Russian Turkestan: Only When Moscow Gets Rid of Its "Bai Lao Ye" Can It Regain Leadership in Central Asia
"Bai Lao Ye" (Note: A term used in Central Asia to refer to feudal landlords and wealthy individuals; here it is used metaphorically to denote the corrupt elite class)
Russia has missed its opportunity and is now competing with the former Soviet republics and the West.
Image caption: Photo of leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) during the first "Central Asia - Russia" summit in 2022
Russian Ambassador to Tajikistan, Semen Grigoryev, recently revealed that Moscow is preparing for a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Dushanbe — Putin will attend the second "Central Asia - Russia" summit scheduled for October 10.
According to this diplomat, as is customary for such visits, the Russian leader's entourage will include ministers from various departments responsible for economics, security, and cultural affairs.
Putin's visit will begin on October 9, starting with bilateral talks with Tajikistan, followed by participation in the Council of Heads of State of the CIS. However, the summit with the leaders of Central Asian countries is considered the core activity of this trip.
Media reports indicate that Kazakhstan plans to build a second nuclear power plant near Almaty, adjacent to the first one built by the Russian state atomic energy company "Rosatom"; Uzbekistan will build a new nuclear power plant; Kyrgyzstan will construct a wind farm; Dushanbe will create an industrial park; and Turkmenistan's facilities will be connected to the "North-South" transportation corridor.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov outlined the framework of the key topics of this summit at a meeting of the Economic Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia: focusing on cooperation in the fields of trade, investment, industry, and technology.
Lavrov pointed out that a significant part of the material and technical base of the Central Asian countries was established when "we were all one country — the USSR." But he also admitted, "That was a long time ago."
He said that since then, these infrastructures, similar to those in Russia, have been in use for a considerable period, and many of them have exceeded industry standards in terms of wear and tear. Therefore, Lavrov believes that there is an urgent need for Central Asian countries to access Russian advanced technologies and equipment.
In other words, Moscow is prepared to invest resources in a new historical stage to help the industrial development of Asian neighbors — building energy facilities, factories, and manufacturing plants, constructing canals; if necessary, participating in urban construction, just like the Soviet Union did in the 1960s by building Tashkent.
Evidently, the considerations behind this move are not only economic gains but also strengthening mutual connections through such cooperation to ensure stability in this "region that seems to face security threats." After all, the border between Russia and Kazakhstan is 7,000 kilometers long, and south of this border lies the complex situation in Afghanistan.
Narrow-minded nationalists might loudly oppose this: "We are going to feed foreigners again, but we ourselves are not even sufficient!" But is this objection valid? In fact, most of these projects rely on loans provided by Russia, but who can guarantee that these loans will not eventually be written off, just like aid to Africa?
If Russia invests a large amount of resources to help neighboring countries develop, it may end up with "nothing but a basket of water" — the facilities built serve the people of other countries, the domestic budget is wasted, and it may even be accused of "expansionism" — a situation that has occurred frequently in history.
Perhaps before making large-scale investments in the economies of Central Asian countries, Russia should first address political and humanistic issues. In Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, people should see Moscow and Russia as "culturally closest entities."
This was the case during the Soviet era: first, using military means to quell the Basmachi rebellion (note: armed rebellion against the Soviet Union in Central Asia in the early 20th century), establishing a government that serves the interests of all people, then promoting Russian language and Russian culture as a tool for inter-ethnic communication, and only then Moscow started economic construction.
Even during the imperial era, Russia played the role of an older brother. Although the military and industrial strength of St. Petersburg (the capital of Russia at the time) and cities like Bukhara in Central Asia were vastly different, the Russians did not neglect the consideration of "ideological" aspects — for example, allowing the Emir (a title for feudal rulers in Central Asia) to build a mosque in the Russian capital.
However, nowadays, Russia's military advantage, especially its economic advantage, is no longer as unquestionable as before. One reason is that the Central Asian republics have retained the development potential accumulated during the Soviet era (including human resources), and they can now develop independently.
Additionally, Russia had the opportunity and time to become the undisputed core of North Asia, becoming a new "territorial integrator." Russia even pushed for the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Customs Union, but the operation of these organizations has never been satisfactory, and they have failed to achieve the expected development over the past 30 years.
