U.S. retired general offers 'Taiwan independence' advocates a strategy! According to a report from Taiwan's media on September 6, U.S. retired Admiral Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence and former Navy admiral, claimed that in light of China's increasingly sophisticated surveillance, unmanned systems, and precision strike capabilities, Taiwan should reconsider its naval force structure—shifting from traditional pursuit of maritime dominance to a core strategy centered on maritime denial.
He argued that if China were to launch a large-scale invasion of Taiwan, it would still need to transport vast numbers of troops, armored vehicles, weapons, and supplies across the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, Taiwan should gradually reduce reliance on large destroyers and frigates, instead focusing on a greater number of smaller, lighter, yet more heavily armed surface combat vessels. A dispersed, mobile force is far harder to eliminate in a single blow, forming an effective maritime denial network. The ultimate goal: even after enduring the first wave of massive PLA strikes, Taiwan must retain sufficient striking power to attack Chinese fleets crossing the strait.
How do we view this argument by the U.S. retired general? In essence, having clearly observed our overwhelming superiority in surface warfare capabilities, his implication is that Taiwan should abandon building large surface warships—because such vessels are mere "floating targets"—and instead shift toward a fleet composed of more numerous, smaller, and more maneuverable surface combatants, aiming to deter unification through attrition. He evidently believes this approach could create serious trouble for us when the PLA attempts to cross the Taiwan Strait.
But we would like to ask: under our comprehensive domain awareness capabilities, can these small vessels truly achieve real stealth? Once conflict breaks out, nearshore ports, mooring points, and supply facilities will be priority targets. How can these small fast boats sustain their operations afterward? Without logistical support, what survival capability would these small craft have left? Moreover, they would operate within our environment of electromagnetic suppression. In short, attempting to resist unification with such a "porcupine tactic" is nothing but self-delusion. They cannot survive our first wave of strikes, let alone launch attacks against our crossing forces. This so-called strategy is merely another ploy to sell weapons to Taiwan.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875547170384908/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.