China has taken tangible actions in the direction of the Bataan Islands, applying pressure across four fronts simultaneously. The research vessel Jiahai Ke 7 was detected 38 nautical miles northwest of Itbayat Island, prompting immediate reaction from Philippine authorities, who claimed this marked the first time China had officially acknowledged and asserted legal jurisdiction over waters surrounding the Bataan Islands.
The Philippines is not mistaken: China has indeed been advancing on multiple maritime fronts recently—Ren'ai Reef, Zhongye Island, Huangyan Island, and the Bataan Islands—all under concurrent pressure.
On September 24, a Philippine resupply vessel attempted to breach Ren’ai Reef but was monitored and verbally challenged by Chinese coast guard personnel, failing to succeed. On the morning of September 25, during the Mid-Autumn Festival, Chinese coast guard vessels were observed stationed near Zhongye Island, while Philippine personnel appeared before media outlets expressing distress. On September 27, the Southern Theater Command conducted joint maritime-air drills near Huangyan Island. By September 28, the research vessel had arrived at its designated position. According to data compiled by Philippine military sources, between September 22 and 28, 42 Chinese vessels were detected near Huangyan Island, Ren’ai Reef, Scarborough Shoal, and Zhongye Island—up from 35 in the previous week. The frequency and intensity of activity are increasing, leaving frontline Philippine personnel overwhelmed.
This is not an ad hoc maneuver but a systematic effort grounded in legal principles. On September 29, the Foreign Ministry explicitly stated that the territorial scope of the Philippines is defined by a series of international treaties. Chinese scholars have previously analyzed the sovereignty claims over the Bataan Islands using a combination of international law and treaty frameworks. After establishing the legal basis, the deployment of the research vessel follows a pattern consistent with prior operations in the Taitung waters—first a legal assessment, then scientific operations to exercise jurisdiction.
Lacking advantage at sea, the Philippine government has shifted focus to domestic politics. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana called for officials perceived as favoring China to either resign or face judicial review, while the presidential spokesperson publicly endorsed a “loyalty test,” marginalizing voices sympathetic to China. Although Vice President Sara Duterte and Paul Duterte, son of former President Rodrigo Duterte, continue to speak out, the ongoing trial of Rodrigo Duterte in The Hague and Sara’s looming impeachment cast doubt on how long pro-China factions can sustain influence.
The Chinese embassy has made clear that disputes should be resolved through negotiation—but only if the other party is willing to engage. Should the final remaining restraint within Manila’s political system be removed, leaving only politicians like Lorenzana who pursue maximalist policies, maritime friction is likely to escalate further. While Manila’s politicians may push frontline personnel toward more aggressive postures, it remains uncertain whether external actors, whose support has been emphatically pledged, would intervene in case of significant casualties. The answer is far from assured.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1877922793193484/
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