Editor's Note: The international strategic academic exchange activity "Mingde Strategic Dialogue (2025)" hosted by Renmin University of China, and co-organized by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies of Renmin University and the Global Leadership Academy, will be held from October 13 to 17. On the eve of the event, the director of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies of Renmin University and the director of the Global Leadership Academy, Wang Wen, had a dialogue with participants of the "Mingde Strategic Dialogue (2025)" and Gideon Rachman, the chief foreign affairs commentator of the Financial Times. They discussed topics such as China's transformation, the rise of the East, and the difficulties in Europe. Observers.com published this dialogue for the reference of readers.
【Dialogue/Wang Wen, Gideon Rachman】
Wang Wen: Today, we have a very important guest — Gideon Rachman, a columnist at the Financial Times. In my view, he is one of the wisest and most forward-looking foreign policy commentators in the West.
Mr. Rachman, it's a pleasure to have this online conversation with you! I remember our first meeting was in 2010, when you just started working at the Financial Times, and I was working at the Global Times. That year, you came to Beijing for research, and I was invited to meet you at the Financial Times' Beijing headquarters. We met several times after that. Time really flies.
I know that over the past 15 years, you have visited China frequently, so my first question is: what do you think is the biggest change in China? What changes in China have impressed you the most? And during your upcoming visit to China to participate in the "Mingde Strategic Dialogue 2025" series, what are you most interested in?
Gideon Rachman: Since 2010, both the world and China have undergone many changes. What impressed me most is China's progress in technology. China has achieved rapid industrialization and poverty reduction, becoming the world's largest manufacturer and possibly the largest exporter. So, China is a very large and successful economy. I think one of the next questions is: can China become a technologically advanced country that leads the world? This is very important for the world and China, because there have been many discussions about the middle-income trap, that is, whether China can transition to a more advanced economy.
This point has gradually been proven. In advanced fields such as electric vehicles and medical research, China is already leading the world; in top scientific journals, many papers come from China. I remember having a conversation with the head of a major American tech company, who was worried that if they couldn't hire Chinese PhDs in the U.S., or conduct research in Shanghai, it would harm their company's interests, because a lot of the best talent and research results come from China. Therefore, I think, in a sense of economic science, these are the most impressive developments in China.
Another thing that deeply impressed me is the improvement of Beijing's environment. Around 2010, people were very concerned about pollution in Beijing, which was very severe. I remember that upon arriving in Beijing, sometimes my eyes would tear up due to the pollution, and even from high buildings, I couldn't see the ground because of a layer of smog. This problem has now been greatly improved, which is also a typical example showing that China can face and solve difficult problems, although it still faces environmental challenges, it has made significant progress.
Understanding what is happening in China through Southeast Asia
Wang Wen: Yes, a lot has changed. I still remember that 10 years ago you wrote a book called "Easternisation," which I think is an excellent book and one of the earliest representative works in Western mainstream media that systematically discusses the rise of the East. These days, I'm still reading your book. So my second question is: compared to when you wrote the book 10 years ago, do you think the trend of "Easternisation" is consistent with your predictions in the book? What has surprised you about the rise of the East in the past 10 years?
Gideon Rachman: You're being too kind by saying I was one of the earliest predictors. Actually, I don't think so. I remember that one of my concerns when writing the book was that the rise of Asia was almost too obvious, yet not so obvious in the West. I think one of the reasons I was interested in doing this research was that from 1992 to 1995, I was stationed in Bangkok, Southeast Asia, as a foreign correspondent for The Economist, which was my first job.
Gideon Rachman (Gideon Rachman) Photo
I think Southeast Asia is actually a good place to understand what is happening in China. The changes in China may have been taking place for more than a decade, as early on, many were overseas Chinese investors, such as the CP Group in Thailand. I think they understood what was happening in China and what would happen earlier than the West, partly because they were of Chinese descent, and partly because they witnessed the rapid development of their own countries (Thailand, Singapore, etc.), and knew that the same things could happen in China. In short, this is one of the reasons I became interested in China's rapid development and have always believed that this development might continue for some time, although some unforeseen complexities have gradually emerged during this process.
