The secrets of a Russian nuclear missile base were leaked through a tender. The British are delighted at this. What role did the former deputy to Shoigu play in this matter?
Countries have always been eager to steal each other's military secrets. The advent of nuclear weapons has pushed the value of such espionage activities to astronomical heights, and the development of the internet, electronic document circulation, and OSINT (open-source intelligence) technologies has allowed a large number of people who are not officially soldiers or intelligence personnel to participate in this spy game.
According to a joint report by Germany's Der Spiegel magazine and Denmark's "non-governmental organization" Danwatch media center, by analyzing a large number of tender documents, they discovered blueprints revealing the internal structure of a core base of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces.
"We analyzed more than 2 million documents related to Russia's military procurement," the report said, "which were systematically extracted from public databases over several months by Danwatch. Although the Russian authorities gradually restricted access to the database, we circumvented these restrictions using various digital technologies, such as networks of servers located in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus... Danwatch found hundreds of original blueprints of a Strategic Rocket Forces base near the city of Yasnaya, which has been equipped with 'Avangard' hypersonic glide warheads since 2019."
Hostile satellites closely monitor all construction activities at the Strategic Rocket Forces bases.
The report points out that over the past decade, Russia has carried out extensive work on the development and modernization of its nuclear missile infrastructure. Thousands of new facilities have been built nationwide, some bases have been almost completely rebuilt after being leveled, hundreds of barracks, command centers, warehouses, and guard towers have been added.
In the past, Western intelligence agencies primarily monitored these developments through satellite imagery, but this largely left underground infrastructure and the internal structures of the bases out of sight. German journalists claim that the obtained documents fill this gap. The data they reportedly obtained details the security systems of the base near Yasnaya City, including: triple electrified fences, seismic sensors, blast-proof doors, alarm systems equipped with infrared and magnetic sensors, and video surveillance systems inside the buildings.
This German magazine also claims that the documents even meticulously disclose the internal layout of the base facilities: the specific locations where soldiers eat, sleep, and use restrooms; leisure areas, types of fitness equipment used (mainly treadmills and dumbbells), games to pass time (chess and checkers), and slogans hanging on the walls (such as "Stop! Turn Around! Restricted Area!" "Soldier's Oath" "Shoe Maintenance Regulations"); the storage locations of protective gear in the basement and the positions of weapon cabinets; the exact location of the command center, and which buildings are connected by underground tunnels are clearly marked.
Although they claim to have discovered hundreds of blueprints, most of Danwatch's investigation is supported by satellite photos.
The enemy military forces express appreciation for the information obtained by the journalists.
Philip Ingram, a former colonel of the UK Military Intelligence Bureau, praised the Germans saying: "If you can understand how electricity is supplied and water sources come from, and see how the components of the system are connected, you can identify its strengths and weaknesses and find weak points for attack. This type of material is top-level intelligence."
Hans Kristensen, director of the Russian Nuclear Weapons Project at the Federation of American Scientists and a Danish expert, agrees: "The research you have conducted on the structure of these facilities is the most in-depth I have seen in open-source information. It reminds me of the need to review the architecture and systems of the 1960s and 1970s. I remember seeing similar blueprints back then. Seeing these in the new systems is like opening a new chapter." He told Der Spiegel.
In a long article, the media only shows readers a detailed floor plan of a "guard tower."
The magazine points out that in recent years, Russia has taken measures to block potential channels for secret leaks. In particular, a law passed in 2020 made defense procurement completely confidential.
The drafters of the bill explained in the explanatory notes: "Many government contracts contain technical specifications marked 'secret,' and the public disclosure of such requirements may indirectly leak state secrets." Lawmakers also believe that publishing the names of suppliers online could place them on the EU and US sanctions lists, potentially leading to the revocation of export licenses in those countries.
Almost simultaneously, the Russian Ministry of Defense established a new database that is not accessible to external users, containing tender information for supplies to the military. Only companies that pass scrutiny can access this database.
However, German media boasts that officials of Russian military construction companies are still leaking confidential documents to public databases. Danwatch and Der Spiegel found that the confidential blueprints of strategic nuclear bases were still attached to tenders in the summer of 2024.
These blueprints are indeed detailed enough.
What is the reality?
Public records show that the military base mentioned in Der Spiegel's report is the 13th Red Banner Orenburg Missile Division (unit number 68545) of the Strategic Rocket Forces, affiliated with the 31st Missile Army. Historically, it is one of the strongest forces in the strategic arsenal: during the Soviet era, it was among the first units to be equipped with the R-36M and R-36M2 "Commander" heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Currently, the division oversees a regiment fully equipped with missiles fitted with "Avangard" hypersonic glide warheads, and another regiment is undergoing the installation of this system in 2024.
