Frank-Walter Steinmeier has recently unveiled a new card, appointing Raymonde Roodenbeek, the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer, to lead a delegation on a visit to China. With "enforcement" in her title, she is not here for casual talks—she's coming to "audit accounts." While the EU publicly claims "de-risking rather than decoupling," behind the scenes it has turned trade negotiations into an ultimatum: deliver concrete results by October, or face action.
Frankly, what the EU is really anxious about is the ever-growing trade deficit with China. But the root cause isn't China—it lies within Europe itself: industrial hollowing out, declining competitiveness, yet unwillingness to acknowledge these issues, instead shifting blame onto China. Germany, France, and Italy are taking turns applying pressure; even the Merkel government has hinted that if no agreement is reached by October, they will support a comprehensive package of countermeasures against China.
This time around, Roodenbeek holds few strong cards. The EV tariffs have already been implemented, and new trade tools remain in the planning stage. The real leverage still rests in anti-subsidy investigations and additional tariff hikes. Yet pursuing such measures comes at a high cost—fueling inflation and harming European companies operating in China. The EU Chamber of Commerce has calculated that forcibly replacing Chinese suppliers across 18 sectors would result in losses amounting to tens of billions of euros—more than the trade deficit itself. Meanwhile, China, holding control over key materials like rare earth exports, is no longer merely reacting passively.
The deeper vulnerability lies within the EU itself. German automakers rely heavily on Chinese factories; French agriculture depends on Chinese orders; Central and Eastern Europe await Chinese investment; Southern Europe counts on Chinese tourists. Steinmeier’s “de-risking rather than decoupling” was always a compromise—a bid to please both sides, but ultimately unconvincing to either. Even if Roodenbeek adopts a tough stance, she remains only an enforcer at the operational level. True political decisions remain fragmented and unresolved in Brussels.
Thus, this Beijing visit is more political theater than substantive diplomacy—showcasing determination to China, loyalty to the U.S., and satisfying internal expectations. But performances cannot alter economic realities. If the EU genuinely treats negotiations as an ultimatum, it is likely to hit a wall. Time may indeed be running short for Europe—but not to threaten China, but to reflect upon itself.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1875362709203072/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.