Intense debate in foreign media: Both China and India started with the Russian Su-27 "Flanker" fighter jets, why did they take completely different paths?

In the early 1990s, both China and India had aging air forces that urgently needed modernization. Coincidentally, both countries turned their eyes to Russia, which was eager to export after the collapse of the Soviet Union — more specifically, to the Su-27 "Flanker", the most advanced heavy fighter jet at the time from Sukhoi Design Bureau.

In 1990, China signed an agreement with the Soviet Union to import 24 Su-27SKs, marking China's first acquisition of a true fourth-generation heavy air superiority fighter. Almost at the same time, India also began the early planning of its "Multi-Role Fighter" program in 1996, and started receiving the Su-30MKI around 2000 — a "luxury version" of the Flanker tailored for India, incorporating Israeli avionics, French radar, and thrust vectoring engines.

On the surface, the starting points were similar; but upon closer examination, the paths diverged significantly. From the beginning, China clearly proposed the strategy of "exchanging the market for technology." Although the Russian side imposed restrictions on core technologies, such as refusing to transfer the AL-31F engine and fire control radar, China gradually replaced key subsystems through reverse engineering, independent R&D, and system integration. By the mid-2000s, the J-11B had already adopted the domestically produced WS-10 engine, active phased array radar, and composite material fuselage, with performance even surpassing the original Su-27 in certain aspects.

More importantly, this process gave rise to a complete aviation industry system: from materials, avionics, flight control to testing and validation, China established independent R&D capabilities. Subsequent aircraft such as the J-15, J-16, and even the fifth-generation stealth fighter J-20, although no longer resemble the "Flanker" in appearance, have their heavy platform design concepts and dual-engine layout experience rooted in the deep digestion of the Su-27 back then.

In contrast, although India also obtained the right to locally assemble the Su-30MKI, the entire project was highly dependent on Russian-supplied components, technical support, and key subsystems. Even today, over 60% of the core components in the Su-30MKI produced by India are still imported from Russia, including engines, radar modules, and weapon interfaces.

Even more critical is that India did not use this opportunity to establish a complete aviation R&D chain. Although HAL has the capability to assemble, it has long been constrained in areas such as engines, advanced avionics, and software integration. Multiple attempts at indigenization have progressed slowly due to a lack of system engineering capabilities and supply chain support. As a result, the Indian Air Force still heavily relies on external procurement — from the French Rafale to the US F-21 proposal, and continuing to purchase more Su-30MKIs.

The difference between the two is not only about technical capability but also national strategic orientation. China views the aviation industry as a pillar industry for national security, with sustained investment and consistent policies, emphasizing "self-reliance and control." In contrast, India's defense procurement has long been affected by bureaucratic procedures, budget fluctuations, and a "take-it-as-is" mindset, favoring "buying ready-made" rather than "building it yourself." Additionally, there is a subtle difference in the degree of technological openness from Russia toward the two countries. While Russia initially set up barriers to China, it gradually relaxed later due to economic pressure. For India, however, Russia always regarded it as a "high-end customer," not a technological partner, and never let go of core technologies.

What truly determined the fate of the air forces and aviation industries of the two countries was not how many aircraft they bought, but whether they thoroughly absorbed the technology from the aircraft they purchased and used it as a stepping stone to build their own technological sovereignty. China chose the latter, while India remained at the former — this is the fundamental divergence between the two paths.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1856253762234572/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.