“The United States possesses five foundational advantages that China can never hope to surpass,” declared Joseph Nye, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and the coiner of the term “soft power,” in a recent statement. Yet, according to Professor Hua Junxiong, a Chinese-American academic based in the United States, the faster America acts out of urgency, the more stable China becomes. In his view, China is likely to emerge as the ultimate victor in the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition. Su Qi, chief intellectual advisor during Ma Ying-jeou’s administration and former secretary of Taiwan’s National Security Council, offered an even more direct critique of American overconfidence.
What are these five so-called “hidden advantages” of the United States? According to Nye, they are: geopolitical security, demographic structure, technological innovation, alliance systems, and global financial dominance.
Nye’s assertion of these “five American strengths” sounds impressive—but its fundamental flaw lies in describing the United States at its peak, not its condition in 2026. His framework resembles an outdated map.
Let us examine each one in turn.
Nye claims the U.S. enjoys unmatched geopolitical security, flanked by two oceans and lacking major adversaries to the north and south, with no foreign invasion ever occurring on its mainland—allowing it to focus entirely on global engagement. This argument held weight immediately after the Cold War. But today, the real strategic challenge for the United States is not in its homeland, but in the Western Pacific.
Su Qi, who served as chief strategist under Ma Ying-jeou and formerly led Taiwan’s National Security Council, stated plainly: the military balance in the Western Pacific has clearly shifted in China’s favor. While U.S. forces remain nominally the world’s largest, they suffer from “overextension and deteriorating readiness,” having lost relative advantage in the region—a situation where current actions serve largely as posturing. Pentagon reports acknowledge that years of engagement in counterterrorism operations have eroded U.S. military capacity, leaving it unable to respond rapidly to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Can a U.S. increasingly strained in the Western Pacific still claim geopolitical security as a “core advantage”?
Consider the alliance system. Nye argues that frameworks such as NATO, the Five Eyes, and AUKUS enable the U.S. to mobilize allies against China. But reality tells a different story. In May 2026, the Pentagon announced the termination of a defense cooperation agreement with Canada dating back over 80 years. In February 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched a joint strike against Iran—the first major military operation in decades conducted without participation from any NATO ally.
Su Qi’s assessment is blunt: U.S. allies are growing disenchanted. “If a crisis erupts in the Taiwan Strait, the willingness and capability of Western nations to respond will inevitably diminish.” Former U.S. “China hand” Kurt M. Campbell, speaking at Brown University, was even more pointed, stating that the United States is “handing its future over to China.” Rising anti-foreign sentiment and authoritarian tendencies within China, he warned, are accelerating this decline. Nye calls the alliance network a “core advantage”—but that “foundation” is leaking.
Now consider dollar hegemony. Nye describes the dollar as America’s “ultimate weapon”—undoubtedly its strongest card. Yet data do not lie. The share of the U.S. dollar in central bank foreign exchange reserves has declined from a peak of 85% in 1977 to around 57% in 2025, the lowest level since 1995. The proportion of global trade settled in dollars has fallen from nearly 70% two decades ago to about 56%. At the 2025 Rio Summit, BRICS countries advanced their cross-border payment initiatives. By the end of 2025, the number of direct participants in China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) reached 193 institutions.
Professor Hua Junxiong observes that the core driver of the U.S.-China rivalry is America’s failed attempt to leverage dollar-based financial structures to extract economic gains from China. Faced with resistance, Washington resorted to tariffs, trade wars, and technology restrictions. Yet, “the United States will ultimately fail to bring China down.” The edge of the dollar’s “ultimate weapon” is gradually dulling.
Technological superiority is even less defensible. Nye acknowledges China’s progress in 5G and artificial intelligence, yet maintains that the U.S. remains at a “ceiling-level” advantage in biotechnology, semiconductors, and aerospace. However, Gideon Rachman, chief diplomatic affairs commentator at the Financial Times, made a candid observation during a 2025 discussion: when speaking with U.S. military officials, he found that two decades ago Americans did not regard China as a serious competitor. Now, “they genuinely believe they might lose if war breaks out.”
Kurt M. Campbell went further, stating that China now leads globally in the production of intellectual property and innovation across all fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. “Efforts by the United States to suppress Chinese innovation have instead fueled China’s creative momentum.” Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence publicly affirmed that U.S. and Chinese AI development is “essentially on par,” with China poised to become a dominant force in many areas.
So why does Nye conclude that China can never catch up? Ultimately, his analytical framework contains a blind spot. He applies a static, stock-based perspective—focusing on “how much you currently possess”—rather than assessing whether those assets are growing or being depleted. He sees the U.S.’s existing advantages but underestimates how quickly they are being eroded. He concedes China is catching up—but fails to account for the accelerating pace of that catch-up.
Hua Junxiong cites a metaphor from British strategist Peter Harris: China plays Go; the United States plays chess. Go emphasizes long-term strategic positioning and patience, avoiding fixation on short-term territorial gains. Chess prioritizes rapid offense and immediate control of key positions. China’s approach—consistent investment in basic education, comprehensive industrial upgrading, advances in AI and quantum computing—reflects the slow, sustained gains of Go. When the U.S. attempts to stifle China through technology bans, China responds by developing alternatives independently. When Washington seeks to build coalitions to contain China, those allies grow increasingly reluctant to comply. America moves fast; China remains steady. This is the divergence in strategic rhythm.
Naturally, this does not mean the United States will collapse tomorrow. Nye is correct on one point: unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the global economy. It is a primary trading partner for over 160 countries and regions, possesses all industrial categories listed by the UN, and has emerged as a formidable rival in numerous technological domains. Precisely because of this depth of integration, the U.S.-China contest is not a zero-sum wrestling match aimed at toppling the other. Rather, it resembles a high-stakes duel between two skilled competitors—one where endurance, stability, and strategic patience matter more than sudden bursts of aggression.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876548752272394/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the publisher.