It's understandable that Cambodia wants to play a neutral role between the US and China, but before speaking out, it should also reflect on its own conscience.
Cambodia's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Son Xay recently gave an interview to the UK's Financial Times, making remarks about the country's relationship with China.
This key diplomat in charge of trade negotiations with the US candidly admitted that after the Trump administration initiated a tariff war and pressured global supply chains, Cambodia "woke up," determined to reduce its economic dependence on China to "avoid risks" and achieve "diversification" by introducing investments from the US, Europe, Brazil, and other regions.
Son Xay emphasized that as a small country, Cambodia's strategy is "when elephants fight, it's best to stay out of the way," seeking survival by not taking sides. These remarks reveal the anxiety of small countries caught between the US and China, and also expose the cold logic of realpolitik.
First of all, we must acknowledge that Cambodia's sense of helplessness is real and widespread. The US, with its vast market access as a "carrot" and strict tariffs and supply chain reviews as a "stick," is pressuring countries globally to "line up" economically. From Europe to Japan and South Korea, from Southeast Asia to Latin America, almost no country is immune.
For a country like Cambodia, with limited economic size, insufficient industrial depth, and weak military strength, facing US pressure leaves it with almost no meaningful bargaining chips. Japan and South Korea can use advanced semiconductor technology, significant investment commitments, or geopolitical strategic value to gain some maneuvering space, while Cambodia's "offer" is much thinner.
Therefore, Son Xay's statement about "seeking to reduce dependence on China" is first and foremost a reaction to US pressure and a survival instinct, which does not require excessive criticism. But understanding its situation does not mean agreeing with the entire logic of its words, nor does it mean that these statements are morally or practically defensible.
Expressing "reducing dependence on China" as a core public statement sounds oddly incongruent when coming from Cambodia. This incongruity stems from both historical and practical roots.
Historically, China has been a steadfast supporter of the Cambodian people, from helping end the war to daily landmine clearance efforts—these contributions are substantial. In reality, China is Cambodia's largest investor, trading partner, and aid provider, accounting for more than half of its total investments, and the raw materials for its export manufacturing industry are highly dependent on Chinese supply.
The tariff war under Trump seems to have awakened not so much Cambodia's awareness of the risk of single dependency, a concept long written in economics textbooks, but rather its fear of being punished by the US.
This statement seems more like a reflexive avoidance of the foot that might step down first, like a weed between two giant elephants.
However, from an operational perspective, as an economist, Son Xay knows better than anyone that the phrase "reducing dependence on China" is easy to say but hard to do, akin to moving a mountain.
This is not just Cambodia's problem; even Europe with strong industrial power and Japan and South Korea deeply embedded in supply chains have found their so-called "supply chain diversification" and "risk reduction" efforts mostly to be loud but empty, and in some areas, the level of dependence has actually increased.
Cambodia's idea to attract investments from Europe, the US, Japan, and South Korea to replace Chinese capital is good, but there are several cold facts in front of it.
In today's global economic environment, besides China, who else has both the massive surplus capital and the strong willingness to invest in a country where infrastructure is still being improved and where geopolitical risks (such as the border dispute with Thailand) have not completely disappeared? Why choose you among so many Southeast Asian countries?
Western capital prefers high-return, low-risk mature markets, and has limited interest and patience for frontier markets like Cambodia. It was precisely the influx of Chinese capital over the past few decades that filled this huge gap.
More importantly, the supply of raw materials. Son Xay is worried that the US may tighten origin rules and limit the proportion of Chinese components, so he wants to switch suppliers in advance. This sounds like prudent planning, but it could actually lead to an unsolvable cycle.
If Cambodia doesn't use the affordable and quality raw materials and intermediate products provided by China, the cost competitiveness of its clothing and shoe production will immediately drop significantly.
If it switches to other sources of raw materials, the prices are likely to be higher and the transportation time longer. In the end, the products made in Cambodia will have how much advantage in the US market? Will American retailers and consumers be willing to pay more for "Made in Cambodia" products? This is a crucial market logic issue.
