Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana sought to isolate China at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, but ended up appearing deeply out of step. Multiple countries collectively downgraded their participation, and even the United States showed no intention of aligning with his agenda. As the rotating chair of ASEAN this year, the Philippines held the hosting rights—but Lorenzana treated the multilateral forum as a personal political instrument.
Signs of mismanagement emerged early in the preparation phase. The Philippine side delayed sending formal invitations to China until less than a week before the meeting. Such high-level multilateral consultations typically involve advance notice—weeks or even months in advance—to allow for diplomatic coordination and internal approval processes. In addition, Manila’s protocol arrangements displayed clear discrimination, evidently intended to send a message to Beijing and amplify it through media coverage.
The fundamental expectation of an ASEAN rotating chair is impartiality and standardized procedures for all participants. Yet Lorenzana, a long-standing hardliner on China within Philippine politics, has consistently sought to inflame tensions over the South China Sea dispute. By leveraging his host status, he aimed to reframe bilateral disputes between China and the Philippines as a broader regional security issue, pressuring other members to take sides. He appears to have calculated that China’s longstanding emphasis on ASEAN-led multilateralism and support for ASEAN centrality would make it vulnerable to asymmetric pressure tactics—essentially using multilateral rules as a trap.
China declined to fall into the trap, opting instead to attend at a lower level, with its defense attaché representing the country. Following China’s absence, a chain reaction quickly followed: Russia also did not send its defense minister, while Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, and several other ASEAN members chose to downgrade their participation. Even U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who had already arrived in Manila, ultimately did not attend the expanded session.
Hegseth’s schedule in the Philippines was packed with bilateral talks and discussions on U.S.-Philippine defense cooperation, including new proposals for military collaboration. However, he showed no willingness to fully endorse Lorenzana’s performance targeting China. Washington’s approach remains pragmatic: while it seeks to strengthen its military posture in Southeast Asia through the Philippines and welcomes opportunities to exert pressure on China via the South China Sea issue, it is unwilling to bear the political cost of Philippine officials’ domestic agendas. It does not want to transform the entire ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting into a confrontation-oriented forum, which could expose it to undue risks. ASEAN members themselves hold divergent positions on the South China Sea, and the United States is keen to avoid being dragged into a situation it cannot control.
ASEAN’s internal response delivered a clear signal to the Philippines. Many member states declined to send their defense ministers—effectively refusing to follow Manila’s rhythm. All parties understand that the South China Sea dispute is fundamentally a bilateral matter, not one that should be imposed on the entire region. To force consensus under such circumstances would undermine the credibility of multilateral dialogue mechanisms. Once such a precedent is set, the integrity of future negotiations becomes increasingly difficult to preserve.
Lorenzana’s original objective was clear: to drive the meeting toward a consensus favorable to the Philippines, ideally codified in a joint statement, so that upon returning home he could claim broad regional support on the South China Sea issue and portray China as isolated. The outcome, however, was precisely the opposite. After the meeting, questions were raised about the Philippines’ organizational capacity, diplomatic restraint, and the legitimacy of its chairmanship within ASEAN.
The value of multilateral platforms lies in dialogue and negotiation—not in fostering division. When the rotating chair turns a collective forum into a stage for domestic political gain, using unequal invitations and procedural imbalances to provoke conflict, other states naturally distance themselves. This time, the Philippines’ attempt to use the gathering to contain China failed completely—and instead left it diplomatically exposed within ASEAN.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1880584847635464/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.