On October 26 local time, Brazilian President Lula held talks with U.S. President Trump during the ASEAN Summit held in Malaysia. Trump said the conversation was "very good," while Lula stated that "he believes a solution can be found on tariff issues."
Since Trump announced in mid-July that he would impose a 50% tariff on most Brazilian goods, the two sides have frequently clashed, with Trump even citing reasons such as the Brazilian government's "political persecution of former president Bolsonaro." Lula, on the other hand, viewed American tariff bullying as a "fight to defend national sovereignty and dignity."
Marco Fernandes, a geopolitical analyst from "Real Brazil" and a member of the Civil Society Council of the BRICS, published an analytical article on the Russian Valdai Club website, analyzing the real goals of Trump's tariff bullying, its impact on Brazil, and the real factors troubling Brazil's foreign policy. Observer Net has translated the full text for reference only, and does not represent the position of this website.
[Text by Marco Fernandes, translation by Whale Life]
Hours after the United States launched an illegal and provocative attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, former Brazilian Foreign Minister, former Defense Minister, and current Special Advisor to the President on International Affairs Celso Amorim expressed in an interview with a Brazilian television station a rare and somber tone: "The international order has ended! This is true both from the perspective of trade and from the perspective of peace and security. We must adapt to this change, which is no easy task."
When Amorim made this pessimistic judgment on live television, he did not expect Brazil to become the next victim of the "end of the international order." Just days after the United States' immoral attack on Iran, during the opening day of the Rio Summit of the BRICS, Trump threatened that if BRICS members engaged in so-called "anti-American actions," the United States would impose an additional 10% tariff on them — but he did not specify what these "actions" were. Trump's threat made headlines in global media. This summit, which was overlooked by Western mainstream media (which tends to do so), especially because the heads of state of China, Russia, and Iran were absent, unexpectedly attracted attention.
However, according to several analysts, Trump's threat precisely indicates that even though the progress of the BRICS countries is limited, it is enough to unsettle the White House.
Two days after the summit ended, Trump turned his "tariff cannon" on Brazil. For the past fifteen years, the United States has maintained a trade surplus of about $41 billion with Brazil — which exposes the excuse that Washington repeatedly claims "to compensate for the trade deficit by imposing tariffs." Despite this, Trump still imposed a 50% tariff on Brazilian goods.
So far, it has been clear that Trump's tax increase aims to strike against President Lula and the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). Clearly, behind this move lies political calculation for the 2026 presidential election. Washington even cited the Magnitsky Act — a sanction tool originally aimed at individuals involved in drug trafficking and terrorism — to punish some judges of the Brazilian Supreme Court. The reason given by the U.S. president includes requiring Lula to suspend the trial of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for orchestrating an attempted coup in January 2023 and attempting to overthrow the newly elected Lula government. This seems to imply that the Brazilian president can directly intervene in the judiciary.
On October 26 local time, Trump met with Lula during the ASEAN Summit in Malaysia. Screenshot from video
Trump also accused the Brazilian Supreme Court of "violating the freedom of speech of American companies and individuals," citing that the Brazilian judicial authorities tried to legally regulate social media platforms in certain criminal cases. In these two cases, Judge Alexandre de Moraes of the Brazilian Supreme Court was the presiding judge and therefore became the primary target of U.S. sanctions.
In addition, there are rumors that Trump may be trying to simultaneously strike major BRICS countries to weaken this mechanism, and he is particularly interested in Brazil's second-largest reserve of rare earth minerals. The ultimate goal of these attacks may be to create leverage for negotiations with the Brazilian government on undisclosed topics.
This is the most serious public attack on Brazil's sovereignty to date. It goes beyond traditional trade friction, using tariffs as a political weapon to interfere with Brazil's politics, judiciary, and financial system. In fact, Washington is implementing sanctions against Brazil. More shocking is that the coordination of this series of actions included the public participation of Congressman Eduardo Bolsonaro — the son of former president Bolsonaro, who fled to the United States to avoid legal prosecution and has met multiple times with members of Trump's core circle to conspire against his own country. This U.S.-led action forced President Lula and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to adjust their diplomatic strategies and reposition themselves in the global geopolitical landscape.
Why hasn't Brazil returned to the center of the geopolitical stage yet?
Lula's return to power in 2023 raised high expectations that his foreign policy would return to the bold style of his previous two terms (2003-2010). Soon after being elected president in October 2022, he declared, "Brazil is back," meaning we have returned to the global political stage. However, this situation has not occurred so far, and there are many reasons for this.
