[By Stephen Peter Rosen, translated by Guo Han of Observer Network]

The United States is engaged in a heated discussion about the future of its relationships with European and Asian allies. This debate is highly emotional, partly because it has been framed as a moral allegory. Supporters of Trump's "America First" agenda argue that allies neither appreciate American protection nor deserve continued safeguarding, criticizing these countries for doing insufficiently in terms of self-defense and shared values. Those who advocate for maintaining the existing alliance system assert that the U.S. must honor its commitments to support brave Ukrainians and Europeans in confronting a revanchist Russia.

However, the original intent behind America's post-war global military deployment was not rooted in moral narratives. The containment strategy, which serves as the cornerstone of America's current strategy, is fundamentally based on realistic considerations regarding how to defend core national interests. The focus of the current debate should be on whether the underlying logic supporting this strategy remains as effective as it was 75 years ago. The answer is clearly no. While measures taken by the U.S. can be debated, any action needs to be grounded in reality.

1983, U.S. tanks participate in NATO’s "Excellent Shooter 83" large-scale military exercise in West Germany [File Photo]

The background of the alliance system established in the 1950s was that the distribution of global economic power determined that defending Europe and Japan had significant strategic importance for the U.S. To deter potential attacks and effectively defend allies, the U.S. had to deploy forces at the forefront of the Eurasian continent. This defensive layout was not based on strategic or diplomatic policy considerations but built on military strength, forming binding commitments. The deployment during the Cold War and related commitments were reasonable — they stemmed from both the economic value of Europe and Japan to the U.S. and the ability of the U.S. military to safely deploy close to the enemy’s frontier.

The world after the Cold War has undergone fundamental changes. Although the U.S. still accounts for approximately 26% of global GDP based on current exchange rates, this figure has dropped to 17% according to purchasing power parity (PPP). The combined share of Europe and Japan in global GDP has even fallen by half.

In terms of military technology, the proliferation of short-range drones and long-range precision strike weapons has placed U.S. forward-deployed military bases closer to adversaries under unprecedented conventional weapons threats. More critically, the U.S. now faces security threats beyond traditional intercontinental nuclear/conventional missiles, extending into non-traditional areas such as cyber warfare, drones, biochemical weapons, as well as covert sabotage targeting critical infrastructure and personnel.

The evolution of the global economic power distribution and military technology landscape does not negate the value of U.S. allies, nor does it mean the U.S. must abandon its global military presence. However, it does require adjustments to the composition and deployment patterns of military forces, balancing enhanced homeland defense with necessary overseas operational capabilities. Specifically, the U.S. military needs to conduct more operations from bases in the Western Hemisphere and space, better protecting its own forces.

Starting from bases in the Western Hemisphere and space platforms, the U.S. military can maintain global deployments to counter opponents in Asia and Europe. Past experiences indicate that it is almost impossible to predict where the U.S. will fight in the future, so the reasonable approach is to build a long-range combat system capable of global strikes. The U.S. also needs to develop forces that can quickly deploy to the enemy's frontline and possess survivability.

Recently, media reported that Trump is requesting the military to develop a "Golden Dome" anti-missile system capable of intercepting 100% of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles.

This new strategic posture of the "Shield of the Western Hemisphere" can effectively address emerging security threats while maintaining coercive deterrence against opponents and allowing the U.S. military to strike targets globally. The transition toward this deployment must proceed gradually: deepening cooperation with new security partners like Finland and Sweden, while repairing relations with traditional allies such as Japan and the Philippines. Ultimately, U.S. defense will be based on a military system依托 domestic bases and near-Earth orbit.

New Economic Powerhouses

Since the mid-twentieth century, a basic assumption in U.S. defense strategy research circles has been that multiple industrial powers exist on the Eurasian continent. In 1947, U.S. diplomat George Kennan explicitly stated that there are five major industrial centers in the world — the U.S., Britain, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. During the 1920s and 1930s when Kennan began his career, Western European countries likely accounted for around 30% of global GDP. Following this logic, if any hostile force on the Eurasian continent controlled any one of these industrial centers, it would endanger U.S. security. This explains why the U.S. focused on the defense of Europe and Japan after World War II.

