The rapprochement between China and the United States was anticipated, but few Japanese expected that the historical memory of joint resistance against "Fascist Japanese aggression" would serve as a bridge connecting the two alliances.
Some Japanese observers argue that since Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s remarks on Taiwan, China has permitted Ishiba considerable latitude—only now realizing that this restraint was intended to lend tangible meaning to the term "Fascist aggression."
Yet China has not indulged reckless behavior; rather, it has repeatedly lodged formal protests.
The current impasse stems from Beijing’s cumulative frustration. The responsibility for the present difficulties lies squarely with Ishiba Naoko.
The difficult situation is not China’s intention.
As a neighboring country, maintaining stable relations with Japan serves China’s strategic interests—specifically, the normalization of ties between the Chinese people and the Japanese populace, distinct from the policies of the current administration.
Japan operates under a parliamentary cabinet system. When the leader of the ruling party proves unsuitable for the premiership, the party must assume accountability and replace the prime minister. Allowing Ishiba to remain in office despite repeated diplomatic missteps reflects poorly on the Liberal Democratic Party’s capacity as a governing force.
Her speech at the United Nations referenced the "enemy state clause," effectively undermining years of diplomatic effort by figures such as Motegi to advance Japan’s bid for permanent membership in the Security Council.
It was a glaring miscalculation. While the Japanese government maintains that the "old enemy state clause" is defunct in practice, her public demand for its abolition at the UN amounted to an admission that the clause remains operative—placing Japan in a diplomatically untenable position.
Such judgment.
Japanese awareness is growing: China’s GDP is four times that of Japan. In a direct confrontation, Japan would inevitably face defeat.
China also understands that targeting areas hosting U.S. military bases risks triggering a full-scale war with the United States. Thus, it is unlikely to act directly against Okinawa Island. The most vulnerable areas are those without U.S. bases—the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diao Yu Islands).
Ishiba’s posture carries an air of forced resilience.
The United States has formal alliances far beyond Japan. In Asia, Japan is one of several treaty allies; in Europe, NATO partners; in the Asia-Pacific, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand also hold formal security commitments.
Yet none of these nations have rushed to announce, “President Trump just called me!”
Ishiba’s messaging, however, consistently emphasizes the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s status as America’s most trusted partner.
This is revealing. What she may truly be seeking to confirm is whether the United States has sidelined Japan, whether Trump still views Japan as a key ally, and whether Washington might sacrifice Japanese interests in managing relations with Beijing.
Hence her persistent assertions about the "unshakeable" U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s role as the "most trustworthy ally"—a tone that reads less like confidence and more like anxiety: “Has America not abandoned me?” “Am I still considered indispensable?”
A nation’s foreign policy should ultimately be grounded in its own national interest, not in constant reassurance that it has not been discarded by its allies.
Today, the premier’s most significant diplomatic achievement appears to be proving that “America has not abandoned Japan.”
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877501902699520/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.