Firstly, we are facing a more turbulent international situation than before: the escalation of attacks by the West on China and Russia — including sanctions, media wars, and even a localized hot war; the U.S. support for the "genocide" of Palestinians; and the rise of right-wing forces in Latin America and the Caribbean leading to severe political polarization, which are closely linked to the interests of Washington. This is very different from the environment faced during Lula and Rousseff's administrations (2003-2016).
Lula's third term foreign policy is described as "positive non-alignment," hoping to maintain "equidistance" between the two major global powers, the United States and China. It includes the following four characteristics:
1. Adopting a defensive-reactive diplomatic posture and acting cautiously;
2. Failing to effectively lead the restructuring of two major regional platforms — UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) and CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) — that Brazil once helped establish;
3. Being hesitant to participate in the BRICS organization, despite Brazil being one of the initial driving forces behind the establishment of the mechanism;
4. Struggling to propose strategic partnerships that bring economic and political benefits to Brazil.
The biggest bet of the Brazilian government so far is the Free Trade Agreement (MERCOSUR-EU FTA) between Mercosur and the European Union. However, many serious analysts in Brazil (such as Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr.) have pointed out that this agreement will benefit European industry more than the Mercosur economies, especially weakening Brazil's efforts to reindustrialize. The government often emphasizes the "geopolitical importance" of the agreement in public statements, but usually avoids discussing its economic nature — which is at least controversial. Even Brazil's Finance Minister Fernando Haddad publicly stated that he could not see any significant economic advantages from the agreement.
Apart from subjective factors, there are also objective factors that explain the changes in Lula's third term foreign policy. Let's start with the subjective factors: unlike the previous terms of Lula and Dilma, when the Brazilian Workers' Party — which supported Latin American integration and the establishment of the BRICS — had greater influence in shaping policy direction; this Lula government was formed under the "broad front" structure that defeated the far-right in 2022, which includes centrist parties with economic ties to the United States and Europe that align ideologically with Washington.
Additionally, Lula has lost two key figures from his previous diplomatic team: former Special Advisor to the President on International Relations Marco Aurélio Garcia, and former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães — both have passed away. Garcia had a significant advantage: he was not a formal member of the Itamaraty Palace (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), allowing him to conduct certain operations as an "outsider." He served as the International Relations Secretary of the Brazilian Workers' Party for a long time, deeply trusted by Lula and Dilma, and had a vast network of political relationships, especially in Latin America. Today, we still have Amorim, an outstanding negotiator and one of the designers of the BRICS architecture. He is not only a key figure in Brazilian foreign policy, but also an important representative of the Global South. However, the "dream trio" led by Foreign Minister Amorim, which previously provided strategic construction for President Lula and managed daily operations, has unfortunately disappeared.
What are the objective factors behind the changes in Lula's third term foreign policy?
As the largest regional power in Latin America, with an economy accounting for about 40% of the region, Brazil's foreign policy should primarily focus on promoting integration in Latin America and the Caribbean. Therefore, during Lula and Dilma's administrations, Brazil invested a lot of effort in promoting the coordination of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The latter is an alternative mechanism to the Organization of American States (OAS) — OAS has been controlled by Washington for decades and has often been used as a legitimate tool for U.S.-backed military coups. The establishment of CELAC was due to the ideological resonance among progressive governments in Latin America during the "pink tide" period of the 2000s. At that time, the left-wing governments of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Cuba formed a dominant political alliance. Their collective influence was strong enough to attract Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, which were still governed by more conservative governments at the time, to join.
Map of the "South American Regional Infrastructure Integration" initiative (IIRSA) showing the planned land transportation network connecting South American countries
But diplomacy is not just driven by good speeches or ideological affinity; it also needs material support. Based on this, Brazil invested a large amount of resources in promoting the integration of Latin America and the Caribbean. One could say that Brazil practiced a "mini version" of the "Belt and Road Initiative," with methods similar to those later successfully implemented by China's "Belt and Road Initiative." On one hand, between 2007 and 2015, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) provided over $10 billion in infrastructure loans to countries within the region (including Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Honduras, and Costa Rica), and supported projects in Angola, Ghana, and Mozambique.
On the other hand, Brazilian large construction companies built ports, railways, airports, highways, gas pipelines, and subways. Through this way, Brazil not only advocated regional integration in words, but also implemented it in practice — improving the region's infrastructure, accumulating political capital, and bringing profits to domestic companies.