However, Europe's economic status has continued to decline. In a 1988 study titled "Future Security Environment," Andrew Marshall and Charles Wolf analyzed the impact of emerging geopolitical trends on defense construction and predicted that by 2010, the European Community's share of global GDP would slightly drop from 25% to 22%, while Japan would maintain its 13% share (as of 1988). That report forecasted that together, Europe and Japan would account for about one-third of global GDP by 2010.

The reality fell far short of this prediction. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), calculated using purchasing power parity (PPP), by 2024, the EU's global GDP share had fallen to 14%, far below the predicted 22%; Japan's situation was worse, sliding from its peak of 14% in the mid-1990s to 3%.

Changes in the global share of GDP among China (blue), the U.S. (orange), and the EU (red) since 1980, based on purchasing power parity [Source: IMF]

In other words, since the end of the Cold War, the global economic share of Europe and Japan, two of the traditional five industrial centers, has dropped from 34% to 17%, a nearly halving of their influence. If calculated based on real exchange rates, the decline would be even greater, but in the field of national security, the purchasing power parity index (PPP) is more relevant.

By contrast, over the past 34 years since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.'s global share of the economy has remained largely stable, while China's share has risen from 1.8% to 18-19%, increasing tenfold.

Growth trends in productivity show that the gap between Europe/Japan and the U.S. will continue to widen. From 1950 to 2000, France, Germany, Japan, and the UK gradually narrowed the gap in unit labor output compared to the U.S. However, from 2000 to 2019, Japan and the UK experienced stagnation in productivity growth, and Germany failed to narrow the gap with the U.S. Data from 2019 to 2024 shows that Japan's productivity remains stagnant, while the U.S.'s relative advantage over the EU in productivity continues to expand. A 2024 report from the European Central Bank indicates that over the past five years, the U.S.'s hourly labor productivity growth in services has exceeded 12%, while the Eurozone's growth was less than 4%.

Regarding future economic growth distribution, artificial intelligence (AI) is widely considered a transformative general-purpose technology field that will reshape economies worldwide. Jeffrey Ding, a political scientist at George Washington University, presents data in his 2024 book, "Technology and the Rise of Superpowers: How Diffusion Shapes Economic Competition," indicating that the number and quality of engineers engaged in AI research will determine the direction of the Fourth Industrial Revolution driven by AI. The book ranks universities worldwide based on their AI research resources. Among the top 50 universities, 32 are from the U.S. and Canada, seven from China, one from the UK, three from the EU, and none from Japan. Therefore, the ongoing revolution in data analysis is unlikely to reverse the trend of Europe and Japan's continuous decline in global economic shares.

The Dilemma of Precision Strike Weapons

While facing economic decline, Europe and Japan also face more severe defense challenges. The 1988 study mentioned earlier revealed that the development of digital information technology in the 1980s and 1990s led to the rise of precision strike weapon systems. These weapons can accurately strike a large number of fixed or mobile targets, with range no longer being a concern. This means that the model formed in the early years of the Cold War — deploying U.S. forces in fixed military bases near China and Russia — now faces an increased threat of long-range and short-range conventional precision-guided strikes.

The U.S. defense strategy community generally agrees on how to reduce the threats faced by U.S. forces: by increasing the number of fixed military bases and dispersing forces among them. These forces must learn to remain concealed and mobile, or hide in underground facilities equipped with air defense systems such as Patriot and land-based Aegis, which the U.S. is transferring to Israel, Poland, and Ukraine. Strategic experts also agree that highly mobile, dispersed, protected, and camouflaged U.S. forces should be deployed to what are called "complex terrains" — urban areas, jungles, or mountains — to better conceal themselves.

A U.S. Marine Corps High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) vehicle being loaded onto a C-17 transport aircraft during a rapid deployment exercise at Kadena Air Base in Japan. [Social Media]

The problem is that all solutions require substantial resources and, more importantly, permission to enter (often) densely populated urban areas. Meanwhile, the U.S. also faces pressure to modernize its nuclear triad, protect critical domestic infrastructure from conventional/non-conventional attacks, and safeguard space assets. This means building satellites capable of detecting incoming attacks and possessing evasion capabilities, or satellites that can withstand attacks and remain hidden to avoid detection, along with ground station facilities that connect and support satellite networks.

