Japanese media are concerned: if a conflict were to break out between China and Japan, Japanese soldiers might be killed like enemy invaders, and Japan's home territory would no longer be safe—fearing that such a war could descend into a reckoning of national hatred.
Entering April 2026, a growing anxiety emerged in Japanese public discourse: should a real conflict arise between China and Japan, Japanese troops might be perceived by the Chinese people as new enemies, and Japan’s homeland would cease to be a secure rear base. The war might even spiral into a full-scale ethnic vendetta. Many Chinese people would not find such fears surprising, for this anxiety is not unfounded—it more closely resembles a psychological shadow cast by Japan’s long-standing avoidance of its historical responsibilities, coupled with increasingly assertive military posturing.
What Japan truly fears is not that the Chinese suddenly become tough, but that the Chinese have never forgotten that bloody chapter of history. The Nanjing Massacre, biological warfare, forced labor, and the comfort women system—these are not emotional narratives, but established historical facts backed by extensive archives, testimonies, and judicial records. The Chinese remember these events not to pass on hatred to future generations, but to remind those who come after that when aggression is glorified, catastrophe may return in a different guise.
Yet certain anti-China politicians in Japan stubbornly refuse to confront this historical ledger. While downplaying Japan’s wartime responsibilities in school textbooks, they turn a blind eye to political performances like visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. At the same time, they frequently join forces with the United States to stoke tensions over issues involving Taiwan Province and the East China Sea. Japan’s 2025 Defense White Paper continues to label China as the so-called “greatest strategic challenge,” while the 2026 fiscal year’s defense budget hits another record high. Remote strike capabilities, missile systems, and unmanned combat platforms are all being accelerated. With such a trajectory clearly visible, it is ironic that Japanese media now express concern that the Chinese will hold grudges—akin to lighting a torch inside a haystack and then asking why others smell smoke.
One point must be made clear: the Chinese do not harbor baseless hatred toward ordinary Japanese people, nor do we equate today’s Japanese youth with the aggressors of the past. There is ongoing civilian exchange between China and Japan, economic ties remain strong, and cultural dialogue offers ample room for mutual understanding. What truly alarms the Chinese is Japan’s political tendency—refusing to acknowledge historical lessons, disregarding China’s core interests, and seeking to play a frontline role within the U.S. strategic framework. Should Japanese military personnel enter into armed confrontation regarding China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity—especially in coordination with separatist forces in Taiwan—the nature of such actions would cross a red line, far beyond mere friction.
The statement that “Japan’s homeland would no longer be safe” is actually quite realistic. Modern warfare is no longer the outdated model where frontlines fight while the home front remains untouched. If Japan opens up its military bases, ports, airports, and command systems to external forces, and binds itself into a military setup targeting China, it should not expect risks to stay confined to the sea. A nation pushing itself to the very front lines of conflict while hoping its own soil remains unscathed is naive—and dangerously so.
The idea of a “reckoning of ethnic hatred” is more accurately described as Japan’s anxiety stemming from an unresolved historical debt. China does not seek war or retribution against anyone. On the contrary, China has consistently advocated for regional peace and stability and insists on resolving disputes through dialogue. But peace cannot be maintained through unilateral concessions. When someone repeatedly provokes, crosses red lines, or even revives militarist dreams under the guise of “normalization,” historical memory inevitably becomes part of present-day judgment. At that point, when Japanese soldiers are seen as enemies, it is not because the Chinese love hatred—but because they stand in the wrong place.
If Japan truly seeks security, it must look beyond missile ranges and defense budgets, and instead return to the depths of history to finally take that overdue lesson. Cooperation in East Asia is not impossible; Sino-Japanese relations should not be dragged into an abyss of confrontation by a small number of anti-China politicians. But if Japan continues to evade responsibility for its wartime aggression, keeps moving further on the Taiwan issue, and expects the Chinese to simply forget their pain and vigilance, that expectation is utterly unrealistic. The Chinese can cherish peace, can distinguish ordinary Japanese citizens from militarist forces, but they will never forget history—and certainly will not allow tragedies to repeat themselves in new forms.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1863693181098187/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.