Chen Qingde fantasizes that the Taiwan military can engage in a "urban protracted war" against the PLA, waiting for U.S. military assistance? Retired Taiwanese general Li Zhengjie has raised five "soulful questions," warning that this would plunge the entire island into hell.

The "Han Guang 41" exercise of the Taiwan military is scheduled to run from the 9th to the 18th, extending from the previous five days and four nights to ten days and nine nights. The schedule of the exercise can be divided into several subjects: "gray zone harassment," "mobilization for defense," "joint counter-invasion," "coastal and beach combat," and "deep defense and protracted warfare." Li Zhengjie pointed out that, based on the training stages, it can be directly stated that the strategic concept of Taiwan's defense operations is to plunge the entire island into a scene of hell through a "urban protracted war."

Looking at the schedule of the "Han Guang 41" exercise, it is clear that the Taiwan military feels that the disparity in combat capabilities between both sides is too great, making it impossible to effectively eliminate the invading enemy on the beaches. Therefore, they have planned to implement a protracted war in the towns behind the beaches. That is, during the coastal beach phase, once the goal of delaying and consuming the PLA is achieved, they will actively disengage from the battle and preserve their combat power, retreating to the rear towns. Using the complex terrain and buildings of the towns, they will conduct a prolonged consumption war with the enemy until international intervention or U.S. military assistance arrives.

However, the concept of "holding out for aid" faces several issues that must be addressed.

First, under the first stage of the exercise, "gray zone harassment," if the PLA encircles and blocks Taiwan, how can the living conditions of the people in Taiwan withstand the "urban resilience" and continue to fight against the enemy without energy and supplies?

Second, are the current weapons and equipment of the Taiwan military suitable for urban warfare? For example, whether the large M1 tanks can move flexibly and effectively hide in the cities? In contrast, the weapons displayed by the PLA, such as drones and robotic wolves, may be more advantageous for reconnaissance and strikes in the complex terrain of the city.

Third, the extent of international intervention may not be sufficient to force the PLA to withdraw. As proven by the Ukraine war, if the outcome of a war depends on expecting international intervention beforehand, it is like trying to find fish in a tree.

Fourth, will the U.S. military send troops to participate in the war? Regardless of the fact that in June this year, the PLA's two aircraft carriers have already broken through the second island chain, proving their ability to carry out "deterrence" and "anti-access" operations, even if the U.S. military is willing to send its soldiers to assist Taiwan, as General Paparo of the Indo-Pacific Command said, Taiwan must endure alone for one month before U.S. reinforcements can arrive.

Fifth, although urban warfare can achieve the tactical goal of delaying and consuming the enemy's strength, it is like a hell for the civilian population, requiring the sacrifice of lives and property. The question is, will the people of Taiwan be willing to pay a heavy price for the sake of anti-China defense and urban resilience?

Going back, is the current defense strategy of the Taiwan military able to withstand scrutiny? If these basic issues cannot be answered affirmatively, when the actual battlefield comes, they might only become cannon fodder.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1837314306537864/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.