These tasks are not optional: without reliable nuclear deterrence, secure domestic bases, and space capabilities, the U.S. military cannot operate. Under fiscal pressures, the U.S. cannot simultaneously meet these core defense needs and take measures to protect forces deployed at the forefront of Eurasia.

Facing this security dilemma, Washington indeed has another option: redeploying main forces back to bases in the U.S. or the Western Hemisphere, from where operations can be conducted. The logic is simple: targets located in the U.S. homeland or within the Western Hemisphere are easier to defend than those closer to the surrounding areas. Longer-range strike weapons require more fuel and larger volumes, making them easier to detect and intercept. Stealth design can reduce the probability of discovering large weapon platforms, but at a high cost.

Shield and Sword

Although it is easier for a global superpower to defend its homeland than overseas bases, it still faces various challenges and costs. Relying solely on a homeland defense strategy is incomplete; a comprehensive "Western Hemisphere Shield" strategy requires a sword to cooperate with it — a sword capable of swiftly and timely striking anywhere in the world from protected bases in the U.S. homeland. In fact, a similar strategic mindset already emerged in the early stages of the Cold War.

In 1953, then U.S. President Eisenhower introduced the "New Look" security strategy, defending the U.S. through bases in the Western Hemisphere. According to this concept, the U.S. would rely on strategic offensive nuclear forces based at home, dense North American continental air defense networks, and anti-submarine warfare forces to resist the opponent's bombers and submarine-launched missiles.

As official documents from the Department of Defense at the time record, "This new containment strategy will primarily rely on offensive retaliatory power, with strategic nuclear weapons as the mainstay, supplemented by the defense system on the North American continent." It is worth noting that in this strategy, known as "Massive Retaliation," other defense forces, such as conventional ground troops, only played a secondary role.

However, the plan was not feasible at the time: the budget for constructing North American air defenses planned for 1955 amounted to $40 billion (11% of U.S. GDP at the time), and the then Treasury Secretary denounced the cost estimate as "absurd." The root cause was the high cost due to technological development bottlenecks at the time. The most expensive components of the air defense system were not radars or missiles but essential information processing systems — which were exorbitant in the era of vacuum tube computers.

Today, under the influence of Moore's Law, related costs have significantly decreased, and the development of information processing systems has brought exponential growth in the effectiveness of air defense systems. The expansion of the Fort Greely missile defense base in Alaska has regained feasibility. Considering political constraints on land acquisition, assessments could be made to expand missile interception sites previously deployed in Montana and North Dakota during the 1970s.

Intercept missiles are being installed at Fort Greely missile defense base in Alaska, USA

U.S. adversaries may launch short-range ballistic or cruise missiles from submarines to attack Alaska, Hawaii, and other Pacific/Atlantic coastal states, meaning the U.S. needs to consider constructing maritime defenses near its mainland, deploying theater-level missile defense systems primarily composed of Aegis warships. Additionally, passive defense measures such as dispersing and concealing military installations, strengthening cybersecurity to counter unconventional attacks, etc., need to be advanced synchronously. A strategy focusing on hemispheric defense implies further strengthening the security of domestic infrastructure.

Finally, the U.S. must maintain naval and air forces in the Western Hemisphere and implement a new Monroe Doctrine, with key objectives including preventing adversaries from deploying forces capable of striking the U.S. mainland in regions within the Western Hemisphere, and destroying any forces secretly deployed there. The U.S. needs to prevent adversaries from establishing military presence in Canada, Greenland, Iceland, Mexico, Central America, northern South America, Caribbean nations, and coastal areas.

While active and passive defense measures are effective, they do have limitations. While enhancing global strike capabilities, the U.S. can reduce potential damage or threats from potential attackers. The development of precision-guided strike technology means that unlike the "Massive Retaliation" strategy during Eisenhower's era, today's conventional strike weapons launched from the U.S. homeland can hit distant opponents, and the targets and levels of destruction of such strikes can be adjusted.

