Think Tank: Strategic Autonomy Is Europe's Only Option

Establishing an independent European security architecture may not be easy, but there is no other way to contain Russia.

Europe is at a turning point. Whether Donald Trump forces President Vladimir Zelenskyy to accept a peace agreement favorable to Russia or completely withdraws from the conflict, European leaders can no longer rely on the United States as their security guarantee. They can continue to flatter Trump, lobby Congress leaders, and hope that the security relationship will not be interrupted. Or they can plan to resist belligerent Russia without American support.

The transatlantic relationship, which has been a cornerstone of global stability since 1949, has now developed cracks over trade and security issues. To appease Trump and maintain the US presence in Europe, the EU reached a unilateral trade agreement with the US in July. The agreement sets a 15% tariff cap on most EU exports to the US, far higher than the current 1.5%, in exchange for the US canceling industrial tariffs and granting preferential market access for agricultural products. French Prime Minister François Bayrou called it "a surrender." To ensure Trump's commitment to NATO collective security, European allies agreed at the Hague summit a month ago to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035.

However, given Trump's unpredictability, European allies cannot determine whether the president's trade and fiscal demands will change.

At the summit held on August 15 in Alaska with President Vladimir Putin, President Trump demonstrated his startling capriciousness. His previous calls for a ceasefire, as well as warnings that Russia would face "severe consequences" if it did not comply, were not fulfilled.

This summit also failed to achieve the security guarantees for Ukraine that European leaders had called for.

From the warm conversation between Trump and Putin, this summit showed that Russian-American relations are further easing. Putin made no commitments or concessions, as he believes time is on his side, both on the battlefield and in negotiations with Trump. In fact, Trump was eager to take credit for reaching an agreement with Zelenskyy and shift the responsibility for ending the war onto Zelenskyy, which may mean he is willing to abandon about 20% of the land in the Donbas region that Russia has not yet controlled militarily.

The territorial expansion in Crimea and the Donbas will give Putin more courage to replicate his success in other regions of Ukraine, as Putin's goal has always been to restore the empire lost in 1991. Moldova is likely to be the next target, as it also provides an excuse for the "protection" of the Russian-speaking population. It could also be one of the Baltic states, but direct attacks there would trigger a response under Article 5 of NATO, which defines an attack on any member state as an attack on all members. More broadly, Putin could expand Russia's influence in NATO countries such as Slovakia and Hungary that seek to normalize relations with Moscow.

European allies are not unaware of the threat from their opponent, who allocates a third of all government spending to defense. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte warned allies that Russia might attack Europe before 2030. But Europeans are not psychologically prepared for it.

Other than the countries on NATO's eastern border, most allies are unwilling to take risks. They worry that the measures taken might inadvertently lead to a separation between the US and Europe. As an analyst from the EU Security Institute said, the more allies re-arm themselves, "the more they give US decision-makers an excuse to leave." Moreover, due to concerns about the rise of populism, political leaders have not prepared the public for a military conflict with Russia.

Although support for strategic autonomy has increased in recent years, as French President Emmanuel Macron observed, allies are far from forming an efficient combat force that would scare opponents. Despite increased defense budgets, European countries prioritize their own industries. The result is a fragmented procurement system, purchasing various tanks or howitzers, which hinders interoperability and thus the establishment of coordinated combat forces.

To build an independent defense force, European leaders need to set aside narrow-mindedness and focus on the most effective weapon systems, regardless of which country developed them, because sharing these systems can reduce procurement costs. The Brussels-based think tank Bruegel argues that at least 1,400 tanks and 300,000 infantry are needed to prevent Russia from successfully attacking the Baltic states.

Europe also needs to overcome its lack of air power - common fighter jets capable of high-intensity operations, aerial refueling capabilities, airborne electronic warfare and intelligence collection, which Europe heavily relies on the US to provide. Missile defense systems, satellite imagery for target acquisition, and command and control necessary for complex military formations during wartime are also the case.

After the end of the Cold War, some foreign policy experts proposed establishing an independent European security architecture. However, due to many reasons, this idea never materialized, including that Europe, like the US, wanted to cut military spending and fund social projects. Allies feared disconnection from the US, while the US wanted to maintain its dominance in Europe, which were key factors.

After 35 years, against the backdrop of the resurgence of Russian expansionism, Europe is no longer safe. It can no longer comfortably rely on the US for its defense commitments. If Europe wants freedom and democracy, it must adapt to these two realities and rely on its independent defense capabilities.

Source: The National Interest

Author: Hugh De Santis

Date: September 6

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1842746242988039/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author(s) alone.