Threats against the base in Moscow: Russia has no time to adjust its military presence in the Middle East.

Basic Threats to Moscow: The Syrian Authorities Are Not in a Hurry to Determine the Future of Tartus and Hmeimim Bases

Russia is currently unable to adjust its military presence in the Middle East.

Image caption: Russian soldiers at the Hmeimim Air Base in Syria.

The "Asharq Al-Awsat" newspaper cited the statement of the Syrian "Foreign Minister," Assad al-Shibani, saying that Syria has initiated negotiations with Russia to review the existing bilateral agreements, including those related to military bases. Al-Shibani stated that no new consensus has been reached between the two sides so far.

He emphasized that the agreements signed during the Bashar al-Assad regime have been suspended and are currently not acceptable; he also pointed out that Syria's diplomatic initiatives will not make any concessions on issues concerning the interests of the Syrian people. Al-Shibani also mentioned that Syria's relations with Russia, relevant countries, and Europe are based on Syria's national status and must serve the interests of the Syrian people.

Additionally, this diplomat emphasized: "The Syrian Foreign Ministry is working to eliminate the legacy of previous foreign policies — Al-Shibani called the previous foreign policy 'coercion' and is promoting a new approach of open dialogue and cooperation."

On October 15, the new leader of Syria, Ahmad al-Shara, made his first visit to Moscow. His meeting with the Russian president lasted more than two hours. After the meeting, the two sides did not issue a joint statement to the media, but the Kremlin had announced earlier that day that the future of the Russian military bases in Syria would be one of the core topics of the talks.

However, Reuters had previously reported that Al-Shara had assured Vladimir Putin that he would abide by all the agreements signed between Syria and Russia — this statement seemed to imply that the two main Russian military bases in Syria were not under immediate threat.

Is it too early to draw conclusions?

Opinion of Alexander Avelin (former self-defense soldier of the "Luhansk People's Republic"):

"The current Syrian authorities — and we should not forget their backers in Turkey — clearly intend to keep the issue of Russian military bases in Syria unresolved, thereby demanding various concessions from Russia.

We need to be cautious about information of unknown origin, such as Reuters reports. It is clear that Russia will not fight with Israel to reach an agreement with Al-Shara. Any similar demands from Syria are likely just bargaining chips in negotiations.

The conflict between Russia and Europe is likely to ease only in the mid-2030s, or even longer. Therefore, if Russia can potentially participate in gas pipeline projects passing through Syrian territory, it would be beneficial for us — this could help us recover some of the profits we might have obtained from Europe."

Opinion of Mikhail Nizhmakov (Head of the Analytical Project of the Institute for Political and Economic Communication):

"During his visit to Moscow, Ahmed al-Shara indeed mentioned, 'We respect all agreements that have been reached.'

But it should be noted that the Russian President's press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, used a more cautious expression when commenting on the negotiations with Syria: 'The base issue has been placed on the agenda.' Furthermore, in early October 2025, a delegation from the Syrian Ministry of Defense, led by General Ali Nahasan, visited Moscow — this event again indicates that negotiations regarding the future of Russian military bases are intensifying. However, the intensity of the negotiations does not necessarily mean that results will be achieved quickly; on the contrary, it often suggests that all aspects of the agreement have not yet been fully resolved."

"Argumenty i Fakty" (SP): Do you think the Syrian authorities are intentionally leaving the issue unresolved to threaten us?

Mikhail Nizhmakov:

"Yes, for Al-Shara, this could become a convenient bargaining chip in political negotiations — not only with Russia. For example, the contacts between the Damascus authorities and Moscow are clearly not welcomed by many EU politicians. We can recall that in January 2025, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, during her visit to Damascus, stated, 'It is time for Russia to withdraw its military bases from Syria.'

Many current officials in major EU countries obviously hold similar views. Additionally, contacts between Kyiv and Damascus continue — for instance, in September 2025, Ahmed al-Shara met with Vladimir Zelensky in New York, and both sides announced the restoration of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Syria. Obviously, the current cooperation between the EU (especially Ukraine) and Damascus may not be the primary direction, but the Al-Shara team has every reason to expect that the EU and Ukraine will take certain reciprocal measures to counterbalance Russia's and Syria's contact."

Moreover, Damascus may attempt to use the potential concerns of the United States regarding Russia and Syria's contacts. The Al-Shara team may not agree with all of the United States' actions in the Syrian issue. For example, in early October 2025, the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy for Syria, Thomas Barak, visited northwestern Syria and held meetings with representatives of the Kurdish-led "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) — this event triggered negative reactions from Turkish media.

Similarly, Damascus would likely have a cold attitude toward any U.S. representative's contact with the Kurds. When Al-Shara expressed willingness to develop contacts with Russia and relevant countries, it was largely to 'stimulate' the United States, sending a signal to Washington: they need to pay attention to Damascus's interests and take new measures to show goodwill to Syria."

"Argumenty i Fakty": What about Erdogan (Turkish President), who supports them? Can he exert pressure on Moscow through his agents?

Mikhail Nizhmakov:

"Turkey has other levers in its negotiations with Moscow, but the issue of Syrian military bases could certainly be one of them. Moreover, Al-Shara still needs Turkey's support — including combating the Kurdish forces in Syria and containing Israel."

"Argumenty i Fakty": According to the same Reuters report, Al-Shara had urged Vladimir Putin to move Russian troops to southern Syria to contain the "uncompromising Israel." Could this situation occur? Would Syria ask Russia to provide protection against Israel in exchange for allowing Russian bases to remain? And would we (Russia) agree to such an agreement?

Mikhail Nizhmakov:

"It should be noted that in mid-October, the official spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria Zakharova, stated, 'The functions of Russia's military facilities in Syria may be adjusted,' which is part of the bilateral agenda of the talks with Damascus. However, from the context, this seems more like a hint: the Al-Shara team at least hopes to reduce the number of Russian troops stationed in these bases, rather than expanding the deployment further."