In my book "Easternisation: China and India Will Dominate the World," I explored the core idea that the economic rise of Asia, especially China, and its growing wealth will translate into global political influence. For example, Britain in the 19th century, the United States in the 20th century. This means (and has already meant) that China's influence is not limited to its neighbors, but extends far beyond to Latin America—the other end of the world, where we can now see this more clearly. Of course, this is the experience of Western countries.
I think one of the things Americans are worried about is that they have always considered Latin America and the Western Hemisphere their backyard, but China's influence has extended to places like Latin America, such as the largest port in Colombia built by China, and China has surpassed the United States to become the largest trading partner of Brazil and Argentina. This is a good demonstration of China's global strength. These are neutral facts, all ongoing events.
Additionally, I discussed geopolitical tensions in the book, such as the famous "Thucydides Trap," whether China will clash with the United States? Whether tensions within Asia will intensify? The history between China and Japan, the division of the Korean Peninsula and its impact on geopolitics? And how Russia, an Eurasian country, is affected by the trend of Easternisation. Overall, Asia has become stronger, and China has become stronger within Asia, a trend that remains clear.
"De-risking" will remain the core axis of Europe's economic strategy toward China
Wang Wen: I completely agree with your views, especially regarding the tremendous changes in China's strength. But the issue is that, due to China's rise, Europe feels increasingly tense and anxious. In recent years, Europe has been implementing a "de-risking" strategy towards China.
My question is: in your opinion, what is the effect of this "de-risking" policy? Is it evolving into a broad decoupling, further restricting Sino-European relations? Or has the "de-risking" strategy failed, and have Sino-European economic ties not undergone fundamental changes? What is your view on Europe's stance toward China?
Gideon Rachman: An interesting question, which is also something I will think about when I come to China.
I think, first of all, "de-risking" was intended as an alternative to "decoupling." Because the term "decoupling" was popular at the time, especially in the US, when Ursula von der Leyen became the President of the European Commission. I think this sounds completely unrealistic, given the deep integration between the West and China, and between Europe and China, making decoupling unrealistic. Therefore, European companies will say: "Sorry, China is our largest market, we won't decouple from China, or we depend on this or that import." Therefore, decoupling makes no sense.
"De-risking" is a term that European governments acknowledge that decoupling is a bad idea, so they don't ask companies to do so, because European governments also need economic growth. However, European governments also believe that certain aspects of doing business with China carry risks. Therefore, European governments aim to maintain broadly beneficial economic relations while reducing risks.
The definition of these risks is vague. The narrowest definition of risk would be purely military, and I think this is more of an American concern. So during the Biden administration, particularly, there were restrictions on the export of high-end chips to China. The typical argument from the Biden team is: China is investing a lot of money to develop advanced military forces, and we don't want any American chips to be used in missiles that could fire at American ships. However, this also affects Europe, for example, Dutch semiconductor company ASML Holding N.V., which is very advanced in the semiconductor supply chain, similar to TSMC, and are companies that others find hard to replicate. Therefore, the US has pressured Europe to ask ASML not to sell its most advanced products to China, which is a type of risk.
ASML's EUV Lithography Machine
Another type of risk is whether China's dependence has threatened Europe's strategic autonomy? Dependence is an issue that Europe has not truly solved in a sense. Green transition is the most prominent example: unlike the US, under Trump, the US said: "We are not interested in reducing oil dependence." The EU has fully committed to this, and without China, it cannot achieve this, and must rely on China for key links - the production capacity of solar panels accounts for an absolute majority of the global supply. It is neither realistic nor economical to completely replace it in the short term, and if it fully shifts to European domestic or "friendly" production, the timeline for the transition may extend to twenty years.
However, some "deconstruction" has already been quietly underway. Yesterday, in a survey at a Swiss business school, they pointed out that a Danish wind turbine manufacturer told the European Commission that, due to concerns about data transmission and the proximity of wind turbines to military facilities, the company could comply with political demands to stop using Chinese sensors, but would face procurement premiums. Such arguments are constantly occurring.
