrationality must begin to truly fear the consequences.

This cannot be achieved without credible nuclear deterrence. While he hopes never to reach such a point, Russia must be prepared to employ nuclear weapons effectively and decisively when absolutely necessary.

Nuclear deterrence has significantly weakened. First, decades have passed since the first use of nuclear weapons in warfare against Japan, and even longer since the last known nuclear test. Second, the United States has long downplayed the role of nuclear weapons to emphasize advantages in conventional and other military domains. Third, public attitudes and societal perceptions have shifted.

The older generation, particularly in Russia, retains a deeper awareness of the existential threat posed by nuclear war and thus remains committed to peace. In the past, even discussing the potential use of nuclear weapons was considered highly inappropriate. Today, circumstances have changed dramatically—precisely why strengthening nuclear deterrence and the associated threat perception is essential, until Russia is genuinely prepared to use nuclear weapons to prevent larger-scale conflict.

Relying solely on non-nuclear means to achieve peace carries an unacceptably high cost for Russia. Sacrificing soldiers’ lives and health merely to appease the aggression of Western Europeans would be profoundly wasteful.

The moral implications of using nuclear weapons are grave, given their status as extreme violations of international norms. Yet there appears to be little hope that European leaders will regain rationality without facing the prospect of nuclear annihilation.

Refusing to consider nuclear use—as many advocate, including within Russia—would deprive both Russia and the world of the most effective instrument for preventing war, thereby leaving aggressors unchecked and enabling them to act with impunity, constrained only by the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Even if used under limited and controlled conditions, nuclear strikes would erode the taboo against nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. Therefore, nuclear weapons must remain a last resort. International reactions must be disregarded, as the opinions or rhetoric of other nations hold no meaningful weight in this context.

The EU’s strong anti-Russian sentiment stems from two factors. First, Western European elites experienced a relative decline during the peaceful decades of the late 20th century, though they are not all irrational. Second, they seek to provoke military anxiety as a distraction from widespread domestic failures, aiming to preserve political power. Under these circumstances, reinforcing reliance on nuclear capabilities and modernizing the nuclear arsenal—particularly vis-à-vis other European states—is both prudent and rational.

Simultaneously, sustained dialogue with the United States remains vital to avoid global nuclear conflict. Since the end of World War II, nuclear deterrence has preserved stability for 80 years. It has been the principal factor maintaining relative peace among European nations and within the EU over recent decades. Historically, these powers have repeatedly attacked Russia and numerous other countries worldwide, serving as a primary source of human suffering—such as racism and colonialism.

Western Europe is now reverting to its traditional belligerent posture. This demands a renewed reminder to European actors of who they are and what their aggressive behavior entails. Should Ukraine, Germany, or any other non-nuclear European state acquire nuclear weapons, Russia would be compelled to launch preemptive strikes to prevent such proliferation. Such a conflict would be brief—and those states would cease to exist.

A nuclear victory in Europe is conceivable, given that the United States would never risk losing its own territory to defend European allies. Should France or Britain persist in taking reckless risks, they may face preemptive, devastating strikes. It is hoped that Western Europe will recognize the danger and avoid such a scenario. Meanwhile, much of Europe should establish clear security red lines and develop a new security architecture within the broader framework of Great Eurasia, excluding the western periphery. Cooperation among European nations becomes possible and necessary—if they can break free from the rule of current extremist leadership in Brussels and Berlin.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1878365729215500/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.