Source: Dante on the River of Forgetfulness
Why has the extremely unfair caste system been able to rule India for 3000 years?
Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras, and Dalits (untouchables) - this is a hierarchy of the Indian caste system that many people are familiar with. In our minds, the caste system seems very dark because it solidifies the hierarchy between each class by bloodline and establishes strict caste segregation. It is considered one of the most rigid floor-level systems in human history's class hierarchies.
According to India's recent population census, the proportions of different castes are as follows: Brahmins 5%, Kshatriyas 10%, Vaishyas 20%, Shudras 45%, and Untouchables 20%.
In other words, even if we do not count the middle-class Vaishyas as low-caste, the Shudras and Untouchables together account for 65% of India's total population, making them an absolute majority.
If we follow the logic that "where there is oppression, there is resistance," then the caste system should have been easily overthrown by the lower-caste populations who make up the majority of the population. However, the reality is that the caste system has been maintained in India for 3000 years since the Aryans' conquest. Even today, although India is moving towards modernization and has abolished caste barriers and segregation in law, discrimination and oppression based on caste still exist. Why is this so? Are Indians really inherently servile?
Before answering this question, let me ask you a question: without consulting any materials, please answer me - among the various castes in India, which castes mainly oppose the caste system and advocate reform or revolution? Which castes support the caste system?
You might instinctively think, isn't it obvious? The lower down the caste ladder, the stronger the opposition; the higher up, the stronger the support!
However, the reality may surprise you:
In India, the two classes that most strongly oppose the caste system are not only the Dalits who are regarded as untouchables but also another one, the Kshatriyas, who are in the second tier.
The reformers who truly challenged the caste system in Indian history, such as Gautama Siddhartha, the founder of Buddhism, Vardhamana Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, and Ashoka the Great, who revered Buddhism, all belonged to the Kshatriya caste.
In contrast, the castes that most strongly support the caste system, besides the Brahmins, surprisingly include the third-tier Vaishya caste.
After the ancient Brahmanism was once suppressed due to Buddhist influence, it was revived by Shankaracharya, who was born into the Brahmin caste. Many of his followers and sponsors were Vaishyas.
Even today, India's current Prime Minister Modi is also from the Vaishya caste. Modi's attitude toward the caste system is particularly interesting—he repeatedly claims in public that India should reform and even abandon the caste system for political correctness. However, the organization he comes from, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, is an organization with strong Hindu characteristics, and the caste system and Hinduism are highly intertwined. This determines that Modi, who views Hinduism as a national treasure, cannot truly carry out reforms regarding the caste system.
Moreover, you might be surprised to learn that Mukesh Ambani, India's richest man, also belongs to the Vaishya caste.
This person is equivalent to India's Jack Ma and Pony Ma, controlling India's industries and information systems, wielding immense social influence, yet he shows little interest in promoting reforms of the caste system in India. He is even a major sponsor of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.
Meanwhile, among the fourth-tier Shudras, they generally adopt a "hands-off" or resigned attitude toward the Indian caste system. They rarely respond to calls from Kshatriya or Dalit castes to participate in social movements aimed at overthrowing the caste system. In 1956, Ambedkar, an activist from the Dalit community, launched the "New Buddhism" movement, calling for 500,000 Dalits to convert to Buddhism and attempting to push for radical reforms through voting and parliamentary struggles. However, this proposal received little response from the Shudras, who are also considered "low-caste." The movement ultimately failed due to lack of widespread support in society.
In other words, opinions on the caste system in India are not gradually changing but present an intriguing "support, oppose, support, ignore, oppose" pattern like a sandwich cookie.
And it is precisely this sandwich cookie structure that has allowed the Indian caste system to endure for 3000 years.
But why is this so? Why does society in India exhibit a "sandwich cookie" state where only Kshatriyas and Dalits oppose the caste system, Brahmins and Vaishyas support it, and Shudras either resign themselves to it or even cheerfully accept it?