"De-risking" also involves the survival of Europe's entire industrial ecosystem. If basic industries such as steel, chemicals, and automobiles become hollowed out due to price disadvantages, it not only poses safety risks (steel is needed to make cars, weapons, etc.) but also causes social unrest in the West. In other words, purchasing from China saves short-term costs, but if the result is the shrinkage of the German automotive industry and the closure of steel mills, the unemployment and social unrest caused would far outweigh the financial savings.
Therefore, "de-risking" is not simply a linear reduction in imports, but a very complex concept. Its internal issues are highly differentiated: some parts are relatively easy to replace and less controversial, while others are extremely difficult and highly controversial. It can be determined that this issue will remain the core axis of Europe's economic strategy toward China.
Europe feels a sense of humiliation in the face of the US
Wang Wen: Yes, so I think sometimes in the eyes of many Chinese scholars, Europe's stance toward China has long been indecisive, failing to show independence, pragmatism, or consistency. Chinese people used to admire Europe, especially the UK, France, and Germany. Most Chinese believe that the UK, France, and Germany are mature great powers, the creators of modern civilization. But the problem is, after the world entered modernization, Europe seems to have lost its independent voice. We seem to no longer find the great thinkers and strategists of the past. So now, when we look at Europe, we miss the great leaders, mentors, and strategists who appeared in Europe in the 80s and 90s. So my question is: what is your view on Europe's current strategy? Can Europe revive its glory?
Gideon Rachman: I think yes, because I believe Europe still has top universities, a mature education system, and a deep cultural heritage, and is also one of the wealthiest regions in the world, theoretically completely capable of continuing to produce new ideas. However, there is currently a sense of drifting and uncertainty in Europe, the root of which can be summarized as follows:
Firstly, compared to the 80s and 90s, the elite class in Europe at that time had a high consensus on "deepening European integration" and successfully completed several landmark events: after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe was reunified, and countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic returned to the mainstream of Europe. Europe's culture, confidence, and wealth were greatly boosted, which not only increased the size of the single market but also increased opportunities for Europeans. I think at that time, there was a feeling that Europe created a single currency and a single market in the 90s because there were leaders like Helmut Kohl (German Chancellor) and Jacques Delors (President of the European Commission), who had vision and could build enough political consensus.
After the Cold War, Europe generally believed that external military threats had decreased, defense spending continued to decline, and the space for decision-making independent of the US expanded, reducing the sense of risk of breaking away from the US. However, now, it's very interesting that we can see a sense of humiliation in Europe. When Trump imposed a 15% tariff on the EU, the European public strongly supported a counterattack, but in the end, they did not implement equal measures, because Europe still needs American security guarantees. Within the NATO framework, about 50% of the frontline forces and high-end intelligence, aerial refueling, and anti-missile capabilities depend on the US, forming a "security-trade" bondage structure. This kind of dependency is similar to Japan in the 80s during the US-Japan trade friction, where Japan could not really say "no" to the US's unequal demands, and today's Europe is the same.
There are other things, such as after the financial crisis, Europe's debt levels have risen and potential growth rates have slowed down, weakening policy confidence. At the same time, right-wing and left-wing forces have simultaneously risen, making it more difficult to reach consensus. Because the EU is not a single country, it consists of 27 countries, and in many cases, it is harder to make decisions. When the center-left, pro-EU centrist forces are in control, they can make decisions, they can create a single currency. However, when there is a big split - for example, one end has Hungary's Prime Minister Orbán, who is quite skeptical of the EU and more inclined to reconcile with Russia, and the other end has left-wing governments such as Spain - it is difficult to unite things under highly divided circumstances.
But I just want to say that what I described is the current situation, which does not mean that the situation will always be like this. Politics can change, and I think Trump's external shock may force Europe to take action, but it cannot be done overnight, they are trying to take action within the next ten years.
