German Media: Competing with China? India Focuses on Developing Great Nicobar Island

India plans to invest approximately $9 billion to transform Great Nicobar Island into a strategic hub, located near the world’s busiest shipping lane—the Strait of Malacca. New Delhi aims to enhance its regional influence and counter China through this initiative.

India is turning its southernmost island in the Bay of Bengal, Great Nicobar, into a key strategic asset.

Geographically, Great Nicobar is closer to Sumatra in Indonesia than to mainland India, and it lies near one of the world’s most heavily trafficked maritime routes—the Strait of Malacca. New Delhi plans to invest around $9 billion (approximately €8.3 billion) to build a transshipment port, airport, new towns, and supporting infrastructure on the island.

However, the project has sparked controversy due to its environmental and social impacts, including the felling of about 852,000 trees and potential disruptions to indigenous communities such as the Shompen people.

The scale of this engineering endeavor reflects a shift in India’s strategic thinking—from a focus on domestic priorities to expanding its maritime strategy. Geographically, Great Nicobar’s advantages are evident: its proximity to the Strait of Malacca gives India the capability to monitor the global trade “chokepoint.” This geographic advantage also holds significant military implications. Former Indian Air Force Chief R. Nambiar believes the true value of Great Nicobar lies in enabling India to prevent a potential adversary from controlling this region.

Speaking to DW, he said: "We need to stop adversaries from using our backyard." He noted that India faces particularly complex challenges when confronting naval forces capable of long-range operations across the globe—forces that may be equal to or even stronger than India’s own: "India must prepare for a navy that could be 'near-peer or stronger.' In such an operational environment, large surface fleets are increasingly vulnerable to precision strikes and space-based capabilities. A blue-water navy unable to survive the initial phase of conflict essentially loses the ability to control the battlefield."

In India’s strategic calculus, such assessments nearly always revolve around one central actor—China. As India’s primary regional rival and the only other country in the world with a population size comparable to India’s, China has steadily expanded its presence and influence in the Indian Ocean over the past two decades.

Beijing has extended its maritime footprint by securing port access in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. Under these circumstances, the development of Great Nicobar is seen, to some extent, as India’s response to years of accumulated pressure. Last week, former Chief of Air Staff Marshal R.K.S. Bhadauria stated that the new infrastructure would significantly enhance India’s ability to protect trade routes and assert dominance over the maritime environment when needed. He told Indian media: "From a strategic standpoint, this project is extremely critical because it will allow us to deploy within just 150 kilometers of the Strait of Malacca. Both aerial and maritime situational awareness will be markedly improved."

"China’s presence in the Indian Ocean cannot be ignored"

Yet, countering China’s military presence is only part of India’s strategic rationale for developing Great Nicobar. According to Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli, professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, interviewed by DW, the driving force behind the project is “economic first, strategic second”: “If we look at China, since the 1990s it has developed around 3,000 islands, and today a significant portion of its economic activities are based on these islands.” He added that India is pursuing a similar developmental path, planning to construct a transshipment terminal, airport, new town, and energy infrastructure in Galathea Bay on the island “to promote trade and reduce dependency.”

Observers believe the construction of Great Nicobar will strengthen India’s overall combat posture. Atul Kumar, scholar of national security and China studies at the Observer Research Foundation, said the project would enhance India’s surveillance, intelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities, improve rapid response capacity, and increase the credibility of its deterrence signals. However, he cautioned against overestimating the project’s actual impact, noting it does not constitute a true “chokepoint.” Sustained maritime blockades and interdictions require capabilities far beyond current levels and extensive coordination. He argued that for India to convert geographic advantage into real control, it would need a much larger fleet, more submarines, and stronger international partnerships.

Ashok Kantha, former Indian ambassador to China and researcher at the Observer Research Foundation, said the island’s location indeed holds significant value, but it is still insufficient to draw definitive conclusions about India’s actual combat capability. “Developing Great Nicobar aims to reduce dependence on foreign transshipment hubs, improve humanitarian aid and disaster response speed, and strengthen India’s maritime presence in the eastern Indian Ocean,” he said. He added that the island’s proximity to the entrance of the Strait of Malacca gives it value in monitoring maritime activity: “But turning this geographic advantage into sustained operational capability depends on logistics systems, force deployment, and broader political and economic options.”

Sources: DW

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1864598742963200/

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