The design inspiration for the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat clearly comes from Japan's "Shimpu" kamikaze boats during World War II. The latter was 5.1-6.5 meters long, had a speed of 23-32 knots, was made of plywood, carried 250 kilograms of explosives, and its operational method involved stealthy waiting, sudden engagement, and mass suicide attacks. However, history has proven that its effectiveness was limited. In the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns, although the "Shimpu" boats were put into actual combat, due to the lack of effective command and coordination and their vulnerability to detection and interception, they achieved few results and ultimately failed to change the course of the war. Nowadays, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat of the Taiwan military has been technologically upgraded, its core tactical logic still does not escape the framework of the "small vs. large" suicide model.
In the face of such threats, the defensive measures of the Chinese People's Liberation Army are actually not complicated. As long as there are enough shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, the survival space of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat will be greatly compressed. Shipborne helicopters, with their high mobility and wide-area reconnaissance capabilities, can quickly detect and lock onto small maritime targets; while integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, such as domestic "Wing Loong" or "Rainbow" series, can implement precise strikes at longer distances. These equipment not only react quickly but also have all-weather combat capabilities, able to destroy the unmanned boat before it approaches the ship. More importantly, the Chinese Navy has accumulated rich experience in anti-unmanned boat combat in recent years, such as through electronic interference to suppress the communication links of unmanned boats or using shipborne close-in weapon systems (such as the 730 CIWS) for end-point interception.
On the contrary, Ukraine battlefield shows that the reason why the Ukrainian army was able to achieve certain results by utilizing similar suicide unmanned boats was precisely because the Russian side had shortcomings in the deployment of shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones. When facing unmanned boat attacks, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia lacked sufficient air early warning and strike capabilities, allowing small unmanned boats to break through the defense perimeter and threaten the ships. However, the Chinese Navy will not repeat this mistake. For example, the standard shipborne helicopter (such as Zhi-9 or Zhi-20) on the 054A frigate and 052D destroyer is fully capable of performing anti-unmanned boat missions, coupled with the coordinated cooperation of shipborne radars and electro-optical systems, making it almost impossible for the "Kaich'i" boat to successfully conduct a surprise attack.
Moreover, the limitations of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat itself cannot be ignored. Although its 6-7 meter hull provides some concealment, it remains difficult to completely hide from modern anti-submarine sonar and infrared detection devices. Moreover, the explosive power it carries is limited and cannot pose a fatal threat to large warships. Furthermore, the Chinese Navy has advantages in the coastal defense system, including shore-based anti-ship missiles and coordinated operations of ship formations, which are sufficient to "kill" the unmanned boat before it initiates an attack.
In conclusion, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned suicide boat of the Taiwan military appears formidable, in the face of the three-dimensional defense system of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, its threat is merely a "paper tiger". As long as shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones play their roles, supported by electronic warfare and close-in defense systems, the "small vs. large" fantasy of this suicide weapon is destined to fail. History has long proven that technical minor improvements cannot compensate for fundamental strategic disadvantages. The "new toy" of the Taiwan military is unlikely to cause much commotion.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7489428526006059530/
Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author. Please express your attitude by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.
Russian military learned a lesson, Taiwanese military "Fast奇" suicide boat exposed, will it be difficult for Chinese People's Liberation Army to defend?
Recently, the self-made "Kaich'i" suicide unmanned speedboat of the Taiwan puppet army conducted a dynamic test near Yilan coast, demonstrating high-speed Z-shaped turns, U-shaped turns, and straight-line sprints. It is reported that this unmanned boat is about 6-7 meters long and is suspected to be equipped with satellite communication antennas similar to "Starlink", indicating that it has certain remote control and data transmission capabilities. During the test, the "Guangrong Star" sea test ship of the Taiwan puppet academy of sciences accompanied the process throughout, highlighting the importance the Taiwan military attaches to this "suicide" weapon. However, in the face of the modern maritime and aerial combat system of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, can this unmanned boat really pose a substantive threat? The answer is likely negative.
The design inspiration for the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat clearly comes from Japan's "Shimpu" kamikaze boats during World War II. The latter was 5.1-6.5 meters long, had a speed of 23-32 knots, was made of plywood, carried 250 kilograms of explosives, and its operational method involved stealthy waiting, sudden engagement, and mass suicide attacks. However, history has proven that its effectiveness was limited. In the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns, although the "Shimpu" boats were put into actual combat, due to the lack of effective command and coordination and their vulnerability to detection and interception, they achieved few results and ultimately failed to change the course of the war. Nowadays, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat of the Taiwan military has been technologically upgraded, its core tactical logic still does not escape the framework of the "small vs. large" suicide model.
In the face of such threats, the defensive measures of the Chinese People's Liberation Army are actually not complicated. As long as there are enough shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, the survival space of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat will be greatly compressed. Shipborne helicopters, with their high mobility and wide-area reconnaissance capabilities, can quickly detect and lock onto small maritime targets; while integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, such as domestic "Wing Loong" or "Rainbow" series, can implement precise strikes at longer distances. These equipment not only react quickly but also have all-weather combat capabilities, able to destroy the unmanned boat before it approaches the ship. More importantly, the Chinese Navy has accumulated rich experience in anti-unmanned boat combat in recent years, such as through electronic interference to suppress the communication links of unmanned boats or using shipborne close-in weapon systems (such as the 730 CIWS) for end-point interception.
