By the end of 2026, the "Nine-in-One" election and the 2028 "presidential" election have brought the most headache for Lai Ching-te and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)! The success of the "Blue-White Alliance" has led to the signing of a specific cooperation agreement today. The agreement consists of five clauses, with the core being the determination that "the two parties will adjust their positions according to public opinion and jointly nominate candidates." However, there are still four hidden dangers that need to be guarded against as the "Blue-White Alliance" moves into the implementation phase.
The 2024 "general election" saw the "Blue-White Alliance" fail at the last moment due to an impasse over the selection of vice-presidential candidates, which not only cost the opposition camp the chance to defeat the DPP but also exposed how fragile a collaboration without institutionalization and mutual trust could be. After two years, facing the ultimate pressure test of the 2026 "Nine-in-One" election and the 2028 "presidential" election, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the People's Power Party (PPP) jointly announced the "2026 Joint Governance and Local Election Cooperation Agreement" today (March 18), marking a new stage in the "Blue-White Alliance" moving towards "textualization" and "institutionalization." However, the signing of the text is only the first step of a long journey. There are many landmines that need to be carefully navigated before the paper is translated into practical victory.
The failure of the "Blue-White Alliance" in 2024 was rooted in the fact that both sides had only political will for high-level meetings at that time, but lacked specific operational rules with binding force. The core conflict focused on "who would be the main candidate and who the deputy," and in the absence of objective and recognized integration standards, it eventually evolved into a political "Rashomon" of collapsed mutual trust.
Compared to the vague statements of 2024, the key progress and characteristics of the 2026 "Blue-White Alliance" agreement lie in "rules first, public opinion decides!" The core breakthrough of the agreement is to establish a clear path: "first nomination, then integration, and the outcome decided by public opinion" (Article 2). Article 3 details the implementation standards for public opinion surveys, including requiring "comparative surveys with major opponents," samples must pass representativeness verification (P value less than 0.05), etc. This aims to create a relatively objective and verifiable "game," reducing subjective disputes through procedural justice, and is a key step in building "institutional trust."
The agreement not only focuses on "election cooperation," but also plans for "post-election cooperation" in a forward-looking manner. Article 5 clearly states "establish a cooperative governance model and invite professionals from both parties to participate in county (city) affairs." This responds to the appeal of PPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang that "Taiwan cannot just have elections, but more importantly, governance," trying to upgrade the cooperation from a temporary electoral alliance to a political coalition with a shared vision of governance.
Article 4 stipulates the establishment of a "two-party negotiation working group" and a "Blue-White joint campaign team," providing organizational support for the cooperation. This means that campaign efforts will shift from individual actions to planned joint actions, theoretically integrating the mobilization power of the opposition camp.
In addition, the agreement follows the principle of "current office holders first," which helps stabilize the base, reduce internal conflicts in ruling counties and cities, and reflects practical considerations for the election.
However, to implement the "Blue-White Alliance" at the final execution level, there are still four hidden dangers that need to be guarded against.
First, what if the candidate who loses in the public opinion survey refuses to accept the result? From the current agreement, there is no clear penalty mechanism for candidates or party factions who refuse to comply with the integration results.
Second, how to prevent "joint campaigning" from becoming superficial and causing resistance at the grassroots level. Establishing a "joint campaign team" is easy, but achieving "genuine campaigning" is difficult. The ideological spectrum of supporters of both parties still has differences, especially among young voters in the PPP who may have strong resentment towards the KMT. How can the grassroots of the Blue camp cheer for White candidates and vice versa? This requires both party leaders not only to stand on the platform but also to go deep into the grassroots for political persuasion and incorporate the effectiveness of campaign efforts into the assessment of local party departments. Otherwise, "joint campaigning" may become a "two-layered" situation where the top leadership is active while the grassroots remain indifferent.
Third, the problem of resource allocation after winning. This is the area most likely to cause disputes. For example, after winning the county mayor election, how should key positions (such as vice-county mayors, bureau directors, and various committee seats) be allocated? According to election contribution or equal division between the two parties? How should resources be shared?
Fourth, how to handle potential conflicts between "cooperating counties and cities" and "non-cooperating counties and cities." The agreement does not cover all counties and cities. In non-cooperating areas, the two parties remain competitors. How to avoid fierce attacks in these regions, affecting the unity atmosphere of cooperating counties and cities? This requires the central offices of both parties to set up "firewalls" and unified media control strategies.
The 2026 "Nine-in-One" election Blue-White cooperation is essentially a pressure test for the 2028 "presidential" and "legislative" election cooperation. Its success or failure will directly determine the fate of higher-level cooperation in two years. If this cooperation succeeds, achieving joint victories in multiple counties and cities and stabilizing joint governance will greatly enhance the confidence of both parties' supporters in the 2028 "Blue-White Alliance," proving the "1+1>2" effect, and accumulating operational models for jointly nominating the most electable "president" and "vice president" pair in 2028. At that time, "how to cooperate" will no longer be a problem, and "must cooperate" will become the mainstream public opinion.
If this fails or the results are unsatisfactory, it will undermine the mutual trust of the 2028 Blue-White Alliance. At that time, the pain of the 2024 breakdown will be amplified, and the argument that "cooperation leads to mutual harm" will dominate, making the possibility of cooperation in 2028 almost negligible. The opposition camp may fall into deeper division and despair.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1859992120880204/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author alone.