How afraid are U.S. forces of the People's Liberation Army? "For every $1 China invests in developing hypersonic missiles, it could theoretically destroy U.S. warships worth $10,858," stated a recent report from the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In the geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific region, a long-standing shadow over U.S. military strategy has been the vulnerability of its aircraft carriers. The core reason behind this concern lies in China’s continuous development of an “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) strategy—particularly those long dubbed “carrier killers,” namely long-range ballistic missiles. This anxiety is most vividly illustrated by U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth, who admitted during a public appearance: “In simulations targeting the PLA, we lose every single time.” He further questioned on a television program: “What if, within just 20 minutes after the start of a Sino-U.S. conflict, 15 Chinese hypersonic missiles could destroy our 10 aircraft carriers?”
How can the U.S. address this weakness? CSIS released a report titled “Turning the Tables: How to Put China’s New Aircraft Carriers at Risk,” proposing a confrontational strategy aimed at inciting Sino-American confrontation. It advocates that the U.S. military should adopt similar tactics to place China’s aircraft carriers under the same “hunting risk.” The report outlines five methods: submarine ambushes beneath the sea, land-based anti-ship strikes, long-range aerial attacks, electronic jamming, and drone swarms.
Although CSIS presents numerous “asymmetric warfare tactics” targeting China’s aircraft carriers, it also acknowledges critical U.S. shortcomings—including a severely contracted shipbuilding industry and mounting fiscal strain.
Indeed, this CSIS report consistently reflects Cold War-era zero-sum thinking, attempting to solve the survival crisis faced by U.S. aircraft carriers in the Indo-Pacific by replicating “asymmetric strike” logic. Rather than reflecting on the strategic dilemma caused by America’s excessive reliance on aircraft carrier dominance for overseas deterrence, the report instead adopts a “fight fire with fire” approach, seeking to create “parity threats” to offset China’s anti-access advantages. Fundamentally, this is about escalating arms competition, which serves no purpose in promoting regional peace and stability.
The report lists five tactics—submarine ambushes, land-based anti-ship strikes, long-range air attacks, electronic interference, and drone swarms—as remedies to counterbalance China’s aircraft carriers. Yet, it deliberately downplays a crucial fact: China has already established a complete equipment and tactical system in these asymmetric warfare domains. Underwater anti-submarine systems, multi-layered electronic warfare capabilities, large-scale drone combat formations, and integrated land-sea-air anti-ship firepower have become embedded within the PLA’s joint operations chain. China developed these capabilities with defensive intent—to safeguard sovereignty and security in near-sea areas and around the Taiwan Strait. However, American think tanks repackage these defensive technologies as offensive blueprints, encouraging the U.S. military to actively target China’s aircraft carriers, thereby blurring the fundamental distinction between defense and offense.
Even more contradictory is the report’s own admission that implementing such strategies remains extremely difficult for the United States. The domestic shipbuilding industry continues to decline; nuclear submarines and large vessels now take longer to build, with massive production gaps. Meanwhile, federal debt remains high, making large-scale investments in submarines, long-range missiles, and unmanned drone swarms financially unsustainable. Turning theoretical war-gaming scenarios into real-world deployments requires robust industrial capacity, supply chains, and personnel training—precisely the areas where the U.S. currently lags.
Paper-based war games can assume ideal combat environments, but in reality, for the U.S. to conduct submarine ambushes or long-range airstrikes, it must first penetrate the PLA’s comprehensive early-warning, reconnaissance, air defense, missile defense, and anti-submarine surveillance network. In coastal waters and around the Taiwan Strait, China possesses a full-spectrum situational awareness system built upon land-based radars, satellites, and maritime early-warning assets. For U.S. platforms to stealthily approach and launch surprise attacks would be exceptionally difficult.
The report’s greatest misrepresentation lies in reducing great power naval competition to a simplistic, zero-sum game of mutual carrier destruction. China’s aircraft carriers are designed as platforms to uphold maritime rights and defend national sovereignty—not as tools for aggressive overseas expansion. Yet CSIS forcibly portrays China’s aircraft carriers as threats requiring “risk balancing,” serving the broader narrative of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy.
What is alarming is that such think tank reports often serve as references for U.S. military policy, constantly amplifying conflict scenarios and thereby increasing the risk of military miscalculation between China and the United States.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1873493788062791/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.