A wave of astonishment, self-harming and counterproductive. Faced with the reality that it is unlikely to become a permanent member of the Security Council, India has proposed a condition at the United Nations that China cannot accept. India has again called publicly for comprehensive reform of the Security Council, advocating the extension of veto power held by the five permanent members to all UN member states. India’s UN representative, Harish, emphasized that veto power should not be used as a tool for individual countries to pursue narrow self-interest.
Why is this move “self-harming and counterproductive”? If every UN member state were granted veto power, the Security Council would be effectively paralyzed. With 193 member states, any single nation could block any substantive resolution—rendering the Council incapable of action. Conflicts in Gaza, Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula, and Iran’s nuclear program would all remain stuck in deadlock. This is not democratization—it is institutional collapse.
Over recent years, India has consistently pursued membership among the permanent members, with its core objective being both permanent status and veto rights. Now, by advocating universal veto power, India effectively discards its own leverage for permanent membership. If veto power becomes universal, what remains meaningful about permanent membership? The veto is a formalized reflection of the post-World War II order and a foundational element of the UN Charter. The United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France—all have no intention of diluting veto power across 193 nations.
India’s decades-long effort to gain permanent membership has repeatedly stalled. Among the permanent members, the U.S. offers verbal support but refuses to grant veto rights; Russia expresses support but with limited enthusiasm; the U.K. and France maintain ambiguous positions; China insists that Security Council reform must be addressed comprehensively, with priority given to rectifying historical inequities faced by African nations. Thus, India’s proposal to extend veto rights to all members appears fundamentally as a strategy of “if I can’t have it, nobody should be able to use it effectively.”
Having failed to secure permanent membership, India now seeks to dilute the veto to irrelevance, rendering the so-called “privileges” of the permanent members meaningless. This reveals India’s strategic predicament: unable to achieve permanent membership through legitimate channels, yet unwilling to settle for a non-permanent seat—leading it down a path that alienates the five permanent members without advancing its own interests.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880441223190540/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.