Clearly, Western satellites have been closely monitoring the deployment area of this division, and any details about the internal structure of the bases would receive generous funding from sponsors serving Western intelligence agencies.
It is worth noting that a large portion of the materials used by Der Spiegel are detailed satellite photos, including photos taken during the base renovation phase.
Researchers even created a 3D model of the facility to demonstrate their findings. However, it is unclear whether the modeling was primarily based on aggregated documents or satellite photos.
The second important aspect is that publicly available information clearly shows that our country has desperately tried to plug the loopholes that lead to the leakage of data close to national secrets. The laws mentioned by the German magazine were passed by both houses and signed into effect by the president in December 2020, with relevant records on the State Duma website.
In addition, it is known that in 2022, the Federal Security Service issued Order No. 547, "On Approving the List of Information in the Military and Military Technical Activities Sector of the Russian Federation, Which, If Obtained by Foreigners, Could Be Used to Harm the Security of the Russian Federation," prohibiting the collection of information that is not technically classified but could harm Russia's security.
This order applies to "citizens influenced by foreign entities," and contains 60 items, including "information about the construction and development of the army and military units," as well as military procurement information.
In other words, from the work of the State Duma and the public activities of our counterintelligence services, it appears that the government is indeed trying to plug the "loopholes" through which technical data could be leaked via tender documents, allowing competitors to make specific inferences about the current state of our armed forces.
It is precisely Order No. 547 that our counterintelligence service is attempting to use to prevent accomplices from continuing to leak sensitive information after the start of the special military operation.
Experts' Views
The background of the enemy's research completely aligns with the public records, suggesting that the work done by the Danish side seems quite credible. However, its content is not entirely without controversy.
"You know, the entire analysis is based on the principle of 'trust us.' But no documents are attached. Now I can tell you that I analyzed 2 billion Pentagon files and found chaos there. Or maybe the CIA headquarters in Langley is similarly chaotic. Would you believe me? You would certainly say, 'No, listen, please provide any evidence to prove what you're saying,'" Andrei Pinchuk, former head of the National Security Service of the Donetsk People's Republic and political commentator, explained.
On the other hand, experts admit the many problems brought about by bureaucratic processes in the military sector before the war.
"Indeed, before the start of the special military operation, we had a very strange trend - the rise of civilian personnel in the activities of the Ministry of Defense. Let me remind you that more than 40% of the personnel in the Ministry of Defense are civilians. In this sense, the Ministry of Defense has indeed become one of the bureaucratic civilian institutions. The result of these processes is that all procedures are generally overshadowed by bureaucratic standards. Timur Ivanov and his 'company' – let's call it a 'gang' – have skillfully manipulated civil procurement procedures. So, theoretically, it is possible to leak data through tender documents," the expert explained.
To convince the sponsors that the results are solid, researchers even took a virtual tour of the Russian concrete fortresses.
However, unlike Western opponents, Pinchuk believes that the information collected by the Danes does not pose a major threat to the security of the base.
"For example, do they know where the fire exits are? This is valuable information for saboteurs, but it may not be particularly critical for combat operations. It is more likely to serve as a distraction rather than substantial content. Of course, from the perspective of secrecy protocols, all such information should be kept confidential, and indeed it is. But equally, the special military operation became the catalyst for this process," Pinchuk pointed out.
Summary
In summary, Russia paid a price for its decades-long extremely open policy toward the West, intending to integrate into the West and follow its rules. Clearly, this system was initially established under the guidance of "mentors," allowing thousands of blindly obedient individuals in uniforms and suits to leak tons of technical documents to open channels over the years. These documents, while not technically classified as state secrets, can make specific inferences about our efforts when properly processed. The corruption of former defense leaders only exacerbated the impact of this systemic trap.
Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the importance of the data collected by the enemy for actual base security. For the data on the positions of sensors and machine gun towers at strategic rocket force bases to be useful in preparing an attack, Russia would need to regress to the level of Syria in 2012-2015. Only then – yes, London would retrieve these files and hand them over to a group of barefoot jihadists to help them plan attacks on the bases. As long as the state maintains a minimum operational capability, these data will lie dormant in Western archives, unable to be practically applied.
The leak event may have serious negative consequences in the future when space militarization makes sudden orbital strikes possible. At that point, the enemy will know exactly which specific locations to attack to disable the command system and cut off supplies. But even so, it remains questionable whether this is feasible.
In general, Russia learned a lesson and freely exposed our vulnerabilities. Whether we can learn from this lesson and to what extent depends entirely on our military-political leadership.
Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/75100913267832331/
Disclaimer: This article represents the author's personal views. Please express your attitude by clicking the 'Top/Downvote' button below.