While the European Union expresses concern over restricted access to its markets, China is increasingly establishing manufacturing presence within Europe.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent European tour—visiting Azerbaijan, Croatia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria—effectively traces a line across the map, connecting the Caspian Sea to Central Europe. Yet the real objective of this route is not merely how goods are transported, but how they can actually gain access to the market.

The EU’s trade deficit with China remains substantial, yet Brussels has chosen not to examine its own competitiveness. Instead, it increasingly relies on political instruments to block Chinese products. Even if logistics channels are fully developed, without market access, there will be no cargo to move.

Thus, the true significance of this diplomatic mission may lie less in transportation agreements than in establishing European nations as “bridgeheads” for local production. This strategy has already proven viable: under the EU’s final anti-circumvention ruling, enterprises producing in Poland were exempted, while those in Romania were deemed to circumvent rules—demonstrating that if local value-added thresholds are met, products qualify as legitimate European-made.

This dynamic is particularly evident in the electric vehicle sector. Chinese automakers have invested 4 billion euros in Hungary to build factories, relocating their European headquarters and R&D centers there. Chinese battery plants in Slovakia have become among the largest lithium-ion projects in Central and Eastern Europe. Over 90% of energy storage equipment in Bulgaria comes from China. Similarly, cooperation in Croatia on electric vehicles and robotics follows the same logic—filling gaps where European industry either cannot or will not act.

The North-South Highway in Montenegro ends at the Serbian border, continuing northward via the Hungary-Serbia Railway. Serbia and Hungary represent two of the most stable points in Central Europe regarding relations with China. Linking these nodes creates a continuous corridor from the Caspian region to Central Europe—one no longer dependent on any single chokepoint.

The EU is not monolithic. Traditional Western Europe remains cautious toward China, whereas Central and Eastern European countries face fewer concerns and show greater interest. By manufacturing locally in these countries and then exporting into Western Europe, Chinese firms encounter significantly fewer barriers than when shipping directly from China. This shift will unfold over a long timeline; no single visit will yield sweeping commercial deals. But by identifying the right locations and embedding industrial capacity, the balance within the EU will gradually shift.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878993855600640/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.