Wang Wen: Yes, that's the next question I wanted to ask you. Eight years ago, you wrote an article expressing cautious optimism about Trump, and now you have become a continuous critic. How do you evaluate Trump now?
Gideon Rachman: I never became a supporter of Trump. In fact, as early as 2015, I wrote an article stating that my nightmare for Europe was that in 2016, if "Trump-Putin-Le Pen" three right-wing leaders were elected, it would be a nightmare for Europe. Ultimately, Le Pen did not become the president of France, but my concerns showed the vigilance against the rise of the far-right.
The reason I have continuously criticized Trump is first, I am a Western liberal, and Trump's various proposals are contrary to this tradition. Although globalization comes with complex adjustments, it is overall a force that promotes prosperity and peace; Western societies have also benefited from relatively open immigration policies. Trump's systematic hostility towards immigration, I think, has a long-term destructive effect.
Secondly, I think Trump is not a democrat, in fact, his governing logic tends to weaken democratic checks and balances, governing the US with "unconstrained strong power." To me, this is extremely destructive, and I don't think it's a good way to manage a country (at least a Western country).
Thirdly, in the field of higher education, I don't like the way he targets universities, frequently attacking top universities like Harvard and Yale, which are important sources of American soft power and should enjoy academic autonomy. I don't think Trump's trade policies are beneficial, of course, anyone can do some good things, if Trump can bring peace to the Middle East, I will cheer for him, but I can't agree with many of his actions.
On September 30, 2024, US President Trump said that he was about to reach an agreement with Harvard University.
American technological blockade has accelerated China's technological breakthroughs
Wang Wen: Next, let's talk about the Sino-US competition. You once proposed in your article that the US and China have entered a stage of "mutual dependent confrontation." I would like to share my observations from the Chinese perspective. Over the past eight years, Trump's trade war and technology war against China, aimed at containing China's rise, can be seen as a failure. Instead, these external pressures have prompted China to accelerate its technological self-reliance and strategic security layout, and in the social sphere, have made the Chinese people more united, making them realize the harsh reality of the international community, and strengthened our commitment to technological independence and strategic security.
As an example of my personal experience: five years ago, I switched my laptop from Intel to Huawei; last year, I replaced my car from Audi to Huawei; two days ago, I replaced my iPhone with the latest Huawei phone. For the first time in thirteen years, I have left Apple, and this change was entirely a market choice - the product experience of Chinese brands is sufficient to match iPhones, and even more attractive. This shows that the technology and quality of Chinese brands are rapidly improving. Therefore, my question is: how do you evaluate the overall effectiveness of the Trump administration's policies toward China over the past eight years?
Gideon Rachman: First of all, the technological restrictions on China by the Trump and Biden administrations show a clear continuity, reflecting a bipartisan consensus within the US that it is necessary to limit China's technological advancement, or at least not to sell the best technologies to China, and to see it as a long-term technological competition. If you talk to top AI companies in the US, they will all say: "Any additional regulation on our algorithms will weaken our speed, because China will win the AI competition." This is their fundamental argument.
But I think, compared to that, the methods of the Biden team are more rational and systematic, but whether they are more effective is uncertain; the measures of the Trump administration are characterized by a lot of improvisation, and the tariff levels and implementation rhythms often vary according to his personal feelings toward China. As for the "reindustrialization" goal, I have seen Chinese scholars like Professor Wang you have released some rather interesting videos and opinions. When the US imposed a 145% tariff on China at a certain time, Chinese people in the video said: "Do Americans really want to sit on the production line to manufacture those 'made in China' products?" Not necessarily, they may not like doing that. So I think moving production lines back to the US lacks a realistic assessment. Therefore, from the US perspective, a large part of labor-intensive sectors is more suitable to be transferred to Mexico or Vietnam, rather than back to the US.
