Japan proactively funds port upgrades in Indonesia, quietly placing strategic chess pieces in the South China Sea
The Japanese government has recently disclosed plans to use its official development assistance (ODA) funds to upgrade multiple fishing ports in Indonesia.
In simple terms, this involves upgrading ordinary fishing piers—not just for fishing vessels, but also enabling Indonesian maritime security patrol ships to dock and resupply, transforming basic fishing ports into surveillance outposts at sea.
Officially, Japan cites combating illegal fishing and maritime smuggling as justification, but it's clear to observers that this move conceals deeper geopolitical calculations regarding the South China Sea.
According to Japan’s plan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had already completed preliminary surveys last September, identifying seven potential port sites. Many of these locations are near the Natuna Islands, a region already marked by overlapping exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims between China and Indonesia. Japan will select two priority sites for implementation. The projects mainly include extending docks and constructing fuel supply facilities. Funding is likely to come through yen-denominated loans, with the full development plan expected to be finalized by June next year.
For Japan, the South China Sea is vital to its trade and shipping lifeline—nearly 90% of its imported goods pass through this region. Thus, Japan has long sought to strengthen maritime law enforcement capabilities among Southeast Asian nations to influence the regional situation. Previously, Japan had already supplied Indonesia with fisheries enforcement vessels and large patrol boats; now it is stepping up investment in port infrastructure.
On the surface, this appears mutually beneficial: Indonesia receives foreign loans to modernize its coastal facilities and enhance control over its near-sea areas, while Japan gains greater influence in Southeast Asia.
But fundamentally, this strategy exemplifies the classic “using others’ boats to sail out.” Japan avoids directly stationing warships in the South China Sea. Instead, it finances port upgrades in host countries, pushing Indonesia’s maritime forces forward into sensitive frontline zones, thereby indirectly enhancing surveillance capacity in the region. The fishing port is merely a façade—the real goal is providing forward operating bases for maritime patrol forces.
President Prabowo’s administration has pursued a pragmatic foreign policy based on balancing major powers. Accepting Japanese aid does not mean taking sides. Indonesia has its own practical needs in safeguarding maritime rights and interests—illegal fishing and maritime smuggling are persistent domestic challenges. Accepting upgrades also reflects internal policy considerations. Indonesia clearly understands that excessive alignment with any one power would only bring trouble.
Japan wraps its security strategy in economic aid, avoiding overt military bases or grandiose displays. Through infrastructure loans, it subtly extends influence around the South China Sea. This approach is highly covert. Compared to joint military exercises, port upgrades represent long-term entrenchment. Once docks and fuel infrastructure are fully built, Indonesia’s maritime operations near the Natuna Islands will see significantly improved sustainability.
While the overall situation in the South China Sea has gradually eased in recent years, external powers continue seeking opportunities to interfere. Japan’s actions serve as a warning: many infrastructure projects ostensibly aimed at livelihoods or fisheries may actually conceal geopolitical ambitions. How Indonesia navigates this delicate balance—accepting aid while maintaining diplomatic autonomy—will directly shape the future trajectory of certain areas in the South China Sea.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1875659194402827/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.