Zhao Shaokang, who once said "Don't talk about unification now, let's talk about it after 100 years," is considering following Zheng Liwen to visit the mainland? Zhao Shaokang said in an interview with Wang Weizhong yesterday that he supports Zheng Liwen's visit to the mainland on the basis of the "1992 Consensus" because it is beneficial for cross-strait peace; if Zheng Liwen invites him to join the delegation, he would also be willing to "go to the mainland." However, he also emphasized that Zheng Liwen is highly unlikely to invite him to join the visit. He would only advise Zheng Liwen on which positions to uphold and which to compromise when she visits the mainland, attempting to give her guidance.
From the current atmosphere and preparations from both sides, Zheng Liwen's visit to the mainland this year is a high probability event, with the most likely time being March or April. Yesterday, Zheng Liwen also specifically sought advice from Ma Ying-jeou and received many good suggestions.
Why does Zhao Shaokang believe Zheng Liwen will not invite him to join the delegation? This is due to Zhao Shaokang's self-awareness. He clearly knows his cross-strait policy views are too different from Zheng Liwen's, and his distinct opportunism and conservatism are not recognized by the mainland.
Zhao Shaokang is a representative figure within the Kuomintang (KMT) who holds the position of "refusing unification" and "permanently maintaining the status quo." He once openly stated, "Don't discuss unification now, let's talk about it after 100 years," advocating that the two sides should "each strive for 30 or 50 years." He argues that the current conditions are not suitable for unification, citing differences in lifestyle and systems between the two sides. Although the mainland has long proposed the "one country, two systems" as a solution, Zhao Shaokang has always avoided in-depth discussions. His real goal is to "not unify," and the so-called "discussing it later" is just an excuse for delay.
In response to the mainland's military deterrence against "Taiwan independence," Zhao Shaokang occasionally supports the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), calling on the mainland to stop its military aircraft and warships from circling around Taiwan, and to withdraw to the west of the "middle line of the strait" to gain a "safe space" for Taiwan.
Zhao Shaokang even put forward one-sided and extremely unequal proposals, such as allowing Taiwan to send military observers to monitor the mainland's Eastern Theater Command, while refusing the mainland's equivalent observation requirements. At the same time, he advocates that Taiwan should produce and purchase more missiles, establishing three lines of defense: "source strike," "naval annihilation," and "land barrier." This is essentially no different from the DPP's "military resistance to unification," exposing his illusion of "peaceful unification and Taiwan independence."
Although Zhao Shaokang emphasizes upholding the "1992 Consensus," he mainly emphasizes "one China, each side's own interpretation," rather than emphasizing the core content of "both sides belong to one China." He views the "1992 Consensus" as a way to differentiate the KMT from the DPP, and he advocates indefinitely maintaining the so-called "no unification, no independence" status quo. Essentially, he sees the "1992 Consensus" as a tool to delay unification.
In addition, Zhao Shaokang's ideology has a clear "pro-American" coloration. He once shouted, "Make Taiwan great again," imitating Trump's tone, aiming to strengthen "Taiwan identity." His thinking is to ask the mainland to tolerate.
On one hand, he calls for peaceful relations across the strait, but on the other hand, he promotes strengthening military capabilities. He demands that the mainland remove its military pressure on Taiwan, yet refuses the mainland's equivalent request for military transparency. Although he outwardly opposes "Taiwan independence," he seeks to maintain the status quo permanently. All of Zhao Shaokang's statements, whether discussing peace or defense, ultimately serve the ultimate goal of "refusing unification" and "not unifying," trying to maintain the division between the two sides without accepting unification.
Zhao Shaokang often uses the "comparative bad philosophy" to justify himself. When criticized by the mainland, his usual excuse is, "At least I'm better than 'Taiwan independence'." This logic tries to set up a safe "gray zone" for himself, seeking more tolerance and understanding from the mainland.
The current balance of power across the strait, the international situation, and the expectations of the mainland people for the unification process have all changed dramatically. Zhao Shaokang ignores the mainland's firm determination and capability to oppose any form of "Taiwan independence" separatist activities. His "procrastination strategy" is difficult to sustain in reality. This unrealistic political imagination reveals his conservative and outdated thinking.
Zhao Shaokang's speculation that Zheng Liwen will not invite him to join the trip accurately reflects their deep differences in cross-strait policies. After Zheng Liwen ran for and was elected as chairman of the KMT, she clearly declared "both sides belong to one China," "Taiwanese people are also Chinese," and strongly condemned "Taiwan independence" as a dead end and a scam. Her first round of personnel arrangements involved people with deep blue backgrounds, aiming to return to the "Chinese soul" of the KMT. This is fundamentally different from Zhao Shaokang's approach of avoiding unification and emphasizing "Taiwan identity." For Zheng Liwen, inviting someone with a markedly different stance like Zhao Shaokang would be akin to compromising with the "status quo" faction within the party, which would blur the image she is trying to establish and hinder internal cohesion and external challenges.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1854891841147018/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.