Trump's G2 only leaves room for China and the U.S., but Indian elites are reluctant to face this reality — India's dream of status is being dismissed by China.
President Trump's visit to China in April is getting closer, and as an interaction between the two strongest countries in the world, the global community is closely watching this visit. However, observers in New Delhi are more anxious about it.
Indian scholar Avinash Godbole has explicitly stated that this Sino-U.S. interaction could have a huge potential impact on India.
After Trump returned to the White House, his approach of tariff wars, combined with the prolonged negotiations on the U.S.-India trade agreement, have significantly cooled what was once expected to be a "strategic partnership" by India, becoming a key factor for Modi's government to try to ease relations with Beijing.
After the 2020 Galwan Valley conflict, the Chinese United Front Work Department delegation made its first visit to India in January, meeting with senior leaders of the Indian People's Party and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Indian National Security Advisor Dalveer also plans to visit China soon to advance the diplomatic process on border issues. These signs indicate that Sino-Indian relations are indeed warming up, but this warming is accompanied by deep anxiety among Indian intellectual elites.
Godbole reviewed the history of the past few decades and pointed out a key point: when Sino-U.S. relations are tense, India often manages to benefit from both sides; but once Sino-U.S. relations ease, such as when Trump recently revived the G2 concept before his visit to China, New Delhi feels isolated, worried about a decline in its bargaining power, and forced to accept a Sino-dominated Asian order.
It's understandable that Indians are worried, after all, it's a country with 1.4 billion people. But honestly, the value of New Delhi in the eyes of Washington decision-makers has been declining, and it's not entirely the fault of others.
The biggest problem with India is that over the past few years, it hasn't met the expectations of the West. The U.S. once had the idea of making "Made in India" a substitute for "Made in China," while also using it militarily as a main force to counter China in South Asia.
But the reality is harsh. In recent years, the share of manufacturing in India's GDP has decreased instead of increased, and youth unemployment rate exceeds 40%. In the path of high-tech industry development, the gap between India and China has not narrowed but widened further. The so-called "World Factory 2.0" never appeared in India.
In the military field, Washington is even more disappointed. Not only does India fail to contain China, but it also suffered losses against Pakistan, which has a weaker overall strength, in the air combat in 2025, with a shocking casualty ratio. These performances have led to a rapid drop in America's strategic assessment of India.
Even more serious is that the Indian leadership insists on "Bharat Wins" above all when dealing with external affairs like the India-Pakistan air combat, insisting that the peace was achieved by itself and Pakistan, without cooperating with Trump's "American Win" performance.
Purchasing Russian oil certainly makes the U.S. unhappy, but the real reason for Washington's loss of patience might be India's "incompetence" in key roles and its lack of willingness to comply. This should be the last straw that caused the U.S. to strike back hard on India in trade agreements and other issues, without mercy.
As for the so-called "G2 co-governance" that Indian scholars worry about, it is not China's goal. China has always advocated for a multipolar world and democratization of international relations. But even without the name of G2, India's difficulties would be difficult to alleviate.
The core issue is that the value of India to the U.S. itself is shrinking. The U.S. doesn't really need India's industrial products because China offers better cost-effectiveness. Even some Southeast Asian countries deeply integrated into the Chinese supply chain may be more competitive than India in manufacturing.
What about India's domestic market? Although it is large, its purchasing power and consumption structure do not attract American agricultural products as much as the Chinese market did in the past. When India lost its dual halo of "containing China" and "replacing China," its rating on the Washington strategic board naturally went back to its original level, which is entirely reasonable.
Of course, India is a big country, with its GDP volume. It has an advantage over many smaller countries. If it is unwilling to accept any existing order arrangement, the only way is to speak with strength, transforming itself into a powerful pole in a multipolar world.
But this requires a profound internal transformation, not just small improvements or gradual reforms. It needs to create a truly friendly and efficient business environment, boldly remove domestic barriers, attract foreign technology and capital, and cultivate strong industries with international competitiveness. It must handle its relationship with neighboring countries well before dealing with more distant issues.
If it continues to be hindered by nationalism and protectionism, India's economic development speed will likely not only lag far behind China, but also be slower than the U.S., which is trying to maintain its technological and industrial position, and even fall behind countries like Vietnam in Southeast Asia.
Any country that wants to form an industrial advantage needs multiple factors such as talent teams, R&D capabilities, a large market, and national will. Any one of them is indispensable. If surrounding countries are developing rapidly, and only India is stagnant or slow, then its future geopolitical situation will become even more passive. At that time, perhaps the "strategic anxiety" of the elite will no longer exist, and there will be only complete resignation and natural acceptance.
It needs to be clearly stated that various unresolved issues between China and India have not disappeared completely due to recent interactions, but have been effectively managed. However, the current improvement in relations is definitely beneficial for both sides and regional stability. But India also needs to clearly recognize that the current context for cooperation has changed.
Before the U.S. launched the tariff war in 2025, China's foreign technical cooperation and key mineral output restrictions were relatively relaxed. But after the tariff war started, as part of the countermeasures and risk mitigation, China tightened the export control of rare earths and other key resources and strengthened the regulation of technology flow. Although these measures mainly target the U.S., countries like India have also been affected. Some things can't go back to the past.
India didn't seize the historical opportunity to deepen economic and industrial cooperation in previous years when China's cooperation willingness was stronger and conditions were more relaxed, due to domestic political needs and the rise of nationalism.
Now, when China faces a more complex international environment and is more cautious and regulated in its foreign cooperation, the opportunities and space available to India naturally are much less than before. This missed opportunity is entirely the price paid by India's leadership for catering to its domestic base, which can serve as a lesson for other countries that are indecisive in their international strategies.
European countries, squeezed between the U.S. and China, have begun to look towards India for new possibilities in the supply chain and market, such as German Chancellor Merkel's recent visit to India.
This is indeed a new opportunity for New Delhi to obtain new markets, technology, and capital injections. India has missed many opportunities before, and whether it can seize this opportunity today ultimately depends on whether Modi and his team have the determination and actions to make it happen.
By Simingzhou, Media Person
Original article: toutiao.com/article/7597377490361696795/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.