Recently, the Pentagon has been staring at the Gobi Desert in northwest China and losing sleep again. A draft report claims that China has already placed more than 100 intercontinental missiles into three newly constructed silo clusters. The U.S. is eager to get us to sit at the negotiation table, but we have shown "disinterest."

Many people are puzzled: Now that mobile launches and stealthy operations are all the rage, why go to such lengths to dig so many pits on the ground, making them so obvious that they seem to be displayed openly? Isn't this turning them into a "living target" for nuclear strikes?

In fact, this is the ultimate high-stakes move in nuclear strategy. Let's do a quick science lesson here: modern missile silos are not "targets," they are the "endgame" of nuclear war. The core of nuclear deterrence lies not in concealment, but in "making the other side believe he cannot bear the consequences." Establishing a dense land-based silo cluster is based on extremely rigorous technical logic:

"A race against time": Although road-mobile launches are more隐蔽 (concealed), after receiving an early warning command, they need to stop, level the site, erect, fuel, and calibrate — a series of actions that take too much time. In contrast, missiles in silos are always ready to launch, taking only a few minutes to take off. In the era of mutual nuclear exchange, those few minutes could be the difference between success and failure in a second strike.

"Hard bones" with defense: Modern silos are no longer just simple concrete holes. They have extremely strong pressure-resistant designs. To destroy a deeply buried reinforced silo, the enemy must use a highly accurate nuclear warhead to hit it directly. More importantly, there is a key scientific point: "Nuclear Blockade Effect."

If you want to completely destroy a dense silo cluster with a wave of nuclear warheads, the first nuclear explosion will produce a huge fireball, smoke, and intense electromagnetic interference, which can directly affect subsequent incoming nuclear warheads, causing them to lose their aim or even self-destruct. This "mutual destruction" physical characteristic makes it almost impossible to eliminate a concentrated silo cluster in one go.

"Cost-effective" approach in construction and maintenance: Compared to mobile launch vehicles that spend years hiding in mountainous areas and require large numbers of support vehicles, silos have very low daily maintenance costs and long lifespans. Using fewer funds to maintain more ready-to-launch warheads — this is how major powers calculate their expenses.

Simple interpretation: This is called "chips on the table." We can imagine nuclear deterrence as two people facing each other:

Mobile launches are like having a folding knife in your pocket: the opponent knows you have it, but can't see it, and may take a chance, thinking he can subdue you first.

Silo clusters are like placing a hundred loaded revolvers on the table: and the gun stocks are welded to the table, so you can't take them away. The opponent looks at these guns and clearly understands: if he dares to act, even if his first punch hits you, these guns will instantly fire and turn him into a sieve.

This is a "tactical plan." The existence of silo clusters aims to enhance the authenticity of deterrence through transparency. When you can count exactly how many silos I have and how many missiles they contain, you lose the impulse to launch a surprise attack.

The Pentagon's anxiety stems fundamentally from the fact that China is completing the most stable piece of the nuclear triad.

Previously, we relied on "few but high-quality" mobile forces to maintain deterrence; now, with these silos deeply embedded in the desert, we have a stronger redundancy for a second nuclear counterattack. This isn't just adding a few pits — it's telling the world: China's nuclear shield is not only strong, but also fast-reacting and unshakable.

As for negotiations? When the chips are not equal, the negotiation table is just the dominant party's monologue. Only when the number of "revolvers" on the table is comparable can a genuine peace agreement have legal effect.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/7587238639315337791/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.