To understand this phenomenon, I want to first explain a mathematical model to you—the pirate gold division problem. Three years ago, I told this story in another article. Let’s revisit it now, as it will give you different insights when combined with India's unique class phenomena:
Say five pirates plundered 100 gold coins. They take turns proposing distribution plans: First, Pirate 1 proposes a plan, followed by a vote among the five. The plan must gain more than half the votes to pass; otherwise, Pirate 1 will be thrown into the sea to feed sharks. The process continues in this manner. Assuming all five pirates are sufficiently intelligent and rational, what kind of distribution should Pirate 1 propose to maximize his own gains while ensuring the plan passes?
This is an interesting mathematical game theory problem. To find the correct solution, recursive thinking must be introduced:
Let’s first assume the simplest case: If Pirates 1 to 3 fail to distribute the coins and are thrown into the sea, leaving only Pirates 4 and 5, how would they proceed?
Assuming Pirate 5 has full malice toward Pirate 4 (i.e., given that his own interests are not harmed or improved much, he prioritizes killing his opponent), then no matter what distribution Pirate 4 proposes (even (0, 100)), Pirate 5 will definitely vote against it to ensure Pirate 4 is fed to the sharks, allowing him to take all the gold.
Thus, Pirate 4 will quickly realize that he must support Pirate 3’s distribution plan to save his life.
Predicting this, Pirate 3 will propose the harshest "100, 0, 0" distribution plan, taking all the gold for himself without giving anything to Pirates 4 and 5, knowing that Pirate 4 will still vote in favor just to avoid being thrown overboard by Pirate 3.
Going further back in recursion, Pirate 2, realizing Pirate 3’s plan, will propose a "98, 0, 1, 1" plan, abandoning Pirate 3 and giving one coin each to Pirates 4 and 5. Since this plan is better for Pirates 4 and 5 compared to Pirate 3’s distribution, they will support him rather than risk Pirate 3 getting the chance to allocate the gold.
In this way, Pirate 2 will take 98 gold coins.
Continuing the recursion, Pirate 2’s plan will also be understood by Pirate 1. Pirate 1 will then propose a (97, 0, 1, 2, 0) or (97, 0, 1, 0, 2) plan, abandoning Pirate 2 while giving one coin to Pirate 3 and two coins to Pirate 4 (or Pirate 5).
Since Pirate 1’s plan is better for Pirates 3 and 4 (or 5) compared to Pirate 2’s distribution, they will vote in favor of Pirate 1’s plan. Adding Pirate 1’s own vote, the plan will pass, and Pirate 1 can easily pocket 97 gold coins.
This is undoubtedly the optimal plan for Pirate 1 to maximize his gains.
Therefore, the answer to this problem is: Pirate 1 gives 1 coin to Pirate 3, 2 coins to Pirate 4 or Pirate 5, and keeps 97 coins for himself.
The story of the pirate gold division, beyond its mathematical model, is actually a typical political economy problem—it vividly illustrates what kind of social arrangements the ruling class will make for various classes within a society under an autocratic allocation system, and what attitudes each class will take toward this social arrangement.
For example, in my previous articles, I mentioned that in most societies, the middle-class, positioned as "Pirate 2," almost always plays the role of reform advocates and opposition. Because the "Pirate 1" (the ruler) at the top knows that this group is the most difficult to bribe and gain their support, there exists an unbreakable chain of distrust between them. Therefore, rulers usually adopt the maximum exploitation of this class's interests while preferentially distributing benefits to the lower classes to win their support.
In India, the Kshatriya caste plays the role of "Pirate 2." Although they are the warriors who hold violence, they are forced to submit to the priestly Brahmin caste. This is the main reason why the elite voices advocating reform or overthrowing Hinduism always come from this caste.