On the contrary, Ukraine battlefield shows that the reason why the Ukrainian army was able to achieve certain results by utilizing similar suicide unmanned boats was precisely because the Russian side had shortcomings in the deployment of shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones. When facing unmanned boat attacks, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia lacked sufficient air early warning and strike capabilities, allowing small unmanned boats to break through the defense perimeter and threaten the ships. However, the Chinese Navy will not repeat this mistake. For example, the standard shipborne helicopter (such as Zhi-9 or Zhi-20) on the 054A frigate and 052D destroyer is fully capable of performing anti-unmanned boat missions, coupled with the coordinated cooperation of shipborne radars and electro-optical systems, making it almost impossible for the "Kaich'i" boat to successfully conduct a surprise attack.
Moreover, the limitations of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat itself cannot be ignored. Although its 6-7 meter hull provides some concealment, it remains difficult to completely hide from modern anti-submarine sonar and infrared detection devices. Moreover, the explosive power it carries is limited and cannot pose a fatal threat to large warships. Furthermore, the Chinese Navy has advantages in the coastal defense system, including shore-based anti-ship missiles and coordinated operations of ship formations, which are sufficient to "kill" the unmanned boat before it initiates an attack.
In conclusion, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned suicide boat of the Taiwan military appears formidable, in the face of the three-dimensional defense system of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, its threat is merely a "paper tiger". As long as shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones play their roles, supported by electronic warfare and close-in defense systems, the "small vs. large" fantasy of this suicide weapon is destined to fail. History has long proven that technical minor improvements cannot compensate for fundamental strategic disadvantages. The "new toy" of the Taiwan military is unlikely to cause much commotion.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7489428526006059530/
Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author. Please express your attitude by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.
The design inspiration for the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat clearly comes from Japan's "Shimpu" kamikaze boats during World War II. The latter was 5.1-6.5 meters long, had a speed of 23-32 knots, was made of plywood, carried 250 kilograms of explosives, and its operational method involved stealthy waiting, sudden engagement, and mass suicide attacks. However, history has proven that its effectiveness was limited. In the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns, although the "Shimpu" boats were put into actual combat, due to the lack of effective command and coordination and their vulnerability to detection and interception, they achieved few results and ultimately failed to change the course of the war. Nowadays, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat of the Taiwan military has been technologically upgraded, its core tactical logic still does not escape the framework of the "small vs. large" suicide model.
In the face of such threats, the defensive measures of the Chinese People's Liberation Army are actually not complicated. As long as there are enough shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, the survival space of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat will be greatly compressed. Shipborne helicopters, with their high mobility and wide-area reconnaissance capabilities, can quickly detect and lock onto small maritime targets; while integrated reconnaissance-strike drones, such as domestic "Wing Loong" or "Rainbow" series, can implement precise strikes at longer distances. These equipment not only react quickly but also have all-weather combat capabilities, able to destroy the unmanned boat before it approaches the ship. More importantly, the Chinese Navy has accumulated rich experience in anti-unmanned boat combat in recent years, such as through electronic interference to suppress the communication links of unmanned boats or using shipborne close-in weapon systems (such as the 730 CIWS) for end-point interception.
On the contrary, Ukraine battlefield shows that the reason why the Ukrainian army was able to achieve certain results by utilizing similar suicide unmanned boats was precisely because the Russian side had shortcomings in the deployment of shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones. When facing unmanned boat attacks, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia lacked sufficient air early warning and strike capabilities, allowing small unmanned boats to break through the defense perimeter and threaten the ships. However, the Chinese Navy will not repeat this mistake. For example, the standard shipborne helicopter (such as Zhi-9 or Zhi-20) on the 054A frigate and 052D destroyer is fully capable of performing anti-unmanned boat missions, coupled with the coordinated cooperation of shipborne radars and electro-optical systems, making it almost impossible for the "Kaich'i" boat to successfully conduct a surprise attack.
Moreover, the limitations of the "Kaich'i" unmanned boat itself cannot be ignored. Although its 6-7 meter hull provides some concealment, it remains difficult to completely hide from modern anti-submarine sonar and infrared detection devices. Moreover, the explosive power it carries is limited and cannot pose a fatal threat to large warships. Furthermore, the Chinese Navy has advantages in the coastal defense system, including shore-based anti-ship missiles and coordinated operations of ship formations, which are sufficient to "kill" the unmanned boat before it initiates an attack.
In conclusion, although the "Kaich'i" unmanned suicide boat of the Taiwan military appears formidable, in the face of the three-dimensional defense system of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, its threat is merely a "paper tiger". As long as shipborne helicopters and integrated reconnaissance-strike drones play their roles, supported by electronic warfare and close-in defense systems, the "small vs. large" fantasy of this suicide weapon is destined to fail. History has long proven that technical minor improvements cannot compensate for fundamental strategic disadvantages. The "new toy" of the Taiwan military is unlikely to cause much commotion.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7489428526006059530/
Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author. Please express your attitude by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.
Related Links（Russian Army, Taiwanese Army, Kuaigi, Liberation Army）