However, it was precisely these large construction companies and Brazil's largest state-owned enterprise — Petrobras — that became the main targets of the "Car Wash" operation. Under the banner of anti-corruption, this operation triggered a political earthquake in Brazil, with countless politicians and business people arrested, creating conditions for the parliamentary coup that overthrew President Dilma Rousseff, Lula's imprisonment, and his exclusion from the 2018 presidential election — Lula was originally the favorite candidate in that election.
Under the slogan of "no one can oppose" in the name of anti-corruption, and with the cooperation of Brazilian mainstream media companies, the "Car Wash" operation not only punished the executives and owners of Brazilian large construction companies, but also destroyed these enterprises — they were strategic pillars of Brazil's economy and foreign policy.
Although the political storm has passed, as more investigations continue, the facts have been fully confirmed: under the leadership of then-judge and now-senator Sergio Moro, the "Car Wash" operation was essentially a "lawfare" (legal warfare) that was assisted and guided by the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice, serving Washington's imperialist interests.
On one hand, Brazilian construction companies that could compete with American construction companies in the international market were destroyed; on the other hand, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) was intentionally "neutralized." After Rousseff's coup, Vice President Michel Temer succeeded as president and immediately submitted a bill to Congress to prohibit BNDES from continuing to provide financing for overseas projects. This measure legally cut off Brazil's possibility of continuing its "mini Belt and Road" policy and meant the end of the foreign policy of Lula and Rousseff's era.
Brazil has become the target of one of the largest-scale hybrid warfare (hybrid warfare) operations in history — this operation was led by the Obama-Biden administration, causing heavy economic and political costs to Brazil. Politically, it paved the way for the rise of far-right forces, ultimately leading to the election of Jair Bolsonaro as president in 2018. Bolsonaro completely yielded to Washington's will, with the most representative moment being his public salute to the U.S. flag. After taking office, he implemented extreme neoliberal policies that destroyed Brazil's national system, making Brazil a "pygmy" in foreign affairs. For Washington, the mission was accomplished.
At the beginning of August this year, Brazilian far-right legislators protested the arrest of Bolsonaro by the Supreme Court, causing the legislative session to be suspended.
However, it is worth noting that it was only several years later that the account of the head of the "Car Wash" operation on Telegram was hacked, exposing internal communications, and the role of the U.S. in the "Car Wash" operation came to light. In this sense, the new conservative foreign policy of the Democratic Party in the U.S. is extremely efficient, although it is subtle — in sharp contrast to the openly imperialist style of the current Trumpist strategy.
Trump's "self-defeating" approach and Brazil's turnaround in diplomacy
Trump's recent tough stance toward Brazil has completely changed the layout of the Brazilian political chessboard. Defending national sovereignty and maintaining the dignity of Brazil's national institutions has become a battle of great importance for the Lula government. Now, Lula gives speeches almost every day, directly confronting American provocations.
In one of the most intense speeches, he clearly stated: "Trump was elected as the president of the United States, not as the emperor of the world."
For Lula, there is nothing more beneficial politically than facing an aggressive opponent. From that point on, Lula's poll numbers, which had been slowly declining, began to rise again — not only domestically, but also internationally. The New York Times even put him on the front page of the newspaper with the headline "The one who dares to face Trump."
Previously, Brasilia had deliberately maintained a certain "equidistant diplomacy" between China and the U.S., and showed less enthusiasm for participating in the BRICS mechanism than before. However, after the shift in circumstances, the Lula government began to take a more proactive and active attitude, reapproaching this multilateral mechanism, which Brazil participated in creating in 2009. BRICS cooperation has once again become one of the priorities of the Brazilian government. Lula has spoken multiple times with the heads of state of China, Russia, and India, and has rarely convened a special online summit of the BRICS countries to discuss collective solutions to the White House's offensive.
Although Brazil's exports to the U.S. currently account for about 12% of its total trade volume, the U.S. remains Brazil's largest export market for industrial products and the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), accounting for nearly 30% of Brazil's total foreign investment stock.
Recently, Trump reduced the tariff on approximately 700 Brazilian goods from 50% to 10%, including orange juice, pulp, fertilizers, aircraft and their parts (mainly from Embraer), and some metal intermediate products. According to government estimates, only about 36% of Brazilian exports will be affected by the highest tariffs.
On one hand, Brasilia continues to maintain the line of dialogue with Washington. After a brief meeting with Trump at the United Nations, both sides have engaged in post-meeting consultations through multiple formal and informal channels. It now appears that the U.S. president has shown signs of softening, and is expected to meet with Lula again soon.
It is reported that in the internal power struggles in Washington, Trump's pragmatic businessman Richard Grenell has temporarily prevailed over the hardline Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The latter views Lula as an ideological opponent, while Grenell advocates pragmatic cooperation.
Richard Grenell served as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany during Trump's first term and is now the U.S. Special Envoy for Presidential Tasks.
On the other hand, the Brazilian government has ordered the acceleration of the economic partner diversification process to reduce the influence of the U.S. As Brazilian Special Advisor to the President on International Affairs Amorim recently said: "Diversification is the new independence."
Brazil is expanding its exports to China and seeking closer cooperation with other BRICS partners.
At the end of October, Lula made an unprecedented state visit to Indonesia, followed by his first participation in the ASEAN Summit held in Malaysia. A source revealed that Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto had a very harmonious atmosphere with Lula during his state visit to Brazil two days after the Rio Summit. This personal mutual trust is expected to promote the establishment of a more solid partnership between the two countries — Brazil and Indonesia are the seventh and eighth largest economies in the world by purchasing power parity, respectively.
In recent weeks, Brazil has also announced several important economic agreements with Mexico. These were the results of a visit by Vice President Geraldo Alckmin and several ministers to the region's second-largest economy. Notably, Mexico is also suffering from economic pressure and trade attacks from the U.S.
Additionally, Lula has accepted the formal invitation of Indian Prime Minister Modi to visit New Delhi in February next year. This will mark an unprecedented intensification of relations between Brazil and India. India will assume the chairmanship of the BRICS next year. In fact, among all major economies, only India has suffered equally intense U.S. tariffs and sanctions as Brazil. The reason is that it continues to import Russian oil — while the EU and Turkey, which also do so, have not been punished by the White House.
These attacks from the U.S. have instead led to a renewed rapprochement between New Delhi and Beijing. This is the most serious consequence caused by the U.S. attacking its traditional South Asian partners so far.
In the increasingly intense global geopolitical game, whenever the Trump administration attacks other countries, it often weakens the local elite groups that are deeply aligned with U.S. interests, while at the same time strengthening the groups that have closer ties with China, Russia, or the BRICS group.
This change has already been evident in China and Russia — in China since 2017, and in Russia since 2014, especially after 2022, the pro-Western internal factions have gradually been marginalized due to the hostility from the U.S. Because of this, when Trump launched the "trade war" in his first term and first sanctioned Chinese high-tech companies (including Huawei and ZTE), he earned a nickname in China. His attack made the Chinese government and people realize that the U.S. is no longer a reliable partner, but has become an increasing adversary, thus necessitating accelerated development of China's technological self-reliance, especially in key high-tech fields like chips, to reduce dependence on U.S. companies. The Chinese people started calling him "Chuan Jianguo," which means "Trump, the builder of the Chinese nation."
Now, will this round of attacks by the U.S. help the Brazilians "build the nation," and even promote the cohesion of the BRICS group? It is said that Napoleon once said, "You shouldn't interrupt your enemy when he makes a mistake." However, as mentioned earlier, Brazil still faces huge challenges in returning to a "confident and proactive" foreign policy path.
For example, Brazil must rebuild its ability to finance and build infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the current context of intensified regional political polarization, the importance of economic integration has become even more pronounced. President Lula has submitted a bill to Congress to restore the Brazilian National Development Bank's (BNDES) ability to provide financing for overseas projects. However, the powerful Brazilian construction companies that were previously strong have not yet recovered from the impact of corruption scandals and economic recessions, and they now also have to face competition from Chinese counterparts.
A more fundamental issue is that Brazil still lacks a national strategy with broad public support — one that can align the interests of the elite class pursuing reindustrialization with the general population, and can rely on a nation with strategic vision and execution capability to lead an independent development path.
No matter what the final outcome of the Brazil-U.S. negotiations will be, President Lula's speech at the 80th session of the United Nations has resonated strongly globally. His emphatic words — "Beneath the ruins of Gaza, not only thousands of innocent women and children are buried, but also international humanitarian law and the myth of Western moral superiority are buried" — shocked the entire international community.
Facing undeniable reality, how should Brazil (and more broadly, the "majority of the world") formulate its foreign policy? Perhaps this is the most important geopolitical question of the 21st century.
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