Of course, in real-world social evolution, due to differences in population ratios, wealth, and discourse power among various classes, the system does not perfectly simulate the pirate gold division model. For instance, due to being at the bottom of the caste system, the Dalits, who suffer from triple discrimination—religious, legal, and economic—are bound to be dissatisfied with the social distribution scheme. Therefore, for the Brahmin class in India to maintain this system, they must "buy off" the support—or at least non-resistance—of the Vaishya and Shudra classes to achieve relative numerical and discursive majority, thereby maintaining the stability of the entire system.
For the Vaishya class engaged in commerce, the "gold division" given to them is the "exclusive right to trade."
In traditional Indian society, only the Vaishya caste was allowed to engage in commerce and trade. While the Brahmin caste used religious doctrines to discriminate against the Vaishyas and required them to pay taxes to support themselves, they also granted them the huge practical benefit of engaging in commerce to buy their support. Moreover, since Vaishya commerce and professional craftsmanship work were written into the Manusmriti and protected by the Brahmin priestly class, situations similar to those in other ancient civilizations where kings or warlords brutally exploited and completely looted the merchant class to meet their political needs rarely occurred in India. In other words, due to the "caste system" and the existence of Brahmins, the Kshatriya class in India holds a "limited monarchy" similar to that in Europe. The Vaishyas formed an alliance with the Brahmins through alms-giving, gaining recognition from the priestly class and protection of their property. Thus, the Vaishyas became the second most supportive group for the caste system after the Brahmins.
What is even more intriguing is the Shudras—logically speaking, as the largest population in India and suffering significant discrimination politically, economically, and legally, the Shudras should be the group most likely to oppose the system besides the Dalits. However, in reality, this population, which accounts for 40% of India, forms the most solid foundation of Hinduism and the caste system. So, what kind of "gold division" bought over this group of "Pirate 4"?
The answer is that the Shudras gained the privilege of discriminating and oppressing the lower-ranking Dalits.
In fact, whether from a racial or wealth perspective, the Shudras and Dalits originally had no great differences—racially, their ancestors were all native dark-skinned people conquered by the Aryans; financially, in traditional times, many Shudras were even poorer than Dalits. As members of the lower classes, they seemed not to need differentiation.
But the shrewdness of the Indian caste system lies in its ability to make a strict distinction between these two lower castes. One is viewed as part of the body of Brahma (Brahmins are the mouth, Kshatriyas are the hands, Vaishyas are the legs, and Shudras are the feet), though inferior to the upper three castes, they still belong to the "internal contradictions within Brahma." But the Dalits are unfortunate—they are not considered to have originated from Brahma in ancient Brahmanic teachings but are seen as demons and monsters defeated and suppressed by Brahma. Today, if you visit Hindu temples or Tibetan Buddhist temples influenced by Hinduism, you can see some people under the feet of deities, Buddhas, or Vajras. Yes, the Dalits are seen as these beings, considered "monsters," and are seen as defeated and suppressed figures.
Then, who has the authority to distinguish between Shudras and Dalits, who are equally poor and racially similar?—This definition power belongs to the Brahmins.
Hindu doctrine stipulates that if a follower of a lower caste commits acts violating religious laws, their family will be classified as belonging to the Dalit caste, becoming untouchables for generations to come.
In a strict sense, the caste system does not use bribery or division to gain the "lie-flat" or even support of the Shudra class but uses intimidation and divide-and-conquer tactics. Under this system, although the Shudras mostly live in poverty, they at least have the hope of "better than above, worse than below," seeking psychological comfort by looking at the Dalits who are worse off than them. Meanwhile, as most Shudras have little opportunity to receive higher education and mainly live in rural areas across India, their living conditions are highly atomized. Individual resistance is difficult to succeed, and the cost of resistance is enormous—even just verbally "offending" the Manu Code could result in being demoted to a lower caste or even becoming a Dalit.
Additionally, due to Hinduism viewing professions such as slaughter, toilet cleaning, and funeral services as "impure," and these jobs being essential in daily life, Shudras themselves cannot perform these tasks and must rely on the Dalit caste for these services. To cheaply obtain these services, they must recognize the caste system to suppress the price of these jobs through discrimination to sustain their meager livelihoods.
