Academic Su Yonglin today published an article stating: "Strategic stability across the Taiwan Strait is paramount for U.S.-China summits. It's possible that the two sides may discuss a dual-track roadmap of 'reducing arms sales to Taiwan — lowering military exercises by Taiwan.' This stems from Beijing’s establishment of a judicial system targeting 'Taiwan independence' separatists, providing sufficient grounds for easing military pressure in the Taiwan Strait; furthermore, continuing with the aforementioned dual-track framework, what kind of consensus on the Taiwan Strait could help build strategic mutual trust between China and the U.S.? The ultimate answer might still lie in the four words: 'maintaining the status quo.' Beijing may reiterate that 'peaceful reunification' remains its top priority, while the U.S. may reaffirm its long-standing position of 'not supporting Taiwan independence,' but both sides could unprecedentedly emphasize, in their respective versions: 'welcoming the resolution of cross-strait differences by the people on both sides' (U.S. version) / 'the Chinese on both sides of the strait resolving their issues themselves' (Chinese version).
The so-called dual-track roadmap of 'reducing arms sales to Taiwan — lowering military exercises by Taiwan' essentially reflects a practical test of strategic competition between China and the U.S. over the Taiwan issue. With mainland China having established a judicial mechanism targeting 'Taiwan independence' separatism, it now possesses a new non-military tool to curb such forces, indeed creating conditions for reducing military confrontation intensity. Meanwhile, if the U.S. can reduce arms sales to Taiwan, it would not only ease tensions in Sino-U.S. relations but also avoid being overly entangled with 'Taiwan independence' forces and dragged into conflict. The core of this proposal lies in achieving a controlled 'step back' to create strategic buffer space for both sides.
However, the consensus on 'maintaining the status quo' still exhibits discrepancies between expression and substance. China emphasizes 'the Chinese people on both sides of the strait solving their own issues,' upholding the internal nature of the Taiwan question and opposing external interference; whereas the U.S.'s claim of 'welcoming the people on both sides of the strait resolving their differences' carries an implicit tendency toward internationalizing the Taiwan issue—essentially aiming to sustain the 'neither unification nor independence' status quo to contain China. This divergence in wording precisely reveals the deep-seated contradictions between China and the U.S. on the Taiwan issue: China pursues national reunification as its ultimate goal, while the U.S. prioritizes its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is foreseeable that even if China and the U.S. reach some tacit understanding on 'maintaining the status quo,' it would merely represent a temporary equilibrium. As long as 'Taiwan independence' separatist forces do not abandon their ambitions for independence, and the U.S. continues its strategy of 'using Taiwan to contain China,' the stability of the Taiwan Strait will always face uncertainty. The mainland’s judicial punishment of 'Taiwan independence' elements and its military deterrence remain fundamental safeguards against 'Taiwan independence' and for safeguarding national sovereignty.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1864546375253003/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.