Why did the US release Dodik, handing over Europe's ailing heart to Russia?

October 2, 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin (right) briefly spoke with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, who denies genocide, after a meeting at the Valdai International Dialogue Club and Foreign Policy Experts in Sochi, a Black Sea resort in Russia (AP Photo)

On October 29, the United States unexpectedly lifted sanctions against Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader who denies genocide, marking an astonishing geopolitical reversal. Dodik has long been a Kremlin ally and has consistently undermined Bosnia's sovereignty. This decision contradicts the U.S.'s long-standing policy and coincides with Russia's direct contact with the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia.

Russia has long regarded Belgrade as the sole authority representing all Serbs in the region, but recently recognizing Dodik as the legitimate representative of the Serb population in Bosnia seriously undermines Serbia's authority.

The Trump administration unexpectedly lifted sanctions on Dodik as he was building a strategic relationship with Moscow, signaling a potential major deal between world powers and raising concerns about what Washington might have gained in exchange for effectively ceding half of Bosnia to a Russian sphere of influence.

An Unexplained Turnaround

The United States unexpectedly lifted sanctions on Dodik and his network, marking a sudden reversal of its long-standing policy without any explanation. For years, the U.S. had sanctioned Dodik for attempting to destabilize Bosnia, denying genocide, and pushing for Bosnia's division. Now removing him from the sanctions list seems to condone the denial of genocide in Bosnia and pave the way for its division.

This move created a clear contradiction in U.S. foreign policy.

Dodik is one of the most open allies of the Kremlin in Europe, openly promoting his relationship with Moscow and defending Russian interests. Yet, the U.S. imposes strict sanctions on many individuals and entities with far less connection to Russia than Dodik.

The inexplicable decision to lift sanctions on him reveals troubling contradictions in Washington's policy toward Russia, undermining the credibility of its broader sanction regime.

Explaining this shift based on Dodik's lobbying efforts is weak and unconvincing. It is estimated that Dodik's lobbying expenditures in the U.S. have grown two to three times the $3 million confirmed in 2017. However, compared to the massive funds spent by other countries and interest groups, his spending remains insignificant, and these groups have failed to achieve such a remarkable diplomatic victory.

Another theory about the change in U.S. policy relates to Bosnia's mineral resources, especially lithium. Previously, Dodik publicly stated on May 21, 2025, that he was willing to provide the mineral resources of the Republika Srpska to the U.S. in exchange for the U.S. recognizing the sovereignty of the Republika Srpska.

However, this theory has a logical flaw: if the U.S. main interest is lithium, maintaining sanctions would more directly control these resources without making any concessions to Dodik. The inadequacy of this explanation strongly suggests deeper, unknown geopolitical considerations behind it, raising concerns about the real cost of the U.S.'s sudden retreat.

Moscow's Control Over Serbia

For some time, Serbia has been distancing itself from Russia and moving closer to the West.

On August 29, 2024, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced a $3 billion deal with France to purchase 12 "Rafale" fighter jets, marking a shift toward Western security alliances for Belgrade.

In a joint press conference, French President Macron praised the agreement as "historic," commended Serbia's "strategic courage," and reaffirmed its European future. Moscow reacted strongly. In May 2025, Russia accused Serbia of selling weapons to Ukraine, calling it a betrayal of Moscow. Additionally, in July, the Kremlin condemned Belgrade for considering joining Western sanctions against Russia.

The day before the U.S. lifted sanctions on Dodik, he was not seeking cooperation with Washington but was in Minsk, warmly hugging Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Moscow's choice to meet with Dodik the day before the sanctions were lifted indicates a new Balkan strategy aimed at marginalizing Serbia.

Earlier in September, the Russian foreign minister called Dodik the "legitimately elected president" of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Now, however, the Russian foreign ministry website describes Dodik as the "leader of the Bosnian Serbs within Bosnia." This new terminology has multiple strategic implications and marks a clear shift in the geopolitical landscape.

First, it undermines Bosnia's sovereignty by asserting that Dodik's authority comes from national authorization rather than purely regional authorization.

