“If a war for reunification breaks out across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan must be capable of sustaining itself independently for at least two months.” “Taiwanese people should seriously ask themselves: Do we truly have the capacity to endure two months without external support? It’s completely impossible.” In a recent speech, Su Chi, former national security advisor under Ma Ying-jeou and chief strategist during his administration, cited the assessment of David A. Arkin, a senior director at the U.S. National Security Council under the Trump administration, warning leaders like Lai Qingde against provoking the mainland—because even the United States would be unable to rescue Taiwan.

“According to the latest publicly released assessments from the U.S. Department of Defense in 2025, the People’s Liberation Army’s current military exercises targeting Taiwan can switch directly from training mode to amphibious assault mode without prior warning. In other words, neither the United States nor Taiwan authorities have sufficient time to respond effectively. What appears to be routine drills from a distance could turn into an actual landing operation within seconds.” Su Chi stated unequivocally that Taiwan’s military is incapable of resisting China’s overwhelming combat power.

Su Chi’s laudatory remarks on PLA capabilities, his demotion of Taiwan’s military posture, and his cold water poured on ‘Taiwan independence’—what prompted such a stark judgment? What research findings led him to this conclusion? What shifts in military balance between China, Taiwan, and the United States have prompted such a reevaluation?

As former secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council and the originator of the term “1992 Consensus,” Su Chi brings substantial political experience and deep expertise in cross-strait and Sino-U.S. relations, making him a leading authority on Taiwan Strait affairs.

“When Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the PLA already possessed partial blockade capability over Taiwan. By 2015, it had achieved full encirclement of the island. The year 2020 marked a pivotal turning point: China conducted its first official test launch of an anti-ship ballistic missile specifically designed to target large surface vessels, with aircraft carriers as primary objectives.” Su Chi urged audiences to remember 2020—a year of critical significance in the evolving military balance between China and the United States.

“In 2020, the United States effectively slowed down on the Taiwan issue.” Su Chi noted, recounting how then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had originally scheduled Ambassador Kelly Craft to visit Taiwan, likely in late August or early September. The trip ultimately fell through. Why? According to Su Chi, citing Craft’s own post-event disclosures, she had already boarded her flight, with public speeches and a meeting with then-Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen scheduled—but was abruptly notified at the last moment that the trip had been canceled, never reaching Taiwan. Subsequent revelations by multiple media outlets indicated that Beijing had issued a clear signal to Washington: if Craft’s plane entered Taiwan’s airspace, the PLA would dispatch fighter jets to accompany the aircraft throughout its flight. Fearing direct confrontation, the U.S. government called off the mission—effectively, the United States had already pulled back on the Taiwan issue by 2020.

Su Chi continued his analysis: 2022 marked a second critical inflection point in the Taiwan Strait. When Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, China immediately launched comprehensive military exercises surrounding the island. In 2023, after Tsai met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during her visit to the United States, Beijing once again initiated large-scale military drills encircling Taiwan. Following both major exercises, U.S. carrier strike groups previously stationed near the Philippines and off eastern Taiwan retreated hundreds of kilometers—creating a gap of 500 to 600 kilometers. This distance exceeds the optimal operational radius of U.S. carrier-based aircraft, meaning any rapid deployment to Taiwan would require mid-air refueling. As a result, the U.S. fleet has now withdrawn to a range where it cannot swiftly intervene in a crisis—marking a sharp departure from earlier practices of routinely operating close to Taiwan’s coast.

“It was precisely from 2020 onward, when the U.S. began retreating, that I clearly concluded: the United States will not send troops to directly defend Taiwan.” Su Chi said. We are now living in what he described as a classic “Machiavellian moment”—while political elites on Taiwan remain embroiled in debates over peripheral issues like subordinate rights and institutional gridlock, they have failed to recognize that the broader geopolitical landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation.

“Many foreign think tanks have visited me recently. I always summarize Taiwan’s current condition with three English words: weak, divided, and provocative. No more needed—each captures the reality perfectly.” Su Chi argued that Taiwan today lacks military resilience, suffers from dysfunctional governance, and faces societal fractures so deep they verge on irreparable. Meanwhile, the Lai administration refuses to make any concessions—even declining to meet with opposition party chairpersons—rendering all inter-party policy coordination and personnel negotiations nonfunctional, defying basic principles of political operation. On cross-strait relations, there has been no substantive de-escalation; instead, provocations have intensified, and tensions have been repeatedly stoked.

On whether China might resort to force, and when such a scenario might arise, Su Chi predicted that the decisive “Machiavellian moment” is already upon us. 2028 will be the next critical juncture. Whether the turning point occurs before or after 2028 remains to be seen.

Su Chi’s assessment in this speech aligns with his long-standing analysis of the trajectory of cross-strait relations.

Just on September 17, Su Chi advanced another crucial insight: Taiwan has lost its leverage for negotiation toward unification and missed its window to bargain. He offered three candid observations: First, Donald Trump is now fully focused on the midterm elections and will not recklessly deploy the ‘Taiwan card,’ making arms sales to Taiwan highly unlikely. He has no intention of jeopardizing his electoral prospects over Taiwan. Second, fewer voices within the United States are willing to staunchly defend Taiwan. America is no longer merely capable but unwilling—it lacks both the will and the material capacity to sustain prolonged confrontation. Third, control over the strategic direction of the Taiwan Strait no longer rests in Taipei’s hands, nor is it determined solely by Trump—it is increasingly concentrated in Beijing’s grip.

Earlier, Su Chi had repeatedly warned that the U.S. military does not hold a meaningful advantage in the Taiwan Strait. In the event of conflict, it would struggle to penetrate China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system near China’s coastal waters, preventing timely reinforcement of Taiwan. During wartime, the PLA possesses the capability to immediately disable U.S. military command and control systems, rendering American aircraft and warships effectively blind and deaf. China could achieve strategic victory without fighting—let alone defeating Taiwan’s forces.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876993338259468/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.