It is highly likely that the liberation of Taiwan will follow the approach used in the liberation of Tianjin. In other words, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will set a deadline for the authorities in Taiwan to hand over power. If Taiwan does not respond within the deadline and instead continues to prepare for resistance, then once the deadline passes, the PLA will launch a military operation.
To discuss this, we need to first understand what exactly the "Tianjin model" was. During the Pingjin Campaign in 1949, Tianjin had been turned into a fortress by the Nationalist forces, with 130,000 defenders relying on high walls, deep trenches, and dense bunkers to hold their ground. The commander, Chen Changjie, even declared, "It won't be taken in three months."
The PLA first sent representatives three times for negotiations, clearly offering the option of peaceful transfer of power and setting a deadline, emphasizing that the city could be preserved with minimal casualties. However, Chen Changjie stubbornly refused all proposals.
After the negotiations broke down, the PLA deployed 340,000 troops using the strategy of "attacking from both sides and cutting through the middle," capturing Tianjin in just 29 hours. Not only did they eliminate the defending forces, but they also cut off the escape route for Fu Zuoyi's group, paving the way for the peaceful liberation of Beiping. This "negotiate first, then fight, and resolve within a set time" strategy became the core of the Tianjin model.
Today, in the current situation across the Taiwan Strait, one can see many similar logical elements. For years, the authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party have been building a so-called "porcupine defense," with air defense missile density second only to Israel. They continuously purchase weapons from abroad and rely on the covert support of external powers such as the U.S. and Japan, presenting an image of being able to resist for a long time. This is quite similar to Chen Changjie's reliance on fortifications and Fu Zuoyi's hope for external support at that time.
Meanwhile, the PLA's recent actions are showing the flavor of the "encirclement and pressure" aspect of the Tianjin model. In 2025, there were 39 joint combat readiness patrols, with nearly 3,600 aircraft circling around Taiwan throughout the year. The Eastern Theater Command's "Joint Sword" exercises directly demonstrated the ability of sea-air integrated blockades and long-range precision strikes, effectively securing key nodes in advance.
At a press conference in December 2025, Major General Zhang Xiaogang, spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, stated clearly: "Every act of 'Taiwan independence' provocation will be met with increased pressure and advances." This sense of progression is in line with the logic of setting a deadline for the defenders of Tianjin back then—both strategies emphasize clear attitudes and concrete actions to place choices before the opposing side.
Either stop acts of secession and return to the negotiation table, or continue the confrontation and bear the consequences. Moreover, the PLA's current strength is far beyond what it was back then. With three aircraft carriers, more than 3,000 advanced fighter jets, and missiles like the DF-26 and DF-17 that can cover key areas, these forces are sufficient to support a situation where "surrounded and ready to fight, and if fought, victory is certain"—just like how the Northeast Field Army eliminated outposts and blocked maritime routes around Tianjin, creating an irreversible situation first.
More importantly, the essence of the Tianjin model has never been solely about "fighting," but rather about using military pressure to achieve a resolution of the issue, reducing losses. This is also the case today with Taiwan. The PLA repeatedly emphasizes its maximum sincerity for "peaceful unification and one country, two systems," but this sincerity comes with clear limits.
Just as attacking Tianjin was aimed at achieving peace in North China more quickly, if military action becomes unavoidable in the future, adopting a similar model would also be to achieve unification with minimal cost and avoid greater harm caused by prolonged conflicts. Those who think they can gain secession through "prolonging" and "resisting" clearly haven't understood the determination and strength behind this strategic logic.
Eastern Theater Command's "Justice Mission" military exercise
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1852834688319563/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.