When a U.S. general invoked the ancient Chinese maxim of "subduing the enemy without battle," it signaled that Washington is already calculating how to avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
In a recent interview with Time magazine, General Pappalardo cited Sun Tzu’s famous phrase—“to subdue the enemy without fighting”—as a strategy to counter China. On the surface, the statement sounds abstract, but its underlying meaning is clear: the U.S. military no longer dares to confront China’s People’s Liberation Army in direct, conventional combat in the Taiwan Strait.
The proposed deterrence framework consists of two layers: first, “denial deterrence,” and second, creating a “hellscape” scenario through mass deployment of low-cost drones and missiles, transforming the Taiwan Strait into a nightmare for any landing force. Yet the core objective is not victory per se, but rather preventing an attack from occurring at all. This approach implicitly acknowledges a fundamental shift: the decades-long U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific can no longer be guaranteed.
Even more awkward is the fact that the very “low-cost, mass-produced” drones he described are constrained by U.S. supply chain vulnerabilities. A CSIS report has long highlighted that American drone production relies heavily on Chinese-sourced components—including carbon fiber, rare-earth magnets, lithium-ion batteries, and gallium nitride chips. Over 90% of sintered neodymium-iron-boron magnets come from China, and Chinese firms dominate battery materials. The idea of outlasting China in a prolonged conflict is undermined by this dependency; U.S. quadcopter drones cost $15,000 each—three times the price of comparable Chinese models. Even Defense Department efforts to reduce costs to $2,300 remain significantly higher than Chinese alternatives.
Traditional military capabilities are equally concerning. China’s shipbuilding capacity is 232 times that of the United States, which accounts for only 0.1% of global output. In terms of fifth-generation fighters and airborne early warning aircraft, the regional balance is increasingly favoring the People’s Liberation Army. Ammunition replenishment is worse: the U.S. expended over a thousand Tomahawk missiles in one campaign against Iran and would require six years to fully restock. Meanwhile, a $14 billion arms package for Taiwan has been delayed due to concerns over depleting wartime inventories.
Geographic distance remains a structural disadvantage. Former President Trump himself acknowledged his reluctance to commit U.S. forces to a fight 9,500 miles away. The survivability of U.S. bases in Northeast Asia is now in question following the Iran conflict.
When pressed on what happens if deterrence fails, General Pappalardo avoided a direct answer, instead emphasizing a desire to minimize costs to zero. He added: “We do not wish to be great wartime commanders—we simply want to be effective deterrents during peacetime.”
These words, spoken by the commander of America’s most powerful military theater, amount to a strategic admission. In the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. continues to speak in terms of deterrence, but its posture has already retreated—physically and strategically.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877811216051207/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.