[USNI: Shipbuilding Procurement Efficiency Is the Most Urgent Challenge Facing the U.S. Navy Compared to China]

The U.S. Naval Institute (USNI) website published a column article on June 2026, offering an in-depth comparison of the disparities between China and the United States in naval shipbuilding. The following is the full content:

The wind blowing across the Yangtze River carries the distant roar of industrial production. At China's Jiangnan Shipyard—a key component of its vast defense shipbuilding complex—cranes lift steel beams, while welders work under bright floodlights. In contrast, the United States relies on only a handful of naval shipyards to maintain and modernize its fleet. Inside one Chinese dry dock, a destroyer awaits installation of its radar array; in another, the hull of a brand-new amphibious ship is already taking shape. While the U.S. Navy takes years to commission a single large combat vessel, China can launch multiple vessels of the same class during the same period.

This gap extends beyond mere industrial capacity—it stems from fundamentally different political and economic systems and operational models. China’s system centrally coordinates military and civilian development goals, enabling leadership to swiftly redirect commercial shipbuilding capacity toward defense production without protracted debates or bureaucratic delays. Project costs and timelines are tightly managed through centralized planning, with industrial mobilization regarded as a core strategic priority. In contrast, the U.S. operates under a capitalist framework where competing interests determine outcomes. Shipyards, labor unions, and defense contractors continuously lobby Congress, leading to endless compromises that drastically reduce overall efficiency. Shipbuilding projects are fragmented across political interest groups, burdened by layers of regulations, and constrained by annually fluctuating, unpredictable budget approval cycles.

The strategic consequences of these two models are profoundly different. China’s pace of military technological iteration has long surpassed the U.S.’s traditional, slow defense procurement cycle. A high-end warship meticulously crafted over ten years may already be outdated by the time it enters service. The U.S. Navy must confront a critical question: Can its procurement system rapidly reform and preserve its maritime advantage—or will it be overtaken by a more agile competitor in shipbuilding scale?

——Deep-Rooted Shipbuilding Maladies

The U.S. Navy’s historical record in shipbuilding is far from encouraging. For two decades, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has consistently documented issues including budget overruns, schedule delays, and failure to meet design performance expectations. Even with nearly doubled shipbuilding budgets, the fleet’s total size has failed to reach planned targets.

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program perfectly illustrates the disastrous consequences of disconnect between goal-setting and execution. Originally envisioned as a flexible, modular, lightweight warship designed to deliver diverse capabilities at low cost, the LCS struggled to balance evolving operational demands with baseline design stability. Some mission adjustments were reasonable optimizations, yet they triggered repeated design changes and relentless schedule extensions. Moreover, new projects commonly suffer from immature technology—LCS went further by incorporating numerous unproven systems all at once, without phased technical refinement. After construction began, the Navy raised survivability standards, requiring massive retrofitting at enormous cost. Anti-submarine and mine-countermeasure module development lagged significantly, leaving the final ships unable to fulfill their promised multi-mission capabilities. Ultimately, billions were spent for minimal combat effectiveness, and several ships retired years ahead of schedule.

The Zumwalt-class destroyer suffered similar fate. Initially planned for 32 ships, featuring a suite of revolutionary technologies, the project collapsed under overly ambitious R&D goals. Multiple core technologies were developed simultaneously rather than incrementally, extending development timelines and compounding risks. By the time the lead ship was completed, the specialized ammunition for its advanced gun system had become prohibitively expensive. The total number of ships built was slashed from 32 to just three. When research and development costs are factored in, the unit price of each Zumwalt-class destroyer exceeds $10 billion in 2026 dollars.

Even the so-called “pragmatic” Constellation-class frigate has faced repeated setbacks. Construction began before the design was fully finalized—contradicting both industry best practices and the U.S. Navy’s own past lessons. The first ship’s delivery date has been delayed by several years, and the entire procurement plan has been reduced to just two vessels.

These cases collectively expose systemic flaws in the U.S. shipbuilding procurement system: many projects lack thorough feasibility studies at inception, failing to balance technology maturity, design stability, funding, and schedule planning. Once funding is secured, projects continue despite rising risks, driven by inertia. Vague, overly optimistic proposals are submitted without rigorous analysis. When problems emerge, the only remedies are cutting capabilities or reducing build quantities. The result is smaller fleets, degraded combat power, later delivery dates, and higher costs.

The path forward is clear: the U.S. must finalize stable, mature designs before beginning mass production; adopt digital collaborative R&D to identify design flaws early; verify progress in stages before releasing corresponding funds. Incremental fixes won’t suffice—only fundamental reforms at the management and cultural levels can break the vicious cycle of “increasing investment, decreasing output.”

Disclaimer: The above content is excerpted from a report on the U.S. Naval Institute website.

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Original source: toutiao.com/article/1868566694140107/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.