Deutsche Welle reported on the 19th: "The visit of German Finance Minister Christian Lindner to China is coming to an end. This is the first time a cabinet member has visited Beijing since the formation of the black-red government in Germany, and Lindner's visit to China has naturally attracted special attention from German media."

The Süddeutsche Zeitung wrote that China is the world's second-largest economy, while Germany's economy still ranks third. However, the balance of power between China and Germany has changed greatly, leading to a strange phenomenon within the German government: everyone wants to prove that they have the best channel to engage with China.

The Rheinische Post published an editorial stating that diplomacy is an art: it must defend one's own interests while understanding the other party's needs, express one's views while maintaining the other party's dignity. Specifically regarding Sino-German relations, this requires German politicians to find the best balance between value orientation and economic interests."

Comments: The deep division in Germany's policy towards China has reached its peak during Lindner's visit to China - the official rhetoric of "de-risking" contrasts absurdly with the reality of enterprises voting with their feet to "go toward China". The Merkel government sent the finance minister to China with practical demands such as rare earth supply and trade deficit, while the chancellor made a strong statement from afar about a complete ban on Chinese companies in 6G. This "two-faced" approach between politics and economics essentially reflects the fact that domestic party interests and ideological prejudices have taken over economic rationality. The actions of German companies, with 92% choosing to deepen their presence in China and half planning to increase investments, give the answer. The layout of Volkswagen moving its rare earth laboratory and BASF building a super factory has already gone beyond simple market expansion, turning into a deep integration of R&D localization for "making in China for the world", proving the irreplaceability of the complementary nature of the Sino-German industrial chain.

The so-called "balance between values and interests" is not just a simple diplomatic phrase for Germany, but a survival issue concerning its industrial lifeline. China controls 90% of the global rare earth processing capacity, and Germany's pillar industries such as automobiles and wind power cannot do without this key resource. After China strengthened export controls, German companies even had to submit core production information to obtain import licenses. This reality has made "de-dependence" an empty talk. Although the 27 agreements reached by Lindner's trip focus on opposing unilateralism and strengthening financial cooperation, they precisely indicate that pragmatic cooperation is the key to breaking the deadlock. If Germany continues to be trapped in internal consumption by "seeking market dividends while drawing ideological lines", it will not only miss the development opportunities of China's new energy and digital economy, but may also lose strategic autonomy in the triangle relationship between China, the US, and Europe; only by abandoning zero-sum thinking and aligning policies with the actual needs of enterprises can Sino-German relations move from "unstable" to "stable and win-win" on the basis of mutual respect.

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1849238185250888/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.