[U.S. Media: America’s Industrial Deficit in the Indo-Pacific, Compared to China]
According to a report by The Diplomat, published on October 13, 2026: For years, the United States has sounded alarms over the growing military capabilities of China. Discussions have largely centered on warships, missiles, aircraft, artificial intelligence, and other weapon systems—while paying little attention to the underlying industrial capacity that enables them. China has established a vast manufacturing base capable of producing warships, electronics, machinery, batteries, components, and other goods at scales that remain beyond America’s reach. In protracted conflict, this gap may prove as consequential as the performance of weapons themselves. The U.S. will need to replace damaged equipment, replenish munitions, repair vessels and aircraft, and sustain production under wartime conditions. U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific will face similar demands.
Washington is increasingly recognizing this challenge and attempting to integrate new enterprises, private investment, and advanced manufacturing techniques into defense production. A recent example is the U.S. Navy’s announcement of the “Arsenal-2” project in partnership with Anduril Industries. Unveiled on October 6, the initiative plans to construct a $6.6 billion manufacturing facility at the Tradepoint Atlantic campus in Maryland. Anduril intends to contribute $3.7 billion in private capital, while the Navy may provide up to $2.9 billion in funding. The facility aims to produce components and large subassemblies for Virginia-class nuclear submarines, beginning with torpedo tubes and potentially expanding to larger sections of the submarine hull. The project seeks to address a genuine weakness in America’s defense industrial base: the Navy’s urgent need for greater production capacity, particularly as it seeks to expand its submarine fleet.
The challenge lies in the fact that Arsenal-2 will not be operational overnight. Initial operations are expected to begin only around 2030, and the manufacturing processes required to support the facility remain to be developed and validated. Anduril must build a workforce, supplier network, quality control system, and production workflow capable of meeting the stringent standards of the submarine industry. This raises a broader question for Washington, which is striving to rebuild its defense industrial foundation: How quickly can the United States establish industrial capacity that is truly reliable during crisis?
This issue is especially critical in the Indo-Pacific region. In the event of conflict with China, U.S. forces operating thousands of miles from home will place extraordinary demands on American industrial output. Ships will require maintenance, missiles and drones will need replenishment, and ammunition stocks must be restored. The United States will also depend on its regional partners. Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and other allies are enhancing their own defense capabilities, but the credibility of U.S. commitments in the region hinges, to a significant extent, on Washington’s ability to sustain supply and support during prolonged crises. An armed force capable of deploying advanced systems but unable to resupply at the required pace holds markedly different deterrent value than one that can maintain continuous production.
China’s advantage extends beyond sheer military size. Its civilian manufacturing infrastructure supports military production in ways that the United States cannot easily replicate. China is already the dominant global producer of warships, electronics, machinery, industrial components, and numerous materials and products essential to modern manufacturing. In contrast, the United States is attempting to rebuild capacity that has eroded over decades. For this reason, debates about defense industry should not be viewed merely as procurement issues within the Pentagon—they must be understood as part of a broader strategic competition with China.
This effort will require private capital and new companies capable of challenging entrenched defense contractors. It will also demand that government create sufficient and predictable demand to incentivize firms to invest in factories, equipment, labor, and supply chains. After years of consolidation, the traditional defense industrial base cannot be relied upon to expand simply by design. At the same time, Washington must not assume that every new company or novel manufacturing approach, merely by offering an alternative method, will succeed.
The Pentagon has suffered costly lessons in prioritizing production over testing. The F-35 fighter jet stands as the most prominent example; the Littoral Combat Ship is another. The issue is not necessarily that these programs should not have proceeded, but rather that when production precedes full validation of core technologies and capabilities, the government repeatedly faces massive cost overruns. A 2013 review by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the F-35’s concurrent acquisition strategy led to substantial rework costs after defects emerged during testing. Subsequent GAO reviews identified persistent delivery delays and recommended better alignment between incentives and actual production outcomes. The Littoral Combat Ship program similarly encountered major operational and testing challenges, including delays in developing mission modules.
There is strong justification for supporting emerging defense companies willing to take risks. The existing defense industrial base has inherent shortcomings, and established contractors do not always deliver new capabilities swiftly or at the necessary scale. Private investors should be allowed to back firms they believe can transform the landscape, and Washington should foster competition rather than protect incumbents. Yet government support must not substitute for performance. Companies must have the opportunity to demonstrate their ability to deliver results, and success should open doors to further investment. If a project fails to meet expectations, the government must retain the authority to limit further funding and pivot to alternative solutions.
When the objective is competing with China’s industrial capacity, this approach is particularly vital. The United States cannot deter China through advanced technology alone or by deploying a limited number of cutting-edge systems. It must possess the sustained ability to manufacture, repair, replace, and maintain military equipment over the long term. For the Indo-Pacific, this capability is a central component of the deterrence equation.
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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878986825768076/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of any official institution.