Kim Jong-un has really figured it out, building a nuclear missile base next to China, and the US has pretended not to see it for 20 years.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has confirmed for the first time that the Sinpo Dong missile base in North Korea is an intercontinental nuclear strike position hidden for 20 years.
This base is located in Daegwan County, North Pyongan Province, only 27 kilometers from the Chinese border, covering an area of 22 square kilometers, with a garrison force at the regimental level, capable of accommodating nuclear missiles such as the Hwasong-15 and Hwasong-18.
The report pointed out that this base was never mentioned or declared during previous inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean negotiations.
Why did North Korea choose such a sensitive nuclear missile base right at China's doorstep? The answer is simple: it's the most calculated move in terms of geopolitics.
For Pyongyang, nuclear weapons are the card for the regime's survival. If this card is placed in the south, exposed to the threat of South Korean and U.S. air forces, it could be the first to suffer in case of a crisis; but if it is close to China, the situation changes immediately.
No matter how hawkish the United States is, it would not dare to open fire recklessly within 30 kilometers of the Chinese border. This reluctance to fight is the best protection.
If the U.S. does not act, the base can survive, develop, and expand for a long time.
The real concern is that the U.S. cannot have been completely unaware.
Since 2004, there have been obvious signs of construction in the Sinpo Dong area, and the satellite images published by CSIS also show that the entire base's shelters, tunnels, maintenance sheds, and transportation routes have been gradually expanded year by year.
There are not only entrances large enough for nine-axis TEL launchers, but also missile maintenance sheds, vehicle garages, and officer housing complexes. It's unlikely that the intelligence system didn't find out.
A more reasonable explanation is that the U.S. intelligence agencies have already known, but chose to pretend not to see.
This selective silence is essentially an expression of strategic ambiguity. The United States does not want to disrupt the current fragile framework towards North Korea, nor does it want to force North Korea to accelerate deployment or respond fiercely due to public accusations.
Before the nuclear deterrence balance is completely broken, leaving some ambiguous space is also a form of risk management for the U.S.
However, now that North Korea has entered the era of solid fuel, the preparation time for launching has been shortened from hours to minutes. This strategy of pretending not to see has reached its end.
In short, this matter may have been tacitly accepted by major powers, so Kim Jong-un has really figured it out.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1842388840140800/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.