Second, it directly challenges Serbia's ambitions – the idea of a "Serbian World" (Srpski svet) as a central protector of all Serbs – instead reinforcing Russia's claim as the ultimate arbiter of Serbian political affairs. Belgrade's "Serbian World" aligns with the Kremlin's "Russian World" (Ruski mir) theory, both aiming to unite ethnically and linguistically related populations under a transnational cultural identity. Ultimately, these ideologies aim to expand political influence and intervene in neighboring countries' affairs under the pretext of protecting their diasporas.

The most powerful signal of this shift comes from Dodik himself. He openly dismissed Vučić, bluntly stating that Belgrade has no authority over the Republika Srpska. Vučić responded, "Last night, I saw someone in Banja Luka say that people from Belgrade should not give orders to them."

For years, Serbia positioned itself as a paternal guardian of all Serbs, with the Republika Srpska operating firmly within its political sphere. Dodik's statement broke this situation, declaring that this Serb-majority entity now answers to another protector.

Moscow's actions openly undermined the relationship between Dodik and Vučić, weakening Serbia's strength. This shows that Russia will now directly engage with Bosnian separatists rather than the Serbian government. For Vučić, who tries to maintain ties with both Europe and Russia, this is the worst scenario. It proves that his influence is no longer necessary, and Russia is now acting through Banja Luka rather than Belgrade, significantly reducing Serbia's importance.

Moscow's Power Play: Annexing Europe's Ailing Heart

The U.S. decision to lift sanctions effectively allows Moscow to incorporate the Republika Srpska into its new territory. The era of indirect influence is over; the Bosnian entity is now directly ruled by the Kremlin, fundamentally changing the balance of power in Europe.

Russian military presence in the Balkans is also expanding. While Russia has unofficial bases in Serbia, it may now establish a base in Banja Luka, the actual capital of the Republika Srpska.

Bosnia is located in the center of Europe, and its shape resembles a heart. For 30 years, the EU had the opportunity to heal this ailing heart of Europe. However, the EU failed because deep-seated racism—anti-Islamophobia and anti-Russian fear—was rampant in its core. Now, the cost of this hatred is evident. Half of Europe's heart—half of Bosnia—is actually becoming Russia's new territory, allowing missiles to be launched more efficiently from this area than from Kaliningrad.

Global Chessboard: Did the US and Russia Reach an Understanding?

The U.S. sudden lifting of sanctions on Dodik, followed by his immediate collaboration with Lavrov, seems more like a carefully planned move on the global chessboard than a failure of U.S. policy. Lavrov's tactic of publicly supporting Dodik directly harms Belgrade's interests, sending a clear message to Serbia that its historical role as the main protector of Bosnian Serbs has ended. Through this new alliance, Moscow demonstrates that it controls the power core of the Republika Srpska and effectively reminds Serbia who truly controls the loyalty of its so-called "compatriots."

This power struggle exploits Serbia's fundamental and precarious dilemma. Serbia has always wavered between its economic and political aspirations to integrate into the EU and its deeply rooted historical, cultural, and religious ties. Lavrov's move tightens Russia's grip, forcing Belgrade to become more subservient to Russia.

This raises the most alarming theory: the U.S. tacit approval may be part of an unspoken deal between great powers. The timing and inconsistencies of the sanctions removal suggest that this is not a retreat, but a strategic transaction. Washington may have intentionally given up its influence in Bosnia, accepting Russia's expansion of its sphere of influence in the Balkans in exchange for strategic concessions from Moscow in other regions—perhaps regarding Ukraine, the Middle East, or elsewhere. This fits a disreputable historical pattern: great powers often neglect local commitments for their secret deals.

Unanswered Questions and Consequences

The U.S. sudden lifting of sanctions, followed by Dodik's immediate turn to Moscow, leaves a chilling unanswered question: What did Washington gain from it? Essentially, it handed over half of Bosnia to Russia's sphere of influence. This opaque transaction sacrifices decades of U.S. principles in the Balkans for an undisclosed geopolitical cost, damaging American credibility and the fragile Dayton Peace.

The consequences are evident: separatists grow bolder, the European situation becomes unstable, and a dangerous signal is sent that hard-won democratic norms are merely pawns in the new Great Game, leading to betrayals of allies and victories for adversaries.

Author: Esad Hrbeković, a Bosnian writer and analyst currently residing in Zurich, Switzerland.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7573004667244773894/

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