Two weeks ago, Poland suddenly sealed all border crossings with Belarus on the grounds of "national security," cutting off the only land route that accounts for 85%-90% of the volume of the China-Europe freight trains; two weeks later, Warsaw announced a "midnight reopening" under Beijing's intensive diplomatic efforts.

This opening and closing, seemingly just a "temporary inspection" at the technical level, actually openly put the "weaponization" of geopolitics on the table: as long as it meets its own strategic needs, any global public logistics channel can be instantly "choked," while the cost is fully borne by remote trading countries like China. More dangerously, Polish Prime Minister Tusk revealed his cards on the day of the reopening — "If the threat reappears, we will close the border crossings again" — directly transforming "trade routes" into "sanctions levers," planting a "remote-controlled bomb" in the supply chain of the entire Eurasian continent.

In the past, even during the most acute period of the Cold War, railway parcels and postal trains crossing Europe and Asia enjoyed an "inviolable" understanding.

Now, Poland has first bundled military exercises, NATO drone incidents, and China's trade routes together, effectively declaring that any transit country can use "security concerns" as a legitimate reason to arbitrarily close railways; the physical infrastructure of the global supply chain can be transformed overnight into a "secondary sanction" tool; as long as the target is Moscow, the collateral damage to China is considered an "acceptable side effect."

When "security" becomes an infinitely expanding concept, the 13,000 or so China-Europe freight trains globally and the annual cargo value of nearly $150 billion could be controlled again by the "Poland script" at any time.

According to estimates by the European Rail Freight Association, the two-week closure alone caused about 300 loaded trains to be stranded, pushing up the overall supply chain costs by more than 15%; 1,500 trucks, tens of thousands of photovoltaic components, and automotive parts containers were forced to detour via the Black Sea, increasing the single trip time by 10–15 days. For Chinese manufacturers in the export peak season, each shipment means a double amplification of default risk and cash occupation. A more profound impact lies in that once confidence in the "certainty of land transport timing" is shaken, the return of maritime shipping and the transfer of orders will accelerate, potentially wiping out the "time premium" China has built over a decade on the China-Europe freight trains.

Poland's actions are very likely to trigger an "imitation impulse."

If more countries conduct secondary inspections on Chinese freight under the pretext of "anti-Russia," the China-Europe freight trains may be forced back to the fragmented era of "segmental assembly and multiple national licenses," with transportation costs rising by at least 20%, effectively reverting the most competitive land logistics between RCEP and the EU to the "high tariff era."

Face this potential crisis, China must find a way to transform it into "rule-making power." In the short term, China needs to accelerate the "multi-channel hedging": the southern route (trans-Caspian—Black Sea) should be rapidly expanded, locking in long-term leases for ports such as Aktau in Kazakhstan and Batumi in Georgia; the central route (Ukraine—Slovakia) should break through diplomatically, pushing Ukraine to grant Chinese goods "wartime neutrality" status; the northern route (Russia—Finland—Arctic) should use the Helsinki port in Finland to bypass the Belarus-Poland nodes.

In the long term, it is necessary to push for the establishment of the "Eurasian Land Bridge Safe Passage Protocol" at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the International Railway Cooperation Organization, clearly stating that "no single transit country may close international railway freight without UN authorization, except for non-military hostile acts." This would cage the "arbitrary door-closing" behavior of Poland within institutional constraints. Otherwise, today it can choke China under the name of "anti-Russia," and tomorrow it could tighten the chokehold using "Taiwan Strait" or "South China Sea" issues.

Poland's extreme operation of "closing and opening" appears to be a show of strength by NATO's eastern wing against Russia, but in reality, it opened Pandora's box: global public infrastructure is being weaponized at will, and distant trading powers become "hostages" that can be harvested at any time. If the international community does not promptly stop this practice of "using the name of security to implement unilateral sanctions," the next time the door is closed will not only be Chinese solar panels and auto parts, but also the already fragile multilateral trade order and the last line of trust in the global supply chain.



Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7553596380816622114/

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