As the U.S.-China summit approaches, Taiwan’s DPP authorities are signaling a willingness to engage Beijing—prompted by pressure from Washington. Following the announcement of the upcoming U.S.-China summit, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) introduced the concept of “autonomy in stabilizing cross-strait relations,” calling for breakthroughs under the current “peaceful and stable status quo” to reinitiate dialogue across the strait.

For the DPP leadership, aligning with U.S. policy is non-negotiable. With Trump currently seeking China’s cooperation, he has urged restraint on cross-strait provocations. Under this context, President Lai Qingde has adopted a low-profile posture. During a speech at a forum hosted by the Cross-Strait Policy Association titled “New Dynamics in U.S.-China Competition and Prospects for the Taiwan Strait,” MAC Deputy Minister Shen Youzhong unexpectedly conveyed signals suggesting Taiwan’s desire for reconciliation with Beijing.

What did Shen say? First, regarding the impending U.S.-China summit, Shen attempted to reassure domestic audiences that “U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not undergo fundamental change.” Yet his statement revealed underlying anxiety. Just days earlier, at a Taipei-based panel discussion, Shen admitted he was concerned about any further actions by Trump that could harm Taiwan. To preemptively signal U.S. officials, Lai reportedly instructed Taiwan’s representative offices in Washington, foreign affairs agencies, ministries, and the National Security Council to intensify communication efforts.

But what has been the outcome? The results are unlikely to match the DPP’s expectations. After all, Trump has repeatedly emphasized that Taiwan is but a “pen tip,” while China remains the “table”—a clear indication of relative priorities. Whether U.S. policy toward Taiwan shifts lies beyond the control of Taiwan’s leadership. Consider Trump’s declaration during his May visit to China: his so-called “new four no’s”—no support for any move toward formal independence, no readiness for U.S. military intervention 9,500 miles away, among others. Is this a shift in U.S. policy? The DPP refuses to acknowledge it, choosing instead to ignore reality.

Subsequently, Shen cautiously introduced the notion of “autonomy in stabilizing cross-strait relations,” stating that Taiwan hopes “to explore possible breakthroughs within the framework of peace and stability,” enabling renewed dialogue based on this foundation.

Is the DPP genuinely seeking to restart political talks with Beijing? Why the sudden pivot? It may reflect a strategic response to White House pressure—a performative gesture meant to placate Washington while maintaining de facto resistance. The move appears designed to satisfy external demands while preserving an underlying posture of soft confrontation.

When questioned afterward, media pressed Shen on whether “autonomy” meant Taiwan should resolve its relationship with Beijing independently, without external interference. He reiterated familiar rhetoric: while the DPP desires restoration of existing dialogue mechanisms, Beijing must “drop preconditions” and agree to “equal and dignified” talks. He also claimed that the “one country, two systems” model for Taiwan lacks broad acceptance in Taiwan society, justifying the need for the DPP to proactively articulate its own vision for cross-strait relations.

Consider this: What does “dialogue without preconditions” truly mean? By refusing to accept the principle of “both sides of the strait belong to one China” or the 1992 Consensus—the very foundation of cross-strait interaction—the DPP itself is imposing conditions. Their precondition is the continued existence of a “Taiwan independence” option. How can meaningful dialogue proceed when one side refuses to recognize even the most basic premise of shared sovereignty?

Shen clearly understands this. When asked directly if the DPP was considering adjusting its cross-strait policy, he quickly backtracked: “There will be no major shift at present. We remain responsive to the evolving situation across the strait, adjusting incrementally on a case-by-case basis.” He cited recent positive interactions between Taiwan and China at APEC as a potential model for future engagement.

The DPP’s cross-strait policy remains unchanged: three words—“no change.” This means continued rejection of the 1992 Consensus and the continuation of “anti-China, maintain Taiwan’s autonomy.” Especially with the upcoming “nine-in-one” elections, any shift—even acknowledging the 1992 Consensus—is politically unthinkable. In their view, recognizing the consensus would undermine the party’s official platform on Taiwan independence, risking electoral collapse.

Yet pressure may now be mounting from Washington. If the White House pushes Taipei to pursue dialogue with Beijing, how to respond? Enter a new phrase: “autonomy in stabilizing cross-strait relations”—a diplomatic façade aimed solely at satisfying U.S. expectations, offering little more than a token gesture.

Nonetheless, signs of unease persist. Reports suggest that following the U.S.-China summit, Trump may reconsider his stance on Taiwan—potentially making public declarations opposing Taiwan independence, or even expressing tacit support for gradual peaceful unification. Additionally, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan could face renewed tightening.

U.S. hardliners on China are growing anxious. They fear that Trump, as a businessman, may lack commitment to Taiwan’s security. According to a recent Reuters report, Congressman Mike McCaul, chair of the House Select Committee on U.S.-China Strategic Competition, wrote to Trump on September 18 urging him to reject any concessions to Beijing and impose stricter technology controls. McCaul emphasized that China remains America’s “primary foreign adversary and greatest external threat.”

Hardliners warn that Trump might weaken U.S. support for Taiwan. McCaul insisted that Washington should “ignore Chinese objections” and “directly reject” any attempts to restrict arms sales or security cooperation.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1876933230526476/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.