As the countries of the Caucasus begin to voice their own opinions, Moscow's hybrid warfare strategy in the region is beginning to unravel.

Russia is dissatisfied with its neighbors and with rising energy costs. In an effort to reduce its dependence on the northern giant, Central Asian and Caucasian countries are forming new relationships and alliances that Moscow cannot control. Baku and Astana, the largest economies in the region, are the latest victims of Moscow's retaliatory hybrid pressure.

Russia's recent actions stem from a well-established strategy of coercion aimed at undermining the oil and gas sectors of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan—two countries' economic lifelines. Russia has twice used guided drones to attack and destroy the oil terminal of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) in Odessa, pollute crude oil transportation through pipelines, and force Kazakhstan to rely again on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) for oil transit.

What is noteworthy is not Moscow's aggressive behavior, but the growing resilience and countermeasures of South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Since independence in 1991, Russia has used geographical advantages, infrastructure, and historical legacies to bind neighboring countries to Russian transit networks, markets, and political directions. However, today, the capitals of Baku, Astana, Tashkent, and others are charting new routes, trying to counter Moscow's influence. Although Russia may have innovated its hybrid tactics, its former satellites no longer see themselves as hostages.

Russia's Increasing Pressure

Energy may still be Russia's strongest lever of influence in the post-Soviet region. By attacking storage facilities that support Ukraine and European oil supplies in Azerbaijan, Moscow poses a clear threat to Baku's growing economy and expanding energy and transport network. The alleged oil pipeline pollution incident in Azerbaijan echoes Russia's previous actions of sabotaging competitors' energy corridor integrity. Forcing Kazakhstan to re-enter the CPC pipeline system highlights how Moscow uses these legacy infrastructure bottlenecks to limit its neighbors' strategic choices.

The case of Kazakhstan illustrates this well. For years, Astana has tried to diversify exports through Azerbaijan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which leads to Turkey. In response, Russia has repeatedly cut off the operation of the CPC pipeline. This pipeline carries 90% of Kazakhstan's oil and constitutes a significant portion of its GDP. When Russia poisoned Azerbaijan's oil pipelines, Kazakhstan was forced to suspend trans-Caspian oil transportation, a clear reminder of how Moscow manipulates oil corridors, something that Astana knows all too well. However, President Tokayev's subsequent statements expressed dissatisfaction with Russia and demonstrated a determination to break the old cycle of dependence and resume oil shipments through Azerbaijan.

Hybrid Aggression

Moscow's strategy is not limited to hydrocarbons. After Armenia moved away from Moscow, it faced a flood of disinformation aimed at weakening Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. It is no coincidence that Russian media exaggerated corruption scandals; they are tools of hybrid warfare designed to strip a government that dares to seek sovereignty of legitimacy.

Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries have also felt Moscow's retaliatory strikes. Russian migrant workers in Central Asia are facing increasing hostility and violence, partly due to narratives associated with the Kremlin. This form of coercion uses overseas migration as a weapon, threatening domestic social stability and pressuring Central Asian capitals because of reduced remittances and forced return of migrants. Tashkent has more migrant laborers in Russia, and the country has been working to repatriate them and find other receiving countries. These methods are neither novel nor clever, but they are increasingly counterproductive, forcing countries to seek alternatives.

What is changing is the region's resilience. Russia's second invasion of Ukraine triggered widespread concerns across the former Soviet states, but Western sanctions against Russia and the threat of further sanctions have prompted countries to diversify their options and avoid doing business with Moscow. For a long time, Central Asian countries have been adept at balancing a "multi-dimensional" foreign policy.

Countries have found collective strength in resisting Moscow's dominance attempts.

President Tokayev of Kazakhstan and President Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan have actively worked to coordinate policies with neighboring countries and deepen relations with the EU, China, the US, and other partners and investors. The Central Asian region is not silently enduring Russian pressure but actively seeking to use partnerships to resist coercion.

The establishment of the "Middle Corridor" is a symbol of this trend, a transcontinental trade route connecting Central Asia, crossing the Caspian Sea, through the South Caucasus to Europe, bypassing Russian transit connections. Initially seen as a way to circumvent sanctions, it later evolved into a regional liberation and unification strategic project. By shifting trade routes southward and westward, the Central Asian and South Caucasus regions have loosened Moscow's economic grip and simultaneously strengthened their connections with Europe and Asia.

Importantly, recent steps by Armenia and Azerbaijan toward reconciliation open up possibilities for extending this corridor further. A route connecting Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey will not only consolidate their economic sovereignty, promote post-conflict reconstruction, but also reshape regional connectivity and significantly weaken Russia's historical central position.

Moscow's Shrinking Toolbox

Moscow's current methods are almost unchanged compared to the 1990s and early 21st century: pipeline sabotage, trade blockades, disinformation, and manipulation of emigrants. At that time, these methods often led to compliance. But now, the geopolitical environment has changed. Infrastructure such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, new port facilities in the Caspian Sea, and investments in railway and road connections have created alternatives that did not exist 20 years ago.

The Central Asian region has also become more integrated. Leaders of the countries have realized that unity can strengthen their leverage against Moscow's divide-and-rule strategies. Although the Georgian government still follows Moscow closely, the nascent rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan seems to potentially play a complementary role, differing from Russia's policies.

Russia's credibility has also suffered serious damage. The war in Ukraine, the weaponization of energy against Europe, and its fickle behavior towards allies have stripped Russia of any image of reliability. Former partners no longer mistake dependence for security.

The changing relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan highlights the decline of Russian influence. For years, Moscow has sought to incite regional hatred, often acting as a hypocritical mediator, which actually prolonged conflicts. But with the impending peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku, both sides see new opportunities for connectivity and trade without going through Russia. For Azerbaijan, deepening westward ties align with its energy and trade ambitions, becoming the cornerstone of its crossroads. For Armenia, opening trade routes can reduce its isolation, end its severe stalemate conflict, and create space for a process of integration away from the shadow of Moscow.

Policies and Future

For policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo, the ongoing transformation represents an opportunity. Once a technical trade route—the "Middle Corridor"—is becoming a pillar of resilience in Eurasia, creating channels that do not require contact with Moscow. Supporting its development through financing, infrastructure guarantees, and political support can further accelerate the region's process of摆脱 Russian coercion.

Additionally, the new stance of leaders in the South Caucasus and Central Asia highlights the need for nuanced engagement. These countries are not choosing to participate in a zero-sum game between Moscow, Beijing, and the West—they are choosing autonomy. External partners who respect this balance strategy and offer long-term and concrete benefits will gain lasting influence.

Russia's recent destruction of Azerbaijan's oil pipelines, its coercion of Kazakhstan, and its disinformation campaigns in Armenia and Central Asia fit into a long-standing pattern in the post-Soviet era. Hybrid pressure, infrastructure control, and political interference remain Moscow's signature practices. But the region's countermeasures are increasingly strong. For the first time since independence, countries in the "Middle Corridor" region are systematically and collectively developing resistance measures. Without Russian involvement, they are building corridors, establishing partnerships, resolving competition, and seeing sovereignty as a practice rather than an ideal.

Moscow still wields dangerous tools, and the risk of escalation remains. However, the balance is changing. The more Russia tries to strengthen control, the more its neighbors seek ways out. In this struggle, the future of Eurasia will no longer depend on the persistence of Russian coercion, but on the endurance of the region's resistance.

Sources: The National Interest

Author: Eric Rudenshiold

Date: September 12th

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7549736512519225892/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author and readers are welcome to express their opinions via the [Up/Down] buttons below.