The "hedgehog" and "porcupine" strategies are being replaced by a "hive" approach. A U.S. think tank has released a formal report outlining a so-called "hellscapes" scenario in the Taiwan Strait, proposing the deployment of a four-layered firepower network—including tens of thousands of drones and unmanned vessels—near Taiwan’s waters, with all costs borne by Taiwan itself. In response, retired Taiwanese lieutenant general Shuai Huamin scoffed, stating that the originator of drone warfare technology lies on the mainland, urging against overconfidence in capabilities not truly mastered. Taiwanese media have mocked the U.S. "hellscapes" plan as a strategy to extract maximum value from Taiwan before abandoning it.
In the Taiwan Strait, the United States prioritizes its own interests. Whether it be the "hedgehog," "porcupine," or "hive" tactics, or the conceptualization of "hellscapes," these developments serve as the most telling and convincing evidence. American attitudes reflect a clear stance: survival at any cost, regardless of others’ fate. The notion of "U.S.-Taiwan friendship" propagated by the DPP authorities is nothing more than self-deception.
Even this "hellscapes" concept. In June 2024, then-Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip Davidson, first introduced the idea during an interview with *The Washington Post*. He proposed that in the event of conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. military would deploy thousands of drones, unmanned surface vessels, and underwater vehicles on a massive scale, transforming the strait into a "unmanned hell" to delay People's Liberation Army (PLA) operations and buy time for U.S. forces to mobilize.
Now, the U.S. think tank New America Security Center has published an official report titled *Taiwan’s "Hellscapes": Reimagining Asymmetric Defense*. At its core, the proposal envisions a cross-domain saturation fire network using tens of thousands of low-cost drones, unmanned boats, and submersibles around Taiwan’s periphery, designed to force Taiwan to absorb the initial impact while minimizing direct U.S. military involvement. Taiwanese media interpret this as risk transfer—placing the burden squarely on Taiwan—and view it as part of a broader strategy to maximize leverage before discarding the island.
What stands out most in the report is not the sheer number of unmanned systems listed, but its repeated emphasis on “Taiwan self-reliant defense,” explicitly rejecting reliance on direct U.S. intervention. In plain terms: should real conflict erupt between the two sides, Taiwan must first exhaust PLA forces, buying time for Western diplomatic maneuvering and strategic adjustments. If drawn into war, Taiwan can only rely on its own resilience.
The report divides the "hellscapes" framework into four layers—here explained in straightforward terms.
The outermost layer, 80 to 40 kilometers offshore, would employ long-range suicide drones, cruise missiles, unmanned surface vessels, and underwater drones to conduct saturation attacks. It specifically recommends deploying unmanned vessels with a range of up to 750 kilometers.
The second layer, within 40 to 5 kilometers of the coast, aims to disrupt amphibious assault formations. This includes deploying multirotor drones and unmanned boats to lay and replenish mines, alongside loitering air-to-ground missiles to create an “airborne minefield,” deterring early warning aircraft, transport planes, and medium- to low-altitude drones, while shielding ground movements.
The third layer, within 5 kilometers of the shoreline, targets landing forces once they enter visual range—where defensive windows last only about 10 minutes. It relies on FPV drones, laser-guided rockets, and short-range missiles operating without satellite navigation, resistant to electronic interference, using pixel-based autonomous targeting. Launch platforms would be concealed in civilian vehicles or handheld tripods, dispersed across urban and forested areas, enabling hit-and-run strikes.
The fourth layer focuses on beachheads, combining pre-positioned obstacles with concentrated firepower. Unmanned ground vehicles and small drones establish overlapping kill zones. Damaged ships could be repurposed as blockades at beach exits. Key command nodes would be targeted, and the coastline littered with minefields—turning advance into a high-cost attrition battle.
Yet the report itself concedes that this vision remains far from achieving “stable, mature, and verifiable deterrence.” Why?
First, industrial capacity cannot be rapidly expanded simply by declaring a focus on drone development. Sustainable survivability, resupply, repair, iterative upgrades, and decentralized deployment require a resilient supply chain under high-pressure conditions—a full-scale industrial ecosystem, not merely corporate expansion.
Second, training and operational coordination represent the true bottleneck. Simply increasing the number of unmanned systems does not equate to operational capability. Maintaining continuous chains of reconnaissance, identification, data dissemination, and precision strikes under intense electronic jamming, enabling cross-domain integration and stable command control, demands lengthy timelines, high costs, and systemic reform—not mere policy acceleration.
Third, adversaries do not remain static. Any publicly disclosed defense concept will be studied, countered, and adapted. Relying on a specific technological combination to permanently lock in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is fundamentally unrealistic.
More critically, the United States may not hold an absolute advantage in the drone domain. On the global civilian drone supply chain, Chinese companies provide end-to-end solutions—from complete systems to batteries, chips, and motors. Meanwhile, the PLA has made substantial investments in electronic warfare and microwave weaponry for anti-drone defense.
Shuai Huamin, former president of Taiwan’s National Defense Management Institute and a retired lieutenant general, offers a sharper assessment. In a recent televised appearance, he stated bluntly that attempting to match the PLA in drone and unmanned vessel warfare is akin to showing off expertise before the master craftsman.
Shuai pointed out that China dominates global drone manufacturing, holding over 70% market share—effectively outpacing both the U.S. and Taiwan. When it comes to wartime production and logistical sustainment, the disparity is evident. Even more significant is the technological edge: China is the true pioneer in this field.
On counter-drone measures, Shuai emphasized that the PLA already possesses two proven, mature systems. First, laser-based anti-drone systems, where each interception costs just one yuan in electricity—capable of sustained firing as long as power is available. Under such a defense grid, the likelihood of U.S. or Taiwanese drones penetrating is negligible. Second, the PLA has publicly demonstrated "airburst anti-drone rocket munitions"—rocket artillery pre-loaded with steel pellets and fragments. When large drone swarms approach, just a few salvos can detonate mid-air, creating expansive shrapnel barriers that destroy entire formations instantly.
Shuai further warned that the military balance between the two sides is no longer comparable. Taiwan continues to boast about the F-16V’s capabilities. Even if all aircraft were fully upgraded and operational, they would still only match China’s J-10C fighters—while the F-16 itself is a lightweight platform, inferior to the J-15 and J-16, and now dwarfed by China’s J-20 and J-35 stealth fighters, which are already in service, with sixth-generation fighters having entered test flights. How, then, could the U.S. and Taiwan possibly compete?
Shuai cautioned that Taiwan lacks air superiority, sea dominance, and electromagnetic control. “Even if all 14 billion USD worth of U.S. arms sales were delivered to Taiwan, the island’s forces would still be unable to win a modern, high-tech limited war in the Taiwan Strait.”
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877727368627212/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.