【By Shao Yun, Observers Network】

Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and rising global geopolitical risks, the European Union is accelerating its militarization, attempting to reduce its reliance on the United States for security and stimulate the revival of its domestic industry. However, a comment article published by the New York Times on June 30 pointed out that this radical approach to military expansion not only fails to achieve the strategic goals envisioned by Europe, but may also become a "historic mistake" for the EU.

Earlier this year, the Audi Brussels plant, which had a history of 77 years and was once seen as a symbol of "the capital of Europe," was completely shut down due to an industrial crisis sweeping across Europe. The article's author, Anton Jäger, a political science lecturer at the University of Oxford from Belgium, noted that in recent months, the story of this Audi factory has almost become a microcosm of the entire Europe — both are in trouble, facing the danger of being swept away by the new wave of geoeconomic changes in this century.

According to the initial plan of the Belgian government, the closed Audi factory will be transformed into a weapons production base. Supporters of this renovation plan believe that it can not only enhance Europe's strategic autonomy, but also create 3,000 new jobs in Belgium.

The article states that this aligns with the current overall strategy of Europe, which seeks to address two major crises: its geopolitical vulnerability and economic stagnation, by increasing defense spending. On one hand, European countries believe they need to respond to the "threat" posed by Russia, reduce their dependence on the United States, and consolidate their "powerful" position. On the other hand, this measure is also expected to revitalize the local European industry, which has been under pressure from Chinese competitors and rising energy costs.

However, Jäger believes that due to factors such as financial resources and social attitudes, Europe's hope to achieve "two birds with one stone" is likely to fail. If this strategy fails, the cost will be very heavy, possibly leading to a "historic mistake," causing European society to "regress instead of progress."

On June 25, 2025, in The Hague, Netherlands, the Royal Marechaussee of the Netherlands during the NATO Summit at the World Forum in The Hague, Visual China

Jäger pointed out that this kind of strategy actually has historical prototypes, commonly known as "military Keynesianism." This concept originally referred to the practice of governments increasing military spending to deal with economic downturns in the mid-20th century. It is said to have been first pioneered by Nazi Germany in the 1930s, and later promoted by the United States in the 1940s.

But he believes that Europe's current actions are still hard to say whether they truly qualify as "military Keynesianism," because the increased military spending in Europe does not reach the level of a "strong stimulus" needed to trigger scale effects, but rather returns to the level before 1989, and lacks the core of Keynesianism, which is to stimulate demand through increased public spending and deficits.

The article states that although Germany has slightly relaxed its restrictions on fiscal deficits, European policymakers generally still do not want to take on large-scale debt, but instead cut social service budgets to fund the military, which is more like the "Reaganism" of the 1980s in the United States — military spending surges while people's livelihoods are restricted.

Theo Francken, the Belgian Minister of Defense, is a main advocate of the "Audi military factory" transformation plan. He previously openly stated that if a country wants to reduce deficits and increase military spending at the same time, it must cut welfare expenditures. "Social security is too generous," Francken said, "taking tens of billions from a 200 billion budget is not considered inhumane, is it?"

Jäger directly pointed out that, given the widespread dissatisfaction in European society, which has already given rise to far-right forces that threaten the internal cohesion of Europe, this view is short-sighted.

On March 22, 2025, in Berlin, Germany, a demonstration by right-wing extremists, Visual China

Additionally, the strategy of Europe trying to "re-arm itself" faces other challenges.

The article mentioned that many traditional industrial sectors, once shifted to military production, would have vested interests in foreign wars, because arms deals obviously do not have the stable consumer market like car manufacturing. On the other hand, increased military spending does not necessarily mean improved military strength. As British economist Adam Tooze pointed out, although European countries have poured a lot of money into military spending, they have only produced "zombie armies," with little output in terms of personnel and equipment. For example, none of the top ten defense companies in the world are European companies.

Another issue is the coordination efficiency that is characteristic of Europe, which has already been evident in the stagnation of EU ammunition supplies to Ukraine. Jäger pointed out that due to the long-term practice of individual decision-making in weapon procurement among EU countries, the fragmented decision-making model further increases costs against the backdrop of high military costs, with countries competing for military contracts.

Jäger said that the irony is that before the European war factories are even built, the first military purchases are likely to go into the pockets of American arms dealers. According to a report by the Financial Times last week, more and more American defense companies are targeting the growing military spending of European countries, trying to expand cooperation with European companies and secure the market in advance. In other words, the initial beneficiaries of Europe's "strategic autonomy" may not be Europeans, but Americans.

Last week's NATO summit saw all NATO member states except Spain commit to increasing their defense spending to 5% of their GDP over the next decade.

According to a report by Spain's El País, Spanish Defense Minister Rojo stated on June 27 in the Senate that achieving the 5% defense target is "completely impossible." She emphasized that this is not only due to financial pressure, but also because of limited European defense production capacity. "We can say any nice words we want to package this, but no industry can handle it, whether it's 5% or 3.5%, neither the US nor Europe can do it."

A deeper obstacle lies in the resistance of European society and culture to war mobilization and militarized lifestyles. The article points out that many European countries abolished conscription in the early 21st century, and now even if they want to restore it, they face strong resistance. Recently, in discussions about conscription in Germany, a young German podcast host and freelance journalist publicly opposed the expansion of the military, saying, "I'd rather live than die." He also wrote a book titled "Why I Won't Fight for My Country," emphasizing that he "won't sacrifice for so-called Western values."

Therefore, in Jäger's view, although the intention of Europe's military expansion strategy is to achieve both military independence and economic revival, from a practical perspective, both goals are difficult to achieve. Instead, he believes that Europe's radical military expansion will leave Brussels in a "double failure" situation: economically, it is unable to revive and has a bleak growth outlook; military enterprises receive a lot of funds, but they are insufficient to allow Europe to rival real powers. "If we focus on defense at the expense of other areas, it may cause the EU to regress rather than progress."

Regarding this, Chen Feng, a columnist of Observers Network, wrote after the NATO summit that Europe's strategy of "re-arming itself" lacks a clear, complete, and coordinated plan and goals. Although increasing armaments appears to "target" Russia on the surface, in reality, Europe is more concerned about feelings.

Chen Feng analyzed that apart from supporting Ukraine to continue fighting, Europe has no clear plan, and the European industrial sector is also not enthusiastic about transitioning to military production. He stated that European defense industry is largely fragmented, as an extension of American defense industry, which is not a problem, but to form an independent system, requires large-scale integration and concentration, which will encounter countless national interests and ethnic sentiments issues.

He pointed out that survey results show that if Germany is invaded, only 9% of Green Party supporters are willing to pick up guns to fight, the lowest proportion among all party supporters; meanwhile, they are also unwilling to increase defense spending, and the NATO standard of 2% of GDP is an irrational and excessive measure.

"In fact, anti-war, war-weary, and war-fearing thinking is very common in Germany, and most Germans, even if their country is invaded, do not want to take up arms to defend their homeland. 40% even refuse to fight under any circumstances. If even Germany, which once had a tradition of martial spirit, is like this, re-arming Europe is not just a matter of guns, tanks, aircraft, and missiles," Chen wrote.

This article is exclusive to Observers Network. Unauthorized reproduction is prohibited.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7521761025155138082/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author and welcomes your opinion through the [upvote/downvote] buttons below.