Over time, in this prisoner's dilemma of mutual dependence, the overall personality of Shudras becoming submissive, not resistant, and even supportive of the caste system has been cultivated—the Shudras need Dalits to live but must discriminate against Dalits to balance their psychology. Only the caste system can satisfy both of these contradictory mindsets.
This is why the majority of Shudras tacitly approve or even support the existence of the caste system. During Ambedkar's "New Buddhism" movement in 1956, many Shudra-caste Indians chose to stay indoors and not convert to Buddhism, which promised "equality for all beings," because they saw that the vast majority of participants in the movement were from the Dalit community. Indian society referred to "New Buddhism" as "New Untouchables." At this point, the Shudras would calculate—this movement, which can only attract Dalits, is unlikely to succeed due to the lack of majority support. And once it fails, joining the movement would make them "New Untouchables," losing even the meager "privileges" they currently possess.
Furthermore, long-term conditioning has ingrained such deeply rooted habits of caste and hierarchy in Indians. Not long after the "New Buddhism" movement began, the Dalit community within it played their own version of "caste stratification"—they divided themselves internally according to their细分种姓 before conversion, establishing their respective rituals and venues. The ideal of Buddhist equality among all beings quickly turned into empty words, ultimately collapsing in India. This situation was akin to how Buddhism was replaced by reformed Hinduism in India many years ago.
Similar stories have repeated themselves countless times throughout India's 3000-year history, with varying details but a similar general trajectory. It is not difficult to understand why the caste system has endured in India for 3000 years.
In the Qing Dynasty, punishment for rebellious relatives often involved "exile to Ningguta to become slaves for armor-wearing people." In Nazi Germany, Jews and political prisoners who opposed the Nazis were discriminated against.
Reviewing human history, we find that the more rigid and autocratic the social hierarchy, the more rulers tend to create a specific "untouchable caste" within society and heavily stigmatize this group in appearance, inciting society to hate these "untouchables."
This is not due to the cruelty or personal preferences of rulers but is a necessary aspect of governance.
Just as Ah Q felt great psychological satisfaction from watching executions, the existence of the "untouchable caste" serves to "redeem" the agreement of various "Shudras" in a dual way: it makes them feel "better than those below," and it uses the power to define "untouchables versus Shudras" to intimidate them from rebelling. This plays a significant role.
As the "first pirate," the Brahmins gained unparalleled advantages and profits in this system due to their control over prior information definitions and resource allocations.
Similarly, India's story and the pirate gold division tell us that voting itself cannot achieve true fairness and justice. Like the five pirates who also vote but end up with a (97, 0, 1, 2, 0) result, India's entire electoral system left behind by the British still cannot abolish the caste system.
So, where is the breakthrough?
In fact, there are two crucial assumptions in the "pirate gold division" model:
First, it assumes that all pirates harbor "full malice" toward each other—that is, pirates will choose to eliminate other pirates if they can do so without harming or benefiting themselves. This allows 5th Pirate to definitely vote against 4th Pirate in the simplest scenario, initiating the recursive reasoning.
Second, it assumes that pirates cannot fully communicate or trust each other, making it impossible to form any "voting alliance" to jointly resist the first pirate and demand fair distribution.
These elements that can break the deadlock of the pirate gold division translate into modern terms as—free communication, equal contracts, tolerance, and universal love.
Free communication allows public opinion to freely exchange and negotiate to break the prisoner's dilemma between classes;
Adhering to contracts fosters a "I help you, you help me" self-organization of society;
Guided by tolerance and universal love, not rejoicing in others' downfall, ensures peace and harmony.
Freedom, equality, and universal love—breaking the "pirate gold division" deadlock is not difficult. Once a society possesses these three things, problems will be solved effortlessly, and the distribution of resources and opportunities will become increasingly fair. From that moment on, people will bid farewell to caste and move toward modernity.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7505210279391658496/
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