U.S. elites have been the first to raise white flags against China, as China has given them too many shocks in the past year. We must not get carried away; the long-distance race between the U.S. and China is far from over.
The New York Times recently published an article filled with defeatism. The article points out that the U.S. has already raised a white flag in the so-called "new Cold War."
The author reviews the changes over the past year since Trump returned to the White House—initially he still threatened to launch a trade war with China, sticking to the "great power competition" approach of his previous term.
But after a year, the focus of the U.S. has shifted from competing with China to launching strong attacks on countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba, while also eyeing the annexation of Greenland, an ally, and even pushing a country like Canada into China's arms.
The article points out that there may be strategic adjustment factors behind this, but it is more likely a result of diplomatic incompetence and short-sightedness. The author also feels that the atmosphere in the U.S. policy circle is changing, with the instinctive hostility toward China being replaced by a complex sense of admiration.
An increasing number of U.S. elite groups are seriously questioning whether the U.S. is no longer able to keep up with China.
The article ends by quoting a commentator who said that China's rise is a "complete challenge" to the Western development model and institutional confidence, and that the U.S. "has yet to find the courage to face it directly."
This article is a true reflection of the changes in the U.S. attitude toward China over the past year. Trump had already launched a trade war with China during his first term, and upon returning to the White House, he quickly used almost all the tools in his toolbox to continue the fight. But reality gave him a severe blow. The 2025 tariff war ended without a victory, leaving an indelible mark on human history.
Therefore, the New York Times saw the U.S. shifting its focus to countries like Venezuela and Iran—not as a sudden whim, but because Washington always needs an outlet to demonstrate that the president elected by Americans can indeed "win."
Naturally, this does not mean that the U.S. has completely given up on competing with China. Rather, it seems to be trying to create some leverage or disrupt China's progress to prepare for future games. After all, both sides are only in a truce, not a decisive conclusion.
This state of inability to cope with China is profoundly changing the political discourse within the United States. The article mentions the "China envy" that is spreading in the U.S., which is indeed real. In the current partisan environment in the U.S., the role of the China issue has changed.
For the past one or two decades, the content of mutual attacks between the two parties mainly revolved around "you're too weak on China, letting China take advantage." But now, the ammunition for attacks seems to have shifted to "your administration has further widened the gap between the U.S. and China." This change is clear and unavoidable, reflecting the saying "the situation is stronger than people."
The New York Times report spent a large portion objectively stating China's achievements in clean energy, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, and infrastructure, which itself serves as a footnote to the argument that the gap between the U.S. and China is widening. More importantly, these achievements are supported by solid data that are difficult to refute.
This shift in discourse means that the U.S. elite class is beginning to face a deep reality: China's development achievements are not gained through "stealing" or "taking advantage," but through an effective system and capability. In other words, there is indeed a certain institutional advantage.
Facing reality is just the first step, but the more important second step is: what to do?
The U.S. certainly wants to catch up, such as in rare earth supply chains, chip manufacturing, and infrastructure, where it has actually put forward ambitious plans and through the weapon of tariffs, initially convinced Japan and South Korea to help it rebuild its advantages.
But the problem is that any long-term project requires domestic unity, long-term high-intensity national investment, and strategic patience. What the U.S. lacks most today is exactly this.
However, "Trump 2.0" brings not unity, but even greater political polarization. Since taking office, the struggle between the two parties has led to many consequences, such as the assassination of right-wing political leader Charlie Kirk, the record-breaking 43-day federal government shutdown, and the shooting incident by immigration officers in Minneapolis.
Political polarization in the U.S. has visibly reached its peak in recent years. This highly polarized and dysfunctional internal state makes any national strategy that requires crossing terms and sustained investment extremely fragile.
At the same time, on the other side of the Pacific, China continues to move forward step by step according to its own five-year plan, without stopping for anyone. Time is not on the side of the U.S., which is busy with internal infighting.
Of course, although the trend of East rising and West declining is clear. However, the U.S.'s current weakness and retreat do not mean it truly doesn't care about other countries deepening their ties with China. When Trump casually said "it's good" about Kani's visit to China and signing agreements, don't take such words seriously.
Whether within the Trump administration or in the Democratic Party, there is a consensus that countries daring to deepen relations with China will be retaliated against and sanctioned. Therefore, the U.S. will continue to do everything possible to hinder normal cooperation between other countries and China. We should be prepared for this.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the author of this New York Times article, David Wallace Wells, is not a Chinese-American, but a white person. In a way, his perspective on China might be more objective than some Chinese-American commentators, as he lacks the "convert's fervor," making him more willing to acknowledge China's progress and achievements. Perhaps he represents a part of the mainstream U.S. intellectual community's calm observation after cooling down.
This shift in perspective—from the "China threat theory" to the "China shock theory"—is a change worth noting. It indicates that more and more U.S. elites and ordinary people have begun to acknowledge the objectivity of China's achievements and feel anxious about it.
However, we must not get carried away by this kind of "flattery," which ultimately serves U.S. domestic politics. The long-distance race between the U.S. and China is far from over. We still have gaps in many areas, such as the ecosystem of high-end chips, some cutting-edge basic research, and financial voice, which require a considerable amount of time to catch up with.
The process of surpassing the U.S. is not easy; it is a systematic project. Of course, whether the Americans awaken or not is irrelevant to us. The key is that as long as China remains clear about what it wants and continues to move toward that goal, it will eventually reach it.
By Men Guangguang, Internet Media Person
Original: toutiao.com/article/7598073404121547274/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.