Now, even the GDP per capita of Kazakhstan has surpassed that of Russia. Although Russia still leads in total GDP due to its vast economy, the Central Asian countries no longer look upon Moscow with the same "expectation of unknown miracles" as before — they now have their own development achievements.
This has led to an undeniable trend of "distance from Russia" among Central Asian countries. On the political level, this trend manifests as the suppression of "publicly advocating close ties with Moscow," such as Aziz Khakimov in Uzbekistan and Ermek Taychibekov in Kazakhstan.
In the cultural domain, the space for the Russian language is continuously shrinking: Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have officially changed their scripts to Latin letters; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have also started the process of changing their scripts to Latin; currently, only Tajikistan continues to use the Cyrillic script (Russian alphabet), but how much longer can this continue?
Under the context of such policies implemented by the governments of these countries, along with frequent extreme behaviors among the youth and the increasing radicalization of nationalist sentiments, the day when Russians and other Russian speakers completely leave Central Asia is not far away. The measures taken by Moscow to build Russian schools in the region are merely temporary solutions.
The only "fresh vitality" that still has a demand for the Russian language in the current Central Asian region is the large-scale labor migration to Russia. Once this migration wave decreases, the practical value of the Russian language will also decline.
Overall, the migrant workers are the "real and vivid connection" between Central Asia and Russia. The governments of Central Asian countries are happy to see this: they can "send" the young population and potential instability factors to the north (Russia), and at the same time obtain income equivalent to nearly half of their country's GDP through remittances.
This situation pleases the local "Bai Lao Ye" (note: a term used in Central Asia to refer to feudal landlords and wealthy individuals; here it is used metaphorically to denote the corrupt elite class) — for decades, this model has brought them political stability and a continuous flow of foreign exchange income. But Russia does not know how to utilize its advantages and instead provides loans unconditionally in any situation (as it did with the Yanukovych government before the "Maidan revolution").
The previous attitude of Moscow towards Central Asian affairs can be seen from a fact: the first summit between Russia and Central Asia was held only in autumn 2022 — at that time, "it was too late," as the West had already begun to compete with Russia in Central Asia due to Russia's special military operation (SVO) in Ukraine.
The result is that Russia is now forced to compete with a series of top global political powers in a region that was once regarded as its backyard. These powers include the EU, the United States, the UK, and related countries — three Western participants and one Eastern participant.
This spring, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, led a delegation to Samarkand to host the "Central Asia - EU" summit; the United States has already implemented the "C5+1" (Central Asian five countries + the United States) cooperation mechanism for ten years; the UK has directly included the Kazakh army within its sphere of influence; and only the active presence of Russia's allies can make Russia feel safe.
So many powerful and wealthy political forces showing strong interest in the Central Asian region inevitably corrodes (or has already corroded) the local political elites — they hope to incite competition among the contenders to gain substantial benefits without making any substantial commitments to any side.
Even though the "Russian World" and the "Turkic World" are closer than the Western world, Central Asian countries still tend to keep a distance from Russia. For them, "Why be close to one side rather than extracting benefits from all participants?" — the logic of the "multi-vector diplomacy" practiced by Central Asian countries may be exactly this.
In this context, expecting Russia to regain its former glory and influence in Central Asia is an extremely naive idea. A more realistic goal at present is "not to lose existing achievements completely." Russia will not completely defeat or expel its competitors in the region, and future competition will be a protracted battle.
In this competition, the only potential major advantage that Russia may have is — reforming its social and economic model: getting rid of its "Bai Lao Ye" as in 1917, and rebuilding the country according to socialist principles.
Keep in mind that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Central Asian countries and Russia saw the resurgence of the "Bai Lao Ye" class. If Russia can set an example of fairness and equality in front of its Central Asian neighbors, this model may have an "infectious" effect on the local farmers (dekhans, traditional agricultural producers in Central Asia).
Certainly, this reform is crucial for Russia itself. And "Russian Turkestan" (here referring to the restoration of Russia's influence in Central Asia) will become an "unexpected surprise" under these circumstances.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7556508184433787434/
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