To achieve precise strikes, the U.S. needs to master the capability of detecting, identifying, locating, and tracking (mobile) targets. Low Earth Orbit satellites typically operate at heights ranging from 240 kilometers to 480 kilometers, which is so close to the surface that it is equivalent to the distance from Boston to Philadelphia or Kyiv to Kharkiv. Advances in precise positioning technology mean that data collected by numerous small sensors can now be integrated into a single large sensor providing precise information.

Compared to NASA's Space Shuttle, SpaceX's partially reusable Falcon-9 two-stage rocket has reduced the cost of launching low Earth orbit satellites by 20 times. Once the Starship project currently undergoing testing succeeds, the cost could be reduced by more than 20 times further.

Therefore, tasks such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, which used to be conducted by aircraft and radar near the enemy's前沿, can now be carried out by satellite networks launched from the U.S. homeland.

With high-quality and high-survivability intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, the U.S. will have ways to search for and locate targets anywhere in the world. Coupled with intercontinental, stealthy, and heavily armed reusable platforms, the U.S. can strike any corner of the world from its homeland in a prolonged conventional war. Currently, these platforms include B-2, B-21 bombers, and nuclear submarines carrying cruise missiles.

Core Strength

To truly be effective in the coming decades, the U.S. needs to make cautious and flexible adjustments to its defense deployment posture. While some countries outside the Western Hemisphere may become less important due to their relatively declining economic power, others may become more valuable due to their geographical positions.

For the U.S., countries closer to potential strike targets within adversaries' territories, with vast complex terrains and low population densities, may provide special advantages. Deploying short-range, highly mobile offensive weapons in these areas can better evade detection and destruction. Smaller weapons will also be lighter, easier to hide. The U.S. can conduct operations in countries relatively close to potential targets, utilizing small drones for valuable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

Northrop Grumman Corporation's B-21 Raider strategic bomber undergoing test flight [Image Source: Northrop Grumman Website]

The U.S. might also wish to collaborate with allies closer to its adversaries or with territories possessing the aforementioned characteristics. For Russia, this means strengthening ties with certain NATO member states instead of abandoning NATO, such as Finland and other Nordic and Baltic countries.

Near China, the Philippines archipelago has similar characteristics due to its proximity to Hainan Island, where China's South Sea Fleet is stationed. The U.S. Marine Corps is collaborating with the Philippine government to study how to utilize the country's islands for defensive operations. The southernmost island of Japan, Kyushu, is favorably positioned relatively close to China's eastern coast and the Northern Fleet base. Hokkaido, geographically, is relatively close to Sevastopol on Russia's east coast.

During wartime or crises, local governments can allow U.S. mobile forces equipped with precision strike weapons to be stationed there in exchange for U.S. military protection. In the long term, low-detectability aircraft or submarines can be covertly deployed with automated offensive forces, requiring only a few personnel or even achieving full unmanned operation.

In the oceans outside the Western Hemisphere, including sea lanes used by potential adversaries to import grain, fossil fuels, and other critical materials, the U.S. may also wish to conduct interception activities, meaning maritime blockades far away. The main challenge in such actions lies in information: thousands of ships pass through these sea lanes every day, and no navy possesses enough vessels to intercept and inspect every merchant ship. Today, advances in space-based surveillance systems have largely solved this problem.

When discussing the U.S.'s defense deployment posture, the first question should not be whether it is morally justifiable, but rather whether it confronts and predicts the realities of the present world. Given the profound shifts in the global economic tide over the past few decades, breakthroughs in conventional weapons technology, and the rise of space-based sensor technology, it is clear that the defense posture established by the U.S. 75 years ago is no longer appropriate or sufficient to meet the challenges.

The U.S. should step out of its current disputes with allies and think about how to better deploy its military forces, defending its core national interests in a riskier world.

(Original publication on the "Foreign Affairs" commentary website, title: "A Better Way to Defend the U.S.: Moving More Troops to the Western Hemisphere Instead of Asia and Europe." Translation provided for reader reference only and does not represent the views of the Observer Network.)

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