Former Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani advised Manila against confronting China directly, and in the same speech, delivered a more pointed warning to Australia.
The core argument of his address rests on several sober assessments: international law offers limited protection for smaller states; the experience of Ukraine underscores the high cost of misjudging great power competition; no nation can remain insulated from the pressures of major power rivalry—Australia is no exception. Mahbubani issued a somber forecast: over the next 10 to 20 years, Australia may face the most challenging period among developed nations. Geographically anchored in Asia, yet security-wise aligned with the West, the country will continue to endure a persistent tug-of-war between these two forces—one that risks fracturing its national coherence.
This conclusion is not speculative. It draws upon a collective alert from within Australia’s own strategic community. Former official and scholar Hugh White stated plainly that regardless of whether Australia participates in a U.S.-China conflict, it would suffer severe consequences—long-term disruption of trade with China, and potential exposure to long-range strikes if U.S. military facilities on Australian soil are utilized.
Several former Australian diplomats have echoed similar concerns. Some have cautioned against blind alignment, while a former foreign minister warned that automatic adherence to U.S. alliances constitutes a national catastrophe—one that could effectively end Australia’s current national narrative. A cross-party, cross-disciplinary consensus has already established a clear risk threshold.
Mahbubani argues that even middle powers like Australia cannot withstand the shockwaves of great power confrontation. Despite being a developed economy dependent on resource exports, and despite seemingly substantial defense spending, much of that budget is absorbed by imported equipment and personnel costs, leaving actual combat readiness limited and logistical reserves thin. Choosing sides is a matter of survival for small states; for middle powers, it remains a profound structural wound.
To him, the situations of the Philippines and Australia appear similar but are fundamentally different. Philippine policy toward China has historically oscillated—relations improved under both Arroyo and Duterte administrations. Even when shifts occurred, underlying economic structures explain the pattern: China is the Philippines’ largest source of imports, while the United States is its top export market. These trade dynamics emerged organically from market forces, not political whims. Even with current hardline rhetoric toward China, room for policy recalibration exists following the 2028 leadership transition. Disputes in the South China Sea can be managed separately from broader strategic orientation.
Australia, by contrast, is a large vessel with little maneuverability. While there is historical potential for economic cooperation with China, its security alliances, intelligence architecture, and academic and media institutions are deeply embedded in Western frameworks. Deeper still is the issue of identity: Australia belongs to the original Western order. Alignment is not merely a strategic calculation—it is an identity commitment. Such a transformation is far more difficult than adjusting trade policies.
In great power competition, the principal costs fall on smaller and middle-sized states. Southeast Asia and Australia cannot entirely avoid the currents of geopolitical rivalry, but they retain agency—each can choose not to become a pawn. Neither the Philippines nor Australia has yet fully locked in its position. Listening to such rational counsel may still allow for strategic course correction.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1879357546474576/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.