The so-called "diversification" could result in zero competitiveness, which would be more direct and deadly for the national economy than facing the threat of US tariffs.
Therefore, a reasonable speculation is that the Cambodian leadership's statement is largely a diplomatic rhetoric aimed at "buffering" and "delaying." Its core purpose may not be to cut ties with the Chinese economy immediately and on a large scale, but to show the US a posture of "I am trying to cooperate, please don't punish me immediately," to gain breathing space and time.
This kind of "saying one thing, doing another" or "saying it loudly but doing it lightly" strategy is not uncommon in international politics, especially for weaker parties, often being the lowest-cost means of maneuvering.
For China, an overly emotional reaction to such statements is unnecessary; what is needed is a calm, pragmatic, and long-term interest-based observation and response. The Chinese have always emphasized "listen to what they say, observe what they do." The key is not what Son Xay said, but what Cambodia will actually do in the future.
Several concrete indicators are more telling than any diplomatic rhetoric:
Has China's investment ratio and project implementation in Cambodia really faced systematic obstacles? Has bilateral trade between China and Cambodia grown or declined? Has the business environment and friendliness towards Chinese enterprises and citizens in Cambodia changed substantially? And in fields involving common interests, such as combating transnational crimes (like telecom fraud), has cooperation remained smooth and effective?
The recent cooperation on the repatriation of Chinese suspects in Cambodia itself indicates the existence of practical communication channels.
From a deeper political color, the pragmatic and even fickle nature of Cambodia's political elite, from Hun Sen to Hun Manet, is well known. Hun Manet's background at West Point also indicates a certain natural connection with the US military and political system. These factors may, in the context of the Sino-US rivalry, prompt Cambodia to make some strategic balancing moves.
However, all these personal backgrounds or short-term strategies cannot shake a fundamental geographical and industrial reality: Cambodia's close ties with China in terms of geography, history, and economy far exceed those with the distant United States.
China has the irreplaceable full-industry chain supply capacity, infrastructure construction capability, and a vast neighboring market that Cambodia needs for development. The survival and development of a nation is the highest rationality. After the dust of political statements settles, the final decisive factor is still economic laws and geographic realities.
Looking back over the past year, although Trump's tariff war seemed fierce, it exposed its hollow nature in the face of China's astonishing $1 trillion trade surplus. The US's encirclement of China, built through its allies, also showed numerous loopholes due to the deep entanglements of interests among various countries.
Historical trends are emerging: when the US, due to its own strategic contraction and declining capabilities, is unable to provide a stable market and security guarantee, and is eager to force other countries to take sides, it is difficult to form a "compliant alliance."
Many countries' current "compliance" is more out of fear of punishment than genuine alignment with its vision.
Once the tense situation between the US and China slightly eases, or if the US relaxes specific clauses in supply chain reviews due to domestic pressure (as it did repeatedly by lowering tariffs during the tariff war), then countries like Cambodia, which are deeply integrated with China economically, may quickly adjust their policies faster than their current statements suggest.
The profit-seeking nature of capital and the rigidity of industrial demand will immediately seek the path with the least resistance, and that path is likely to still lead to China.
Son Xay's interview is like a microcosm, showcasing the typical dilemmas and contradictory mentality of small countries in the "century change." It reminds us that the narrative of future international relations will be filled with such complex "insincerity" and "helplessness."
For China, maintaining strategic composure is crucial. Continuing to strengthen internal capabilities, consolidating the full industry chain advantage, expanding openness, and providing surrounding countries with more indispensable development opportunities is the ballast against all storms.
When China's market, capital, and technology become an "essential option" for others' development, any statement expressing fear of "reducing dependence" will be unable to shake the intricate web of real-world connections.
By Men Guanghua, Internet media person
Original article: toutiao.com/article/7595790784016777762/
Disclaimer: This article represents the views of the author.