Regarding technological blockades, the Biden administration focused on semiconductors and supercomputing chips. However, three major cases show that the restrictions often trigger Chinese acceleration of alternatives:
First, the case of Huawei. Despite the export controls placing Huawei on the entity list, Huawei still launched self-developed chips and operating systems. I think Huawei once really became a focal point in preventing China from occupying certain areas. There was a heated debate in the UK on whether to allow Huawei to participate in 5G construction, which was a very controversial decision, but Huawei has proven that it can produce phones as good as Apple's without those chips, and China was elated.
At the Huawei All-Connected Conference 2025, Huawei's rotating chairman Xu Zhijun announced multiple Ascend series chips and evolution roadmaps, including the Ascend 950 series, Ascend 960 series, and Ascend 970 series. Source: Observer Net
Second, a more recent and very interesting case is Nvidia. During the Biden administration, attempts were made to prevent Nvidia from selling its most advanced chips to China, as the US believed these chips were crucial for military technology and AI. Nvidia was very angry about this, as China is its key market. The debate on this issue went back and forth. But I read in the newspaper last week that China stated "it is no longer pursuing the latest generation of Nvidia chips," and instead is investing in domestic or self-designed architectures, aiming to reduce dependence on the US. In other words, as a top US technology expert who opposes all these measures told me: "What we (Western countries) are doing seems to be telling China: 'Look here, you have dependencies, you have weaknesses.' Then China will go and solve it, accelerating the formation of an alternative ecosystem that would otherwise take much longer to form."
Third, it was also on the headlines at the time, but now people are talking less about it, but I think it is very important — the DeepSeek case. DeepSeek achieves comparable generative capabilities to OpenAI with significantly less computing power, seemingly offering a simpler and less capital-intensive way to enter large language models.
The underlying message behind these cases is that both the US and China are now striving to reduce their reliance on each other in technology.
Wang Wen: Yes, that's why I especially want to know how the Western mainstream media views China's future, so I would like to ask: Does the Western mainstream media consider China's successful rise as inevitable? According to my observation, the Western mainstream media is amazed by China's economic resilience and hopes to gain necessary benefits from economic cooperation with China; but on the other hand, Western media also stoke the "China threat theory," and some even imply that China's economy has already peaked. So what do you think about China's future? Is China's successful rise inevitable? Will there be a decline at some point in the future?
Gideon Rachman: Any country will decline at some point in the future, the key is when? As we just discussed, China is currently showing strong momentum in technological breakthroughs, economic growth, and brand entry into Europe, Latin America, and other regions. However, there are still several issues. First, the population structure. The total fertility rate has fallen below the replacement level, similar to Japan and South Korea, which is an overall problem in East Asia. In fact, the situation in the UK is also quite serious; if we don't look at immigration and only look at the birth rate of native-born populations, the UK's population will also shrink. From a long-term economic perspective, this will lead to a contraction in the labor supply and an increase in the pension burden. Second, the youth unemployment rate; in addition, there are other issues, such as real estate bubbles and local government debt.
Very few economies have no weaknesses at all. These issues certainly exist. Given the massive size of China's economy, its growth path will have spillover effects on the global scale. The focus of the current debate in the West is: is China undergoing a new export-driven phase? Will we feel a second "China shock"? Because China's domestic demand is low, so the source of growth must again turn to exports, can the world cope with this?
Wang Wen: Therefore, I invite you to come to China soon to personally observe China's development, and the youth employment situation you mentioned, perhaps you will have new observations in a few weeks.
Next are the last two questions: in recent years, you have paid close attention to the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the Israel-Palestine conflict, but I don't want to discuss the essence of these conflicts. I want to discuss the ability of the West to contain or end wars in the future, because we all know that wars will continue to increase in the future. So, does the West still have the leverage to make the world more peaceful? How do you predict the "next war" and the "next crisis" triggers?
When the US is destroying its own soft power, the "Chinese model" may become a new ideological and governance paradigm
Gideon Rachman: In Europe, a lot depends on how the Ukraine-Russia conflict ends. It is well known that Europe has gone through a difficult period. This large-scale land war since World War II is said to have caused about a million Russian casualties, and Ukraine doesn't talk about its losses, but it must be many. This war has had an economic impact and reshaped the political atmosphere. Therefore, the EU is now increasing its defense budget, because they are worried that if Russia wins in Ukraine, the next target may be us. Although the Russians obviously deny this intention, the perception of the Russian threat in Europe has changed the atmosphere.
In the Middle East, I don't think anyone thinks Israel will attack Europe, but terrorism spillovers and Red Sea shipping risks have become tangible: for example, ships passing through the Suez Canal - once the most direct route to Europe and Africa - now about 40-50% of the shipping no longer goes there because it's too dangerous, and the feeling of war is closer than for a long time. The Oslo Peace Research Institute's latest data shows that the number of wars currently being fought worldwide has reached a record high since 1945, and there is a sense of失控 (loss of control) in some conflicts, even if some of them are not widely noticed, but for example, "low attention" battlefields like Sudan are still present.
I am willing to believe - I do believe - that the situation is not necessarily going to get worse. If that were the case, it would be terrible news for everyone. I believe that if the Gaza conflict can cease within the next few months, it would be a positive signal. The Ukraine conflict is currently in a stalemate, and neither side can achieve a decisive breakthrough. There was a period when I thought Russia might start making some progress, but they seem to be struggling in Ukraine. Neither side is ready to reconcile this year, but maybe next year, because then it will be clearly evident that neither side can win. The difficulty is not military, but political. I think the leaders of both sides now cannot admit that they cannot win.
Putin: It is necessary to ensure that all the goals set for the special military operation are fulfilled unconditionally
As for the "next crisis," from Washington's perspective, the core concern has shifted to East Asia and all narratives surrounding Taiwan, but that is another issue.
Wang Wen: Three days ago, I met President Putin at the Valdai Club in Sochi, and he was energetic, gave a long speech and released several positive signals, perhaps there will be a turnaround next year.
Gideon Rachman: Yes, I haven't been to Valdai, but I know Lukyanov (Sergei Lukyanov, head of the Valdai Club).
Wang Wen: He is a good friend of mine, and we had a long conversation in Sochi.
Next is the final question — let's talk about 2050. The United Nations' 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) seem to have failed. Last year, I talked to former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and he also expressed regret. Renmin University is promoting the "Human 2050" project, hoping to contribute Chinese wisdom to humanity's long-term future. So my question — and the final question — is: what do you think about 2050? Will China become the most powerful country by 2050? In your view, what contributions should China make to humanity's future?
Gideon Rachman: 2050 seems very far away now.
Professor Wang: Actually, it's not far, because we know that there are only 25 years left.
Gideon Rachman: If I have to predict which country will be the most powerful, I think China is likely to be more powerful in all aspects. I think its economic influence will continue to grow, and I also think its intellectual influence will grow, which largely depends on what happens in the US. As I said, I am not a Trump enthusiast, and I think the US is destroying a lot of its soft power in the world — the power of ideas, which reached its peak after the Cold War. Therefore, the world will seek new ideological and governance paradigms, and China is in a favorable position to showcase itself as an alternative model.
I think the success and appeal of the "Chinese model" partly stems from its non-aggressive nature. The US has launched wars in the Middle East multiple times, and Trump has maintained an aggressive tone. If China, after significantly enhancing its military capabilities, chooses to go to war, it will immediately weaken its model's appeal and change the global balance of power. Therefore, my advice is to avoid war if possible. China's long-term success and prosperity periods coincided with long-term peace periods.
I hope China is less likely to make that mistake than Russia. I think Russia made that mistake — because they felt they were in decline. They believed that unless they dramatically change the situation through war, Russia would lose its status as a great power, after all, they can see their rankings slipping in areas such as the economy. I think China may feel different about the future, and China is willing to wait, because China's strength is continuously accumulating and growing.
So, my guess is that by 2050, if you draw a straight line (continuing the current trend), China will be more powerful. But the only thing I want to remind you is that history does not move in a straight line, and there will always be unexpected events. But in a straight-line prediction, China will develop more powerfully.
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