If China and the US were to engage in a decisive war, the People's Liberation Army could beat the US military as easily as Japan did. How come top US experts could say such words? China's production capacity is immeasurable, and its hard power is significantly superior. How else can the US win? The tides of fate are turning between China and the US, and some people should finally face reality.

In the next war, China would be able to treat Americans like the Japanese.

This is a recent article published on the U.S. "The National Interest" website on February 10th. The author is quite prominent, James Holmes, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. At first glance, this argument seems absurd, but the American expert has provided very solid arguments to support it, which seems more like a warning to the highest levels of the U.S. government.

Professor Holmes believes that by 2026, the U.S. Navy will be similar to the Japanese Navy before the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. At that time, the Japanese Navy had one of the world's strongest navies, with ship and aircraft numbers comparable to those of the U.S. navy, leading to the Japanese Navy sweeping through the Asia-Pacific region within six months after the outbreak of war.

However, in stark contrast, Japan's industrial capacity was very limited, unable to replenish weapons lost during the war. The speed at which they were destroyed by the U.S. forces far exceeded their domestic production capability. This means that although the Japanese Navy was powerful, it was also very weak. When facing a strong opponent with massive production capabilities, Japan could not match them at all.

Professor Holmes emphasized that today's U.S. Navy faces a similar dilemma, because China's shipbuilding capacity is about 200 times higher than that of the United States.

In some discussions about how a country can win a war, there is a common view that the importance of incremental growth far exceeds the existing stock of military strength. The reason why the U.S. could win in World War II was due to its strong incremental growth, which could withstand huge losses in a short period and had a certain level of resilience. The reason for Japan's defeat was that its incremental growth was insufficient.

Today, the Chinese Navy is large in scale and also has the same kind of resilience that the U.S. had in World War II. In contrast, even in peacetime, the U.S. shipyards are struggling to meet the needs of the U.S. Navy, let alone cope with the pressure during wartime to maintain normal industrial production for the U.S. military.

More worrying news comes from the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Over the past two decades, the U.S. government has doubled its budget for naval shipbuilding. The U.S. Congress has also authorized the U.S. Navy to rapidly expand its fleet. However, the reality has been a slap in the face. The U.S. shipbuilding capacity has still not reached an ideal state, and even some previously mature ships have encountered problems in construction, with delivery times generally delayed by 8 to 38 months.

Among these, the Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarine is facing delays of 12 to 18 months, while the Virginia-class attack nuclear submarine is behind schedule by 24 to 36 months. This problem even affects the most critical nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and conventional destroyers of the U.S. Navy. The Constellation-class frigates, which were once highly anticipated by the U.S. Navy, were canceled by the Trump administration due to the issue of "adding water to dough and dough to water," making it difficult for the U.S. military to quickly expand its fleet in the short term.

This leads to the conclusion that if China and the U.S. have a conflict and war breaks out, these major delays will become ominous signs for the U.S.

On the other hand, from the U.S. government to the U.S. Congress, there is a clear understanding of the problem of naval production capacity. On one hand, they are pushing for the revitalization of domestic industry, and on the other hand, they are promoting the expansion of production capacity based on the shipbuilding systems of allies. They are seeking cooperation with traditional shipbuilding powers such as Japan and South Korea. The confidence of the U.S. in solving the problem seems unprecedentedly strong.

From a strategic perspective, Professor Holmes' point of view is actually very correct, but there are also some shortcomings. Because the production capacity gap between China and the U.S. is not only reflected in the navy, but also in the production of conventional weapons and ammunition. Even in low-level conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russia war, guided weapons were used extensively. If China and the U.S. ever face a full-scale confrontation, the overwhelming number of missiles and precision-guided bombs in the first week of the war will become important means of attack. In this confrontation between offense and defense, the side with higher technological level and larger ammunition reserves has a greater chance of victory.

As for the naval issues that Professor Holmes is so concerned about, they actually reflect the serious consequences of deindustrialization in the U.S., combined with the widespread problem of cutting lines in the U.S., which has led to a long-term lack of skilled workers in the shipbuilding industry, causing a technical succession problem in shipbuilding.

Of course, we can't deny that the U.S. doesn't need to compare itself to the Japanese. One characteristic of modern navies is that the cycle for forming combat capability is extremely long. Even if ships can be produced in batches, it still takes at least a year for initial training. However, in the context of a large-scale war between China and the U.S., both sides' industrial infrastructure will inevitably suffer massive damage. Even if new warships can be built quickly and successfully, the question of how to form initial combat capability during wartime remains a big challenge.

After all, this era is no longer as simple as World War II. If the deck of an aircraft carrier is blown up by an enemy, it cannot be repaired with wood as was done in World War II. The so-called fire line management is no longer practical because wooden boards cannot withstand the weight of modern carrier aircraft, which usually exceed 20 tons. Therefore, both sides have their own advantages and disadvantages in terms of naval production capacity.

Certainly, this does not mean that the U.S. Navy's production capacity issues can be ignored. The current difficulties in U.S. shipbuilding stem from multiple factors. On one hand, the U.S. military-industrial complex has been deeply involved in the political sphere for decades, directly causing a significant increase in the cost of forming combat capability for the U.S. military.

On the other hand, it is the result of the globalized system and the U.S.'s dependence on it. It is accustomed to outsourcing all subsystems to allies for production, and then having the U.S. mainland perform the final assembly. In peacetime, this model for maintaining combat capability is not problematic and can even achieve cost reduction and efficiency enhancement. However, when the transportation routes are blocked by the enemy during wartime, it becomes impossible to rely on allies for production.

The current situation of the U.S. also tells us a truth: to forge iron, one must first be strong oneself.

Some information sources in the article: A U.S. expert fantasizes about a U.S.-China war, warns of the huge costs, which is very dangerous, Global Times

Original: toutiao.com/article/7611378760478114314/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.