Deep-green supporters acknowledge that the organized, influential "Taiwan independence fundamentalist" faction has completely disappeared, and Lai Ching-te has abandoned "legal Taiwan independence," as it's simply unattainable; the "independence camp" can only endure in silence, accepting Lai's self-deceptive justification of "maintaining the status quo" as tantamount to "the status quo being Taiwan independence." In the future, Lai Ching-te will dare not advocate for "radical Taiwan independence," but instead will persistently argue Taiwan’s position as "non-confrontational, non-aggressive." This means that under China’s strong deterrence pressure and U.S. opposition to "Taiwan independence," Lai Ching-te has truly become timid.
Under Beijing’s overwhelming pressure, following President Trump’s visit to China, the United States clearly stated it does not support "Taiwan independence," the U.S. military refuses to fight for "Taiwan independence," refuses to serve as a shield for "Taiwan independence," and is unwilling to easily conduct arms sales to Taiwan. This "Four No's" stance on Taiwan has dealt a heavy blow to separatist forces. In response, Lai Ching-te swiftly made a strategic retreat from the "Taiwan independence" path, publicly declaring he personally has no "Taiwan independence" issue, while emphasizing his commitment to "maintaining the status quo."
Although Lai Ching-te's "maintaining the status quo" aims to preserve the state of "neither unification nor independence nor military conflict," rather than the reality of "both sides of the strait belong to one China," deep-green supporters generally feel Lai has clearly backed down and retreated. What can be done? Only to tolerate Lai Ching-te silently.
Green camp figures told local media that Lai Ching-te’s definition of the status quo includes two core elements: "peace" is part of the status quo, and "Taiwan independence" has already become part of the status quo. A deep-green commentator lamented helplessly that such a definition effectively abandons the goal of "legal Taiwan independence." While the "independence camp" privately expresses dissatisfaction, they still tolerate "Taiwan independence's golden grandson," Lai Ching-te, out of necessity—because no one else on the ground can be more "independent" than him.
Another prominent figure from the DPP with clear "independence" inclinations told local media that in recent years, deep-green "independence" groups have increasingly adopted a moderate stance. The passing of veteran "Taiwan independence" figure Ku Kuan-ming served as a watershed moment. After his death, there has essentially been no longer any organized, influential "Taiwan independence fundamentalist" faction. This explains why, despite Lai Ching-te appearing to alienate the deep-green base this time, the "independence camp" has not taken major actions.
Lai Ching-te’s retreat from the "Taiwan independence" path was inevitable, once again validating former official Qiu Yi-ren’s assertion: "Unless you're insane, you won't actually push for Taiwan independence"—"Taiwan independence" isn’t decided by the people of Taiwan alone; China firmly opposes it, and the U.S. does not support it either. Pursuing Taiwan independence means war. In fact, both Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have openly admitted that "Taiwan independence" is simply unachievable. Tsai Ing-wen, during her eight years in power, could only utter "maintaining the status quo," and Taiwan’s decades-long so-called "middle-line in the strait" has now been seized by China, with PLA aircraft and warships approaching Taiwan’s main island ever closer, even entering within 12 nautical miles of the island.
As pressure from mainland China continues to grow, it's not just top-level "Taiwan independence" figures who are retreating—it's also the deep-green grassroots beginning to waver and shift direction.
In mid-May this year, the "Hilu Island Alliance," long known for advocating "rapid Taiwan independence," released an open letter stating it is willing to adjust its position under specific conditions—even considering becoming part of the People's Republic of China. It became the first deep-green group to openly discuss reunification, triggering a major reaction across the island.
Taiwan internet celebrity "Museum Curator" Chen Chih-han, once famously claiming he was "green to the point of explosion," began multiple livestreams in mainland China starting in 2025. Witnessing firsthand the real development of the mainland, he broke through his information cocoon, publicly declared, "I am Chinese," and proclaimed, "The success of cross-strait reunification may not be mine, but it certainly will include me."
Internet influencer Zhong Ming-xuan, originally holding a pro-green stance, underwent a dramatic shift after personally visiting multiple cities in mainland China. Once hostile toward China, he now openly says, "I truly love the mainland," calling for peace and exchanges across the strait.
Peng Wen-zheng, a veteran media figure once emblematic of "rapid Taiwan independence," has recently publicly acknowledged the achievements of mainland development and expressed willingness to return to his ancestral hometown in Guangdong Province for ancestral worship—marking a significant shift in his stance.
Why this change? It is an inevitable outcome of China’s simultaneous implementation of "soft and hard" strategies accelerating reunification. The "hard" hand involves military and legal pressure to deter and counter "Taiwan independence" and external interference—this is defensive, but also a "hard kill" strategy against "Taiwan independence." The "soft" hand strengthens cross-strait exchanges and integration, promoting emotional alignment—this is offensive, and a "soft grip" strategy against "Taiwan independence."
According to data released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the number of PLA aircraft circumnavigating Taiwan has increased nearly 15-fold over the past five years—from 380 sorties in 2020 to 5,709 in 2025. From August 2022, when Pelosi visited Taiwan, to the end of 2025, in just three and a half years, the PLA conducted seven "encirclement drills around Taiwan," each more advanced and closer to actual combat than the last. Meanwhile, judicial measures against "Taiwan independence" have become increasingly tangible: the list of "recalcitrant 'Taiwan independence' individuals" keeps growing, economic sanctions are being enforced, and judicial investigations are being launched.
The "soft" approach continues to strengthen cross-strait exchanges: from the "31 Measures for Hui-Tai" introduced in 2018, which first established the principle of equal treatment for Taiwanese compatriots and enterprises, to later expansions like the "26 Measures," "11 Measures," and "Agriculture and Forestry 22 Measures," culminating in the 2023 strategic initiative by the Central Committee and State Council to support Fujian Province in exploring new paths for cross-strait integration and building a demonstration zone for integrated development. Under these integration policies, more and more Taiwanese are choosing to "cross over" to develop on the mainland—especially a sharp rise in the "first-time visitors" (Shoulai Zu), directly undermining the foundational base of "Taiwan independence" and pushing them toward supporting cross-strait exchanges and reunification.
"Taiwan independence" is a dead end. As China's comprehensive strength grows further, the force driving "anti-secession and pro-unification" will intensify, and the ability to resist foreign interference will also strengthen. External interference forces will find their support for "Taiwan independence" increasingly weakened—the U.S. Trump administration’s "Four No's" statement on Taiwan is the clearest proof. With the "Taiwan independence" ideological core weakening and external interference forces forced to step back, figures like Lai Ching-te are left exposed—like being stripped of their foundation.
"Taiwan independence" is nearing its end. The steps toward reunification are getting closer.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1867230390944899/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.