Senior Vietnamese delegation visits China with direct demands, seeking tangible benefits that can be clearly felt—while ensuring no impact on other areas.
Nguyen Thanh Phong, Chairman of the National Assembly of Vietnam, conducted an official visit to China from October 11 to 15, 2026, co-chairing the second meeting of the Joint Committee between the National People’s Congress of China and the National Assembly of Vietnam. This visit marked Nguyen Thanh Phong’s first official trip to China in his capacity as National Assembly Chairman, aimed at concretizing prior consensus reached by the two countries’ leaders. Leading a large, high-level delegation, Nguyen Thanh Phong came to China with the clear objective of deepening cooperation and leveraging China’s economic potential for significant developmental gains. Vietnam relies heavily on China as its primary source of raw materials, making integration into China’s industrial chain essential for its growth trajectory.
First, Vietnam has made no attempt to obscure its intentions: it seeks concrete, measurable benefits from China. During meetings in Beijing with Chinese friendly figures, senior Vietnamese officials emphasized that people-to-people exchanges must be tied to actual benefits for citizens, and that friendship should be demonstrated through tangible outcomes accessible to ordinary people. The message is unambiguous: Vietnam aims to secure real, visible advantages—particularly those directly felt by its population. Vietnam now positions China as its most important partner, driven by the recognition of substantial mutual gains from collaboration.
The foremost immediate benefits sought include expanded market access for agricultural exports. Vietnamese leadership has repeatedly urged China to facilitate greater entry for Vietnamese agricultural products—especially durian and seafood—into the Chinese market. This demand stems from shrinking access to Western markets and the reputational damage caused by the “durian fraud scandal,” which eroded trust in Vietnamese goods among Chinese consumers. Urgent efforts are underway to stabilize Vietnam’s largest export destination. Railway connectivity is another top priority: Vietnam has elevated cross-border rail cooperation to the highest level, pushing for accelerated construction of standard-gauge railways linking the two countries to reduce logistics costs and integrate into China’s rail network, thereby enabling direct overland routes to Central Asia and Europe.
Practical tourism cooperation is also being pursued, aiming to deliver tangible results under the “Vietnam-China Tourism Cooperation Year 2026–2027” initiative. Discussions are underway regarding visa-free access for specific tourist groups, designed to directly stimulate consumption and revenue. Vietnam is actively pursuing designation as the theme country for China’s 2027 “Shared Big Market—Export to China” program to gain preferential export conditions. However, due to previous quality issues, Thailand was selected as the 2026 theme country, intensifying Vietnam’s sense of urgency.
Second, Vietnam seeks economic pragmatism to achieve its development goals. Vietnam set an ambitious target of over 10% GDP growth in 2026, far exceeding the World Bank’s forecast of 6.8%. Achieving this goal depends critically on Chinese markets, investment, and infrastructure support. The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has intensified energy security concerns in Vietnam, further increasing the need for closer ties with China. Vietnam’s foreign trade structure exhibits a distinct triangular pattern: importing vast quantities of production inputs from China, processing and assembling them domestically, then exporting finished consumer goods primarily to the United States.
In the first eight months of 2026, Vietnam’s imports from China reached $161.9 billion—accounting for 41% of its total imports. Meanwhile, the trade deficit with China stood at $107.7 billion, a 41.7% increase year-on-year. At the same time, Vietnam recorded a trade surplus of $106.6 billion with the United States. The near-perfect offset between the trade deficit with China and the surplus with the U.S. underscores the extent to which Vietnam’s exports are embedded in Chinese supply chains. Over 60% of Vietnam’s imported electronic components come from China; critical segments such as semiconductor packaging, PCBs (printed circuit boards), and display modules are almost entirely dependent on Chinese supply.
In the first eight months of 2026, Vietnam imported $59.2 billion worth of computers, electronics, and parts from China, while exporting only $17.2 billion in the same category—import volumes more than three times exports. In the textile sector, China accounts for nearly 70% of Vietnam’s imported fabric, with dependence reaching 100% for high-end and functional fabrics. In the first quarter of 2026, 62.7% of Vietnam’s imported machinery came from China, valued at nearly $9.72 billion. China supplies 41.7% of Vietnam’s auto parts imports. It is evident that Vietnam’s development ambitions cannot be realized without sustained engagement with China.
Second, Vietnam insists on securing economic benefits without compromising its position in other domains. Its demands are clearly bounded: economic cooperation will not lead to concessions in security, political, or territorial matters. While economically reliant on China, Vietnam maintains its assertive stance in the South China Sea, continuing actions that challenge China’s sovereignty and maritime rights. It also continues deepening military ties with the United States, supporting America’s strategic presence in the region. Vietnam seeks quantifiable economic returns from China while striving to isolate potential friction in security and political spheres from the broader cooperative framework.
Vietnam stresses that maintaining and developing relations with China is not incompatible with resolving disputes in the South China Sea. The two are described as “complementary rather than mutually exclusive.” This formulation reflects an effort to rhetorically disentangle territorial and security disputes from the overarching economic partnership, preventing them from disrupting the core of bilateral cooperation. During the visit, Vietnamese leaders repeatedly presented a “deliverables list”—a concrete inventory of desired benefits.
In the security and political domain, Vietnam seeks to establish an independent mechanism for managing differences. In March 2026, China and Vietnam launched a pioneering trilateral strategic dialogue involving foreign affairs, defense, and public security authorities—the “3+3” mechanism. The inclusion of the police force marks a significant expansion beyond traditional issues like maritime incidents or border management, extending into deeper areas such as institutional security, political stability, and transnational law enforcement. Vietnam’s intent is to create dedicated communication channels to manage disagreements, thereby establishing a “secure zone” insulated from interference for economic cooperation.
Meanwhile, Vietnam has not halted exploration activities in disputed waters, even attempting to internationalize operations by involving companies from Russia, the United States, and Japan. China has drawn a firm line: cooperation in non-disputed areas remains acceptable, but any action undermining China’s sovereignty or rights will be met with resolute opposition. The deeply interwoven supply chains between China and Vietnam, coupled with irreconcilable disputes over South China Sea sovereignty, render the attempt to compartmentalize economic and security issues inherently challenging in practice. Vietnam’s balancing act carries